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Employee performance can be negatively impacted due to the occurrence of unforeseen 
negative events. To filter out the influence of these negative exogenous shocks on employee 
compensation, management can commit ex-ante to consider performing ex-post adjustments to 
objectively determined compensation. However, due to compensation interdependence between 
subordinates common to these types of incentive schemes, management may be reluctant to 
perform such ex-post adjustments. Employees not receiving ex-post adjustments may feel unfairly 
treated, suggesting the need to examine how management’s selective exercise of ex-post 
adjustments impact employee fairness perceptions and subsequent performance. Employees’ 
reaction to management’s apparent non-helping behaviour may stem in part from a lack of 
sensitivity to the difficulty management faces in making such adjustments. I therefore examine 
two interventions, perspective taking and explanation, aimed at improving employee fairness 
perceptions and performance. To test my predictions, I conduct an experiment with undergraduate 
business student participants. I find that the announcement of an ex post adjustment policy does 
not significantly impact participant perceptions of fairness but significantly improves performance 
when they encounter their first negative shock. In addition, I find that although both explanation 
and perspective taking significantly improve perceptions of fairness, only perspective taking 
improves performance after not receiving an ex-post adjustment. The current study contributes to 
the growing management accounting literature examining how management subjectivity in 
compensation contracts influence subordinate performance. This study further contributes to 
organizational justice literature by examining the link between fairness perceptions and task 
performance. Finally, my results show that perspective taking can be an effective intervention to 
improve employee perceptions of fairness and performance in response to receiving unfavourable 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I examine how employees’ perceptions of fairness and performance change in response to 
management’s selective application of ex-post goal adjustments. Ex-post goal adjustments refer 
to subjective adjustments to employee goals made at the discretion of management, typically 
after performance for a contract period has already been realized (Bol 2008). One of the purposes 
of these adjustments are to neutralize the effects of negative uncontrollable events (e.g. natural 
disasters) on employees’ measured performance (Bol, 2008; Bol, Keune, Matsumura, and Shin, 
2010) out of concern for the controllability principle, which holds that individuals should only be 
evaluated based on elements of their performance that they can control (Vancil and Buddrus, 
1979; Giraud, Langevin, and Mendoza, 2008). In support of the application of the controllability 
principle, prior accounting research has shown that the neutralization of uncontrollable events 
through ex-post adjustments can have a positive effect on employee performance through 
improved perceptions of procedural justice (Kelly, Webb and Vance, 2015).     
There is experimental evidence suggesting that even when individuals in the role of 
managers are allowed discretion in allocating bonus pools (Bailey, Hecht, and Towry, 2011; 
Maas, van Rinsum, and Towry, 2012) or in performing ex-post bonus adjustments (Bol, Hecht, 
and Smith, 2015), discretion is not always exercised. Furthermore, Höppe and Moers (2011) find 
that of the firms who disclose the use of ex-post bonus adjustments in their SEC Proxy 
Statements, only about 24% actually exercise the option to do so. Bol et al. (2015) reason that 
when the likelihood of uncontrollable negative shocks to employee performance is high, 
managers may withhold making adjustments in order to encourage employees to adapt to these 
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negative shocks. Similarly, when there is a high degree of compensation interdependence 
between employees, managers may be reluctant to exercise discretion because helping one 
employee by allocating more rewards to them necessarily decreases the pool of rewards available 
to other employees (Bol et al. 2015). If management has discretion to neutralize the effects of 
negative uncontrollable events through ex-post goal adjustments but declines to do so for some 
employees, these employees may feel unfairly treated. It is important to understand how 
employees may react to this selective application of ex-post goal adjustments, as their reaction 
could attenuate any positives of implementing such a policy in the first place. 
 Organizational justice research shows that employees sometimes respond to unfair 
organizational outcomes and procedures by engaging in counterproductive work behaviours such 
as withholding effort. Conversely, employees respond to fair organizational outcomes and 
procedures by increasing effort and engaging in organizational citizenship behaviours (Colquitt 
et al., 2001; Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013). The accounting literature 
has also well documented the positive effects of justice perceptions on performance. For 
example, in a field study, Wentzel (2002) finds that participation in the budgeting process 
improves perceptions of fairness, leading to improved performance through increased goal 
commitment. Similarly, Lau and Moser (2008) find in a survey of managers that justice 
perceptions are positively associated with performance through organizational commitment. 
Thus, I first predict that in my setting, when management announces an ex-post goal adjustment 
policy, the mere announcement of the policy will result in improved perceptions of fairness and 
performance. However, if management selectively performs ex-post goal adjustments in 
response to negative uncontrollable events, those employees who do not receive an adjustment 
may perceive unfairness.  
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Even if management has legitimate reasons and fair intentions in not performing 
discretionary ex-post goal adjustments, employees may nevertheless feel unfairly treated due to 
egocentric bias (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 2006; Pronin, 
2008). Egocentric bias results from individuals’ propensity to disregard others’ thoughts and 
intentions when making judgments because these internal thoughts and intentions are not 
immediately available to the individual and thus effortful to infer (Pronin 2008). Instead, 
individuals have a tendency to over-rely on observable behaviour, which is relatively less 
effortful, resulting in egocentrically biased judgments. Several pervasive human tendencies have 
been attributed to egocentric bias, such as the actor-observer bias (Jones and Nisbett 1972) and 
the tendency for individuals to overestimate the degree to which others share their beliefs and 
preferences (Pronin 2008). In my setting, egocentric bias causes employees to underweight 
management’s legitimate reasons for not performing ex-post adjustments, and overweight 
management’s perceived non-helping behaviour in assessing the fairness of management’s 
actions. Therefore, I next predict that absent an intervention aimed at mitigating egocentric bias, 
in response to management’s non-helping behaviour, employees will continue to disregard 
management’s legitimate reasons for not performing ex-post adjustments in their fairness 
judgments, resulting in a deterioration of justice perceptions and performance. 
In an organizational context, explanations are causal accounts or justifications provided 
by management to employees for management decision making (Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). 
Research on explanations have shown that when employees receive unfavourable outcomes, such 
as having their input ignored, a sincere, logical, and thorough explanation from management for 
these unfavourable outcomes can improve employee perceptions of fairness and performance 
(Libby 1999, Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). Therefore, I predict that when management exhibits 
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non-helping behaviour by not performing ex-post goal adjustments, providing an explanation 
will improve employee justice perceptions and performance relative to employees that receive no 
intervention at all. 
Perspective taking refers to the process whereby an individual, referred to as the 
perspective taker, imagines or simulates the internal state (e.g. thoughts, feelings, and intentions) 
of another individual, referred to as the perspective taking target (Davis, Conklin, Smith, and 
Luce 1996). Research on perspective taking has shown that taking the perspective of others can 
mitigate the effect of egocentric bias in fairness judgments by increasing other regarding 
thoughts (Epley et al., 2006). If employees are asked to simulate management’s perspective with 
respect to the difficult decision of making ex-post adjustments, then management’s legitimate 
reasons for not performing ex-post adjustments may become more available to employees when 
making fairness judgements, reducing the impact of egocentric bias. Therefore, I predict that 
when management exhibits non-helping behaviour by not performing ex-post goal adjustments, 
if employees take part in a perspective taking training exercise, their organizational justice 
perceptions will improve, resulting in increased effort and performance relative to employees 
that receive no intervention.  
Since both explanation and perspective taking are predicted to improve employee 
performance through justice perceptions, it is unclear what the interactive effects will be if both 
interventions are administered to the same employee. For example, if management’s explanation 
completely attenuates the negative fairness effects of observed non-helping behaviour, then there 
may be little scope for perspective taking to further improve justice perceptions and 
performance. However, it is also possible that perspective taking, by combatting egocentric bias 
directly, improves employees’ receptiveness to management’s explanation, resulting in 
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explanation and perspective taking acting as complements. Therefore, in addition to the 
predictions described above, I pose a research question about the interactive effects of 
explanation and perspective taking on employee justice perceptions and performance.  
To test my predictions, I conduct a laboratory experiment using undergraduate students 
as participants. Participants work in a two-task setting over four four-minute production rounds, 
where both tasks are simple, effort-sensitive, computer-based tasks. The two tasks used are the 
number counting task based off Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011), and the letter 
decoding task based off Chow (1983). Further, one of the tasks is characterized as participants’ 
primary task (counting task), performance on which is incentivized through a bonus for goal 
attainment incentive scheme. Participants have an opportunity to earn a bonus in each production 
round for meeting an output goal on the counting task, where output goals are individualized and 
based off practice round performance, and earn a small wage based on time spent on the 
decoding task. Participants are responsible for allocating their time in each round between the 
two tasks and can switch between tasks at will. Participants face a volatile production 
environment on the counting task, such that their performance can be significantly impacted by 
negative exogenous shocks. Ex-ante, they are aware of the possibility of negative shocks to 
performance, but not the frequency or timing of these shocks.  
 I randomly assign participants to one of five experimental conditions in a 2x2 full 
factorial design with a control condition. I manipulate the presence or absence of two fairness 
interventions, explanation and perspective taking. Further, in the non-control conditions, 
participants learn of and are eligible for ex-post goal adjustments to compensate for the 
occurrence of negative shocks to performance on the counting task, whereas in the control 
condition, participants do not learn of and are not eligible for such adjustments. My primary 
6 
 
dependent variables are perceptions of overall justice and performance. Justice perceptions are 
measured using a self-reported survey measure adapted from Kelly et al. (2015), administered 
three times throughout the experiment: 1) after learning of the basic bonus for goal attainment 
incentive scheme, 2) just prior to the production rounds, and 3) immediately after the end of the 
production rounds. Performance is measured as the units of production completed on the 
counting task in each of the production rounds. 
In total, I recruit 169 undergraduate business students from two large Canadian 
universities to test my predictions. Contrary to expectations, I do not find support for my 
hypothesis that the announcement of an ex-post goal adjustment policy improves justice 
perceptions but do find some support for my prediction that it improves performance in the face 
of negative uncontrollable events. Furthermore, I find evidence that after not receiving a goal 
adjustment (non-helping behaviour), participant perceptions of overall justice and performance 
deteriorate, but that this effect is not contingent on the availability of ex-post adjustments. With 
respect to my justice interventions, I find that both providing an explanation and perspective 
taking training improve justice perceptions after observing non-helping behaviour, and that 
perspective taking training further improves performance, whereas explanation does not. With 
respect to my research question, I observe that explanation and perspective taking have a 
negative interactive effect on overall justice perceptions, but no such interactive effect on 
performance. Further, the nature of the negative interactive effect of explanation and perspective 
taking on justice perceptions is consistent with explanation and perspective taking acting as 
substitutes with respect to justice perceptions.  
In addition to my formal tests of hypotheses, I examine how the theoretical model used to 
derive my predictions fits my data and find superior fit using an alternative model where 
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expectancy of goal attainment, the perceived likelihood of achieving one’s goals, mediates the 
effect of justice perceptions on performance. I also perform supplemental analyses focused on 
effort duration, the amount of time directed towards the primary task, and effort intensity, the 
amount of attentional resources directed towards current performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002). I measure effort duration the amount of time spent by participants on the primary task 
each round, and measure effort intensity as performance scaled by effort duration. Analyses of 
duration and intensity further show that the performance effects observed in my formal tests of 
hypotheses are driven by changes in effort duration in difficult rounds, and effort intensity in 
normal rounds.  
I believe my study makes several important contributions to management accounting and 
psychology research. First, I contribute to a small but growing management accounting literature 
on how ex-post adjustments affect employee performance, building on work by Kelly et al. 
(2015), Arnold and Artz (2015), Burt, Libby, and Presslee (2019), and Cai, Gallani, and Shin 
(2019). Importantly, while each of the above studies examine the consequences of performing 
ex-post adjustments, none examine specifically the effect of the announcement of ex-post 
adjustments prior to management’s first opportunity to exercise the policy. This setting is 
important to study because in practice, if targets are set on an annual basis, there may be 
considerable time between the announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy and its first 
application. My finding of a positive announcement effect on employee performance in difficult 
rounds suggests that employees change their effort choices in response to the content of 
management announcements.  
Further, none of the above studies on ex-post adjustments examine the consequences of 
selectively exercising the policy. This is important to study because as described above, the 
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selective exercise of a helpful policy can potentially undermine the positives of announcing the 
policy in the first place. Further, this setting has ecological validity, since prior studies (e.g. 
Höppe and Moers 2011; Bol et al. 2015) show that in practice, such policies are exercised 
selectively. I find that observed non-helping behaviour does not significantly impact justice 
perceptions, and only has a directionally negative impact on performance, suggesting that 
existing management practice of selectively exercising ex-post adjustments may not be 
detrimental to employee justice perceptions and performance. 
My study also contributes to a large body of organizational justice research examining 
the organizational consequences of justice perceptions (see Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001, 
Colquitt et al. 2001, or Colquitt et al. 2013 for reviews). First, building on Libby (1999) and 
Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), I examine the effectiveness of explanation at improving justice 
perceptions and performance, finding explanation to be an effective fairness intervention, but 
unsuccessful at improving performance. This finding highlights the equivocal nature of the 
justice perception to performance relationship described by Colquitt et al. (2001). Second, to the 
best of my knowledge, I am one of the few studies examining the use of perspective taking as a 
fairness intervention in an organizational setting, building on work by Epley et al. (2006). My 
findings suggest that perspective taking can be an effective fairness intervention that also 
improves task performance. Further, results of my mediation analyses show that the justice 
perception to performance relationship is mediated by expectancies, furthering our understanding 
of the justice perception to performance relationship.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on subjectivity in compensation contracting, organizational justice, explanations, and 
perspective taking, which are relevant to the current investigation. Chapter 3 develops my four 
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sets of formal hypotheses and my set of research questions. Chapter 4 describes the experimental 
method through which I test my hypotheses and research question, and Chapter 5 summarizes 
the results of my experiment. Finally, I discuss my results, including limitations and implications 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I review accounting and psychology literature to describe the ex-post 
adjustment setting and examine how organizational justice and egocentric bias shape how 
employees react to this setting. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 
2.2, I review the literature examining subjectivity in compensation contracting. In section 2.3 I 
provide an overview of the organizational justice literature, particularly how it relates to my 
economic setting, and to organizational outcomes such as performance. In section 2.4 I describe 
egocentric bias, how it affects management control system design, and how it can be overcome 
through perspective taking. In section 2.5 I provide some concluding remarks. 
2.2 Subjectivity in Compensation Contracting 
 In this section, I describe my economic setting. From an efficient contracting perspective, 
I explain the need for subjectivity in compensation contracts, and I provide a broad overview of 
the various forms that subjectivity can take in compensation contracts. I also review existing 
literature relating to ex-post adjustments, which is the particular form of subjectivity under 
investigation in my research. 
2.2.1 An Overview of Subjectivity in Compensation Contracting 
 Employees perform a variety of tasks within organizations. The performance outcomes of 
some tasks can be easy to objectively measure and verify. For example, for sales staff whose 
main role is to secure sales, total dollar sales in a given period is a performance outcome that is 
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both measurable and verifiable by a third party. However, to the extent that the performance 
outcomes for some tasks are difficult to measure and or verify, management must use some form 
of subjectivity in evaluating performance outcomes for employees. Consistent with this 
reasoning, the management and accounting literatures have well documented the importance and 
ubiquity of subjectivity in compensation contracting in practice (e.g. Prendergast 1999; Ittner, 
Larcker, and Meyer 2003; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 2004; Höppe and Moers 
2011). 
Bol (2008, p. 2) defines subjectivity from a compensation contracting perspective in the 
following way:  
“subjectivity entails judgment based on personal impressions, feelings, and 
opinions, rather than on external facts. The correctness of a subjective 
assessment cannot be determined by a third party. This means that, by its very 
nature, a subjective assessment is unverifiable for contracting purposes.” 
There are several ways in which management can introduce subjectivity into compensation 
contracts, such as in the choice of contract to offer employees (Kuang and Moser 2009), choice 
of performance measures and their relative weights to be used in evaluations (Ittner et al. 2003), 
or in the setting of and design of goals (Webb 2004; Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole 2010).  
In addition to these, Bol (2008) asserts that one of the most important ways in which 
subjectivity plays a role in compensation contracting is in evaluating employee performance after 
performance has occurred (i.e., ex-post). Bol (2008) further provides a useful typology for 
describing subjectivity in ex-post performance evaluations as relating to one of three categories: 
1) subjective performance measures, 2) subjective weighting of performance measures, or 3) 
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subjective ex-post adjustments to measured performance.1 The third category is the specific form 
of ex-post performance evaluations under investigation in my research, and will be examined 
more thoroughly in subsection 2.2.3. 
 There are many benefits to including subjectivity in compensation contracts. As 
described by Holstrom and Milgrom (1991), some aspects of employee performance, such as 
physical outputs, are easy to objectively measure and contract on. However, employee activities 
that affect asset prices (e.g. asset maintenance, generating goodwill), are often prohibitively 
costly to measure and contract on. Further, to the extent that management relies solely on 
objective performance measures to evaluate employees, employees may excessively focus on the 
objective measure to the detriment of overall firm value (Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Choi, 
Hecht, and Tayler 2012). For example, employment agencies who set client placement rate goals 
for employees may find that their employees excessively focus on ‘easy to place’ employees to 
the detriment of needier clients (Grizzle 2002).  
Further, contracting on specific objective performance measures prior to the 
measurement period (i.e., ex-ante) allows employees some opportunity to manipulate their 
measured performance to maximize their compensation per their contract. For example, for many 
firms, accounting income is an important performance metric for executive employees (Xu, 
Taylor, and Dugan 2007). There is a vast accounting literature (see for example Healy and 
Wahlen 1999, or Xu et al. 2007) documenting the actions that executive employees acting as 
agents for the firm perform to manipulate accounting income in part to maximize their 
                                                          
1 Subjective measures used to evaluate employee performance could include a superior’s rating of the employee’s 
perceived attitude or helpfulness, which cannot be verified. Ex-post subjective weighting involves explicitly 
specifying performance measures in a contract, but allow the weighting of measures in compensation decisions to be 
subjective (Höppe and Moers 2011). Ex-post adjustments allow for managers to consider information other than that 
explicitly contracted on to make adjustments to employee compensation.  
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incentives, such as changing the level of discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006) or reducing discretionary spending such as on research and development (Roychowdhury 
2006; Zang 2012). Introducing ex post subjectivity into such compensation contracts is 
beneficial because it allows management to adjust compensation based on suspected 
manipulation, both directly mitigating the impact of performance measure manipulation, and 
indirectly discouraging it through management’s ability to make such adjustments (Bol 2008).2 
 Another benefit that accrues from introducing subjectivity into compensation contracting 
relates to the flexibility that it provides management to adjust compensation for information 
unavailable ex-ante. In efficient contracting, management offers an employment contract to 
employees based on the information available ex-ante (Baiman and Rajan 1995). However, 
events outside an employee’s control can alter their measured performance, introducing volatility 
to their compensation, for which a risk premium must be paid (Holmström 1979). Management 
can reduce this risk for employees, and the related compensation premium, by committing ex-
ante to subjectively consider additional factors influencing employee performance ex-post 
(Gibbs et al. 2004; Höppe and Moers 2011). Another benefit of this flexibility is the ability for 
management to adapt their compensation contracts to match changes in their business 
environment (Bol 2008). For example, in response to critical online reviews of the sales 
experience, management may believe that customer satisfaction is now more important than 
before. Incorporating subjective weighting of performance measures in the compensation 
contract ex-ante allows management to increase the weight on customer satisfaction after the end 
                                                          
2 After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, many firms adopted ‘clawback’ provisions to executive compensation 
contracts, allowing firms to recoup compensation paid to executives if financial misreporting came to light (Dehaan, 
Hodge, and Shevlin 2013; Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu 2014).  
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of contract period, allowing for re-alignment of compensation contract to firm strategy without 
the need to renegotiate the contract (Bol 2008). 
 However, the introduction of subjectivity to compensation contracts is not without cost. 
Just as subjectivity can be introduced to correct distortions to compensation contracts it can 
introduce its own distortions to compensation contracts through biased performance evaluations 
on the part of managers, and through encouraging rent-seeking behaviour on the part of 
employees (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Prendergast and Topel (1993) emphasize that in most 
organizations, management decision making is undertaken by employees, who to some degree, 
make decisions affecting compensation contracts subject to their own preferences, beliefs, and 
biases.  
The accounting literature has examined a variety of decision-making biases exhibited 
when subjectivity is introduced in compensation contracts. For example, the common measures 
bias describes the tendency for managers to over-weight performance measures common to 
business units over measures that are unique to the business units (Lipe and Salterio 2000; Libby, 
Salterio, and Webb 2004). Similarly, Ittner et al. (2003) find that managers have a tendency to 
overweight financial versus non-financial performance measures. Bol (2011) finds that 
managers’ subjective performance evaluations of employees exhibited leniency bias (upwards 
bias) and centrality bias (ratings compression), in part to avoid costly confrontation and 
information gathering costs. Ding and Beaulieu (2011) find that even the mood of the evaluator 
can significantly influence subjective performance evaluations. These managerial decision-
making biases create distortions to compensation contracts as they introduce measurement error 
to performance evaluations, weakening the incentives provided by the compensation contract 
(Bol 2008). Further, because managerial decision making is subject to the personal preferences 
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and beliefs of the manager, opportunistic employees may shift their efforts away from productive 
tasks and towards rent-seeking behaviour meant to improve their subjective performance 
evaluations (and thus compensation) through image management (Milgrom 1988; Prendergast 
and Topel 1993).   
Another class of costs associated with subjectivity in compensation contracting relates to 
the uncertainty it imposes on employees (Bol 2008). Because subjective evaluations are 
unverifiable, employees must make assumptions about the managers’ beliefs and intentions who 
are making such evaluations. In the case of subjective adjustments (e.g., ex-post adjustments), 
employees must trust that managers will exercise their discretion fairly to reduce distortions to 
payoffs from the compensation contract (Baiman and Rajan 1995). Uncertainty over how 
managers will exercise the discretion bestowed upon them weakens the incentives provided by 
the contract (Holmström 1979). In particular, employees’ perceptions of fairness relating to the 
use of management discretion could potentially have important consequences for employee 
motivation and productivity. This idea is central to my research and will be examined further in 
section 2.3. 
 In summary, the need for subjectivity in compensation contracting arises due to the 
imperfect nature of objective performance measures in capturing all aspects of employee 
performance pertinent to firm value. The incorporation of subjectivity in compensation contracts 
can reduce distortions caused by uncontrollable factors, but can also introduce its own distortions 
in the form of biased managerial decision making and employee uncertainty over how their 




2.2.3 Ex-post Adjustments 
 As described in the preceding section, management establishes compensation contracts 
with the information available ex-ante. However, unforeseen events outside of the control of 
employees may occur during the contract period that are pertinent to evaluating employee 
performance. In order to control for the impact of uncontrollable events on employee 
performance and compensation, management may commit ex-ante to consider performing ex-
post adjustments to performance measures to neutralize the impact of uncontrollable events.  
Much of the management and accounting literature on ex-post adjustments has focused 
on how and when managers choose to use their discretion to perform them. In a survey of profit 
centre managers, Merchant (1989) provides some evidence that organizations make ex-post 
adjustments to control for the effect of uncontrollable events. Merchant (1989) finds that 
organizations differ greatly in the extent to which they adopt ex-post adjustments, with some 
firms making adjustments to completely neutralize the effect of uncontrollable events, and others 
not performing any ex-post adjustments. Similarly, in a survey of German firms, Arnold and 
Artz (2015) find that organizations vary in their degree of target flexibility, i.e., their willingness 
to perform intra-period adjustments to performance targets.3 Consistent with these findings, 
Höppe and Moers (2011) find that 24.3 percent of firms who disclose the use of ex-post bonus 
adjustments in their SEC Proxy Statements actually exercise the option to do so. Clearly, there is 
considerable variation in how firms choose to operationalize ex-post adjustments.  
                                                          
3 Arnold and Artz (2015) study intra-period adjustments, which occur during the contracting period, as opposed to 
after the end of the contracting period, as described in other studies examining ex-post adjustments (e.g. Bol et al. 
2015; Kelly et al. 2015). 
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Merchant (1989) reasons that for some organizations, particularly ones that have a more 
decentralized structure, employees (in this case profit centre managers) are expected to react and 
adapt to uncontrollable events to mitigate their effects on the organization. In line with this 
reasoning, Bol et al. (2015) find in an experiment that managers are less likely to exercise 
discretion to make ex-post adjustments to offset the negative impact of uncontrollable events 
when the likelihood of future uncontrollable events is high compared to when the future 
likelihood is low. Interestingly, Höppe and Moers (2011) find that the use of ex-post adjustments 
as a contracting feature is positively associated with the noisiness of objective performance 
measures, as it would be when the likelihood of future uncontrollable events is high.4 This means 
that although ex-post adjustments are most likely to appear in contracts when the likelihood of 
uncontrollable events is high, managers in these situations are not always willing to exercise 
their discretion in order to try and induce adaptive behavior in their subordinates.  
Bol et al. (2015) also find in an experiment that where employee compensation is highly 
interdependent, in this case a fixed bonus pool setting, managers choose to make fewer ex-post 
adjustments in order to avoid a negative reaction from employees unaffected by the negative 
event.5 This is because in a fixed bonus pool setting, any adjustments to employee compensation 
are a zero-sum game, and so any positive adjustments to employees affected by negative events 
necessarily involves a reciprocal negative adjustment to other employees. Interestingly, Woods 
(2012) finds in a field study that the majority of ex-post adjustments performed are positive.6 
                                                          
4 Höppe and Moers (2011) describe noise as any information that becomes available ex-post that is decision 
irrelevant (i.e., does not change optimal course of action), such as uncontrollable events.   
5 Bol et al. (2015) explain that due to the scarcity of resources within firms, and the importance of performance 
evaluations to promotion and other reward allocation decisions, employees’ compensation are interdependent to 
some degree in most firms. 
6 Woods (2012) examines ex-post adjustments more broadly, not exclusively fixed bonus pool settings as examined 
in Bol et al. (2015).  
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When taken together, these findings suggest that in practice, managers may exhibit leniency bias 
in ex-post adjustment decisions in order to avoid confrontation and information gathering costs.7  
There is also a small but growing accounting literature examining the implications of ex-
post adjustments on employee motivation and performance. Kelly et al. (2015) find in an 
experiment that exercising ex-post adjustments to employee goals in response to uncontrollable 
events had a positive impact on employee perceptions of fairness and performance when initial 
goals were moderately difficult, but not when initial goals were highly difficult.8 Similarly, in a 
field study, Cai et al. (2019) find that employees directly benefiting (losing) from management 
exercise of ex-post adjustment exhibited higher (lower) performance in subsequent periods. They 
find evidence for these effects operating under two different channels: 1) an informativeness 
channel, and 2) a motivational channel. The informativeness channel describes an effect whereby 
management exercises discretion to correct for the impact of negative uncontrollable events on 
employee performance that distort outcomes on objective measures of performance. Assuming 
no negative event occurs for this employee in the subsequent period, objectively measured 
performance should revert to ‘normal’ levels. Consistent with Kelly et al. (2015), the motivation 
channel described by Cai et al. (2019) refers to employees responding reciprocally to 
management’s actions benefitting or hurting them with increased or decreased effort 
respectively. 
In contrast to the above two studies, based on survey results, Arnold and Artz (2015) find 
a negative association between target flexibility, the likelihood of intra-period adjustments, and 
                                                          
7 This is also consistent with Bol (2011), who finds in a field study that subjective performance evaluations exhibit 
centrality and leniency bias due to managers trying to avoid information gathering and confrontation costs.  
8 Kelly et al. (2015) explain that when initial goals are difficult, ex-post adjustments may not always help employees 




firm performance. They reason that opportunistic employees withhold costly effort in 
anticipation of a target adjustment from managers. In an experiment, Burt et al. (2019) similarly 
find that the availability of ex-post adjustments has a negative impact on employee performance 
when the degree of identity (feelings of connectedness, similarity) between managers and 
subordinates is low. However, Burt et al. (2019) attribute their findings to decreased expectancy 
of goal attainment when manager-subordinate identity is low due to lack of trust over 
management’s use of discretionary ex-post adjustments to help them attain their goals.   
Thus, existing literature is equivocal on whether ex-post adjustments have a positive or 
negative impact on employee performance. Further, none of the four above studies distinguish 
between the availability of and exercise of ex-post adjustments.9 This distinction is important 
because as described above, there are a variety of factors that reduce the likelihood of managers 
actually exercising discretion to perform ex-post adjustments. This suggests a need for further 
research examining the consequences of managers exercising discretion selectively on employee 
performance, which is the focus of the current investigation.10 
To summarize, there is considerable variation in the extent to which firms allow for ex-
post adjustments and how managers choose to exercise discretion to perform these adjustments. 
In addition to the efficient contracting reasons to reduce distortions in compensation contracting, 
managers’ decision of whether or not to exercise ex-post adjustments can be motivated by 
                                                          
9 Both Merchant (1989) and Arnold and Artz (2015) examine firms that differ in their attitudes and practices with 
respect to ex-post adjustments, and Arnold and Artz (2015) additionally examine how attitudes towards target 
adjustments (target flexibility) impact performance. The current investigation differs from these two studies in that I 
focus on employees as the unit of observation, whereas the other two studies focus on firms.  
10 Based on the above discussion, another fruitful avenue for research might be to examine factors influencing 
managers’ decision to exercise discretion to perform ex-post adjustments. However, there is already a considerable 
literature examining this or similar topics (e.g. Bailey et al. 2011; Bol 2011; Maas et al. 2012; Bol et al. 2015), and 
so I instead focus on the implications of managerial discretion on employee performance.  
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desires to induce adaptive behaviour or to reduce personal information gathering and 
confrontation costs. There is also mixed evidence on the consequences of ex-post adjustments for 
employee motivation and performance. In the next section, I examine the motivational 
consequences of ex-post adjustments through the lens of organizational justice.     
2.3 Organizational Justice 
 In this section, I provide an overview of the organizational justice literature and explore 
the relationship between justice and organizational outcomes.11 
2.3.1 An Overview of Organizational Justice 
Organizational justice as a field of study is concerned with how outcomes, procedures, 
and interactions between employees, managers, and their organizations affect perceptions of 
fairness in the workplace (Colquitt et al. 2001). Fairness is a multi-dimensional construct that is 
made up of four dimensions: distributive justice, procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and 
informational justice; the latter two sometimes combined as a single dimension, interactional 
justice (Colquitt et al. 2001). Perceptions of distributive justice are based on employee 
perceptions of outcome fairness, which are arrived at by comparing outputs (incentives, rewards) 
to inputs (effort) (Adams 1965). An output to input ratio that is significantly smaller than a 
referent other’s is judged to be unfair (Adams 1965). Perceptions of procedural justice are 
affected by the process by which organizational decisions are made. Procedures are judged as 
fair if they follow six ‘Leventhal criteria’, that is, if they are: applied consistently, based on 
                                                          
11 Goldman and Cropanzano (2015) argue that justice and fairness are separate constructs, with justice describing the 
adherence of actions to norms and values, and fairness describing individuals’ reaction to justice. However, 
following Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) and Colquitt et al. (2001), I use these terms interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation.  
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accurate information, free from decision maker bias, appealable (process in place for employees 
to appeal unfair outcomes or procedures), ethical, and representative of all parties affected by the 
decision (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Leventhal 1980). Interpersonal justice and informational 
justice are both concerned with the operationalization of organizational rules and procedures 
(Bies and Moag 1986). Interpersonal justice relates to the manner (e.g. courteousness, sincerity) 
in which procedures and outcomes are communicated to employees, whereas informational 
justice relates to the content (e.g. validity, adequacy) of these communications (Colquitt et al. 
2001). 
2.3.2 Justice and Organizational Outcomes 
Accounting and psychology academics have long been concerned with the impact of 
organizational justice perceptions on important organizational outcomes. Cohen-Charash and 
Spector (2001) group organizational outcomes examined in the literature into four broad 
categories: 1) individual performance, 2) organizational citizenship behaviours, 3) counter-
productive work behaviours, and 4) emotional or attitudinal reactions. Since my dissertation is 
primarily concerned with individual performance as an organizational outcome, the focus of this 
subsection is on the relationship between organizational justice and performance.  
According to equity theory (Adams 1963; 1965), employees strive for distributive justice 
in the ratio of their inputs to the organization (e.g. task effort) and the outputs received (e.g. 
compensation). If an employee perceives an output to input ratio that is unfair, they can adjust 
their inputs up or down respectively to restore their sense of distributive justice (Adams 1963; 
Griffeth, Vecchio, and Logan 1989). For example, if an employee believes that they are being 
underpaid for their efforts, they can respond by withholding effort in the future, leading to 
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reductions in performance. Conversely, if an employee believes that they are being overpaid for 
their efforts, they may decide to exert even more effort in the future to return the perceived input 
to output ratio to a fair level.12 Based on this reasoning, equity theory predicts a positive 
relationship between perceptions of distributive justice and future performance. 
Employing a different perspective, social exchange theory considers organizations 
“arenas for long-term mutual social transactions between the employees and the organization” 
(Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001, p 285). This stands in contrast to the more economic and 
concrete nature of the resource exchange described by equity theory (Adams 1963). Using social 
exchange theory as a lens, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice are desired 
outcomes for employees in their interactions with managers (Colquitt et al. 2001). In exchange 
for fair procedures and interactions, employees reciprocate with high task performance (Wayne, 
Shore, Bommer, and Tetrick 2002). Based on this perspective, social exchange theory predicts a 
positive relationship between perceptions of procedural, interactional, and informational justice 
and performance. 
Based on the above theoretical discussion, it seems plausible to expect the psychology 
literature to support a strong positive relationship between each of the four justice dimensions 
and performance. However, when considering the literature as a whole, the evidence is equivocal 
on the direction and significance of the relationship between the four justice dimensions and 
performance (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001). In fact, Colquitt et al. 
(2001, p 430) describes the relationship between justice perceptions and performance as 
“perhaps the most unclear of all relationships in the justice literature”. For example, in a 
                                                          
12 Adams (1963) explains that in assessing the fairness of input to output ratios, employees compare their ratio to a 
reference point, which could include a co-worker’s ratio if known or industry benchmarks. 
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laboratory experiment, Griffeth et al. (1989) find that participants who were underpaid relative to 
other participants subsequently performed worse on a proof-reading task, supporting a positive 
relationship between distributive justice and performance. Similarly, in a survey-based field 
study, Wayne et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between employees’ ratings of distributive 
and procedural justice and their performance ratings from a supervisor.13 In contrast, in a field 
study, Aryee, Budhwar, and Chen (2002) find no correlation between distributive justice and task 
performance, but find a positive and significant correlation between procedural and interactional 
justice and task performance. To further complicate matters, in a survey-based study on 
employee reactions to punishments, Ball, Trevino, and Sims (1994) find that distributive justice 
positively impacted subsequent performance, but that procedural justice did not.14 
To help shed light on the equivocal nature of the findings with respect to justice 
perceptions and organizational outcomes, meta-analyses of psychology research in this area have 
been conducted (e.g. Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001). Colquitt et al. 
(2001) find that perceptions of procedural justice are moderately positively correlated with task 
performance (r = 0.30, p < 0.01, two-tailed), but that distributive justice perceptions are only 
weakly correlated with task performance (r = 0.13, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Similarly, Cohen-
Charash and Spector (2001) find that in their sample of field studies, procedural justice (r = 0.47, 
p < 0.01, two-tailed) is the strongest correlate of future performance, with distributive justice 
perceptions weakly correlated to future performance (r = 0.15, p < 0.01, two-tailed). However, in 
                                                          
13 Wayne et al. (2002) find that the positive effect of justice perceptions on performance ratings is mediated by 
perceived organizational support (quality of employee-organization relationship) and organizational citizenship 
behaviours.  
14 Ball et al. (1994) measure distributive justice as employees’ subjective assessment of the ‘harshness’ of 
punishments, ranging from reprimands to lay-offs, received by them relative to other employees who have 
performed similarly. Ball et al. (1994) argue that this represents a distributive justice concern and not an 
interactional justice concern as it asks the employee to compare the severity of their punishment (a quality of the 
outcome) to other employees in similar situations creating a reference point.  
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their sample of laboratory studies, they find that distributive and procedural justice are only 
weakly correlated to future work performance (r = 0.06 and 0.13, p = 0.11 and p < 0.01, two-
tailed, respectively). Taken together, the results of these meta-analyses supports a positive 
relationship between justice perceptions and performance, particularly the relationship between 
procedural justice and performance.  
In contrast to psychology research, accounting research generally finds a positive and 
significant relationship between procedural and distributive justice perceptions and performance. 
In a laboratory experiment, Libby (1999) finds that pseudo-participation, where employee input 
to a budgeting process was obtained but ignored, leads to negative impacts on performance 
through procedural justice, but that fairness is restored and performance enhanced through an 
explanation. In another laboratory experiment, Libby (2001) finds that unfair procedures (in 
budget setting) leads to poor performance, but only when the outcome of the procedures 
(assigned budget) is perceived to be unfair as well. In a field study, Wentzel (2002) finds that 
voice, operationalized as participation in a budgeting process, positively affects perceptions of 
procedural justice, and that this positively impacts performance through goal commitment. In a 
survey of managers, Lau and Moser (2008) find that their sample of managers typically find the 
use of non-financial measures in performance evaluations to be procedurally fair, and that 
perceptions of procedural justice are positively associated with performance through 
organizational commitment. In a field study, Burney, Henle, and Widener (2009) investigate a 
complex model of justice and performance. They find that perceptions of distributive justice are 
positively associated with perceptions of procedural justice, and that procedural justice 
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perceptions positively impact performance ratings.15 Finally, Kelly et al. (2015) find in a 
laboratory experiment that the exercise of ex-post adjustments to predetermined performance 
goals led to improved perceptions of procedural justice and performance, but only when the 
original goals are moderately difficult. 
 In summary, psychology and accounting literatures have long been concerned with the 
impact of justice perceptions on organizational outcomes, such as performance. Psychology 
research provides mixed evidence on the impact of justice perceptions on performance. 
However, meta-analyses of psychology literature, as well as the accounting literature support a 
positive relationship between justice perceptions and performance. 
2.4 Egocentric Bias 
 In this section, I examine egocentric bias, a decision-making heuristic. This discussion is 
relevant to the current investigation because egocentric bias can potentially impact employee 
reactions to the selective exercise of ex-post adjustments, and may potentially impact the 
effectiveness of fairness interventions. I first discuss the source of egocentric bias before moving 
on to discuss two interventions that have potential to combat egocentric bias: providing an 
explanation, and perspective taking. 
2.4.1 Source of Egocentric Bias 
 Egocentric bias is a form of the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) 
whereby individual judgments of self and others are biased by the lack of availability of 
                                                          
15 The effect of procedural justice perceptions on performance ratings are mediated through observed organizational 
citizenship behaviours, i.e., employees who observe fair procedures reciprocate through beneficial extra-role 
behaviours, which in turn positively influence management ratings of performance. 
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information relating to others’ internal states, beliefs, and intentions (Jones and Nisbett 1972; 
Pronin 2008). When individuals make judgments about others, the thoughts and intentions of the 
others are not immediately available to them and thus are effortful to infer and incorporate into 
judgments. Instead, individuals opt to incorporate more readily available information into their 
judgments, such as the observed behaviour of others (Pronin 2008). Egocentric bias in 
evaluations of the self and other is responsible for a variety of pervasive human behaviours 
(Pronin 2008).  
For example, the actor-observer bias describes the tendency for individuals to consider 
contextual factors when judging their own actions, but not the actions of others (Jones and 
Nisbett 1972). This occurs because the contextual factors affecting one’s own behaviour are 
readily available to incorporate into judgments, whereas the factors affecting others’ behaviour 
are relatively less available (even if known), and so are less readily incorporated into judgments 
(Pronin 2008). Similarly, individuals tend to believe that others’ observable behaviour is 
sufficient to judge their internal motives and intentions, but that observable behaviour is 
insufficient to judge internal motives and intentions when they are the subject of judgment 
(Pronin, Kruger, Savtisky, and Ross 2001). Finally, egocentric bias results in the tendency for 
individuals to overestimate the degree to which others share their preferences and beliefs 
(Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross 2004). When these preferences and beliefs conflict with those of 
others, individuals have a tendency to believe that the other’s reasoning is biased, and their own 
reasoning is objective, due to their own intentions and motivations being relatively more 
available than the other’s (Pronin et al. 2004).16 
                                                          
16 Although the accounting literature has examined similar biases, such as availability (Moser 1989), actor-observer 
bias (Wong-on-Wing et al. 2007), and self-serving attributions (King 2002; Libby and Rennekamp 2012), to the best 
of my knowledge, egocentric bias has not been examined in accounting research. 
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Based on the above discussion, it follows that with respect to justice perceptions within 
organizations, egocentric bias will likely result in a tendency for employees to ignore or discount 
the fair intentions that others, such as management, may have, instead fixating on observed 
outcomes (Pronin, 2008). This occurs because the fair intentions of management are relatively 
less available to them when making fairness judgments than the readily observable actions of 
management. Thus, employees receiving unfavourable outcomes will tend to fixate on these 
outcomes, discounting any fair intentions management may have had. Therefore, management 
must consider the existence of egocentric bias when designing any interventions designed to 
improve perceptions of fairness.  
Although many fairness interventions exist, I choose to focus on providing an 
explanation and perspective taking. Psychology research has focused on restoring equity of 
distributions (e.g. Adams 1963; Griffeth et al.1989), satisfying Leventhal criteria (Leventhal 
1980), improving process control (e.g. Thibaut and Walker 1978, Libby 1999), or improving 
interactions between employees and their managers/organization (e.g. Bies and Moag 1986; Bies 
and Shapiro 1988). Although explanations fall under the last category, and have been studied 
extensively, to the best of my knowledge, there have been no studies examining the use of 
perspective taking as a fairness intervention. Further, these two interventions show promise in 
directly combatting egocentric bias, by providing information about management’s internal state 
(explanation) or by asking employees to infer or simulate management’s internal state 
(perspective taking). In the next two subsections, I discuss explanation and perspective taking as 




2.4.2 Providing an Explanation 
In the context of the organizational justice and management literature, explanations are 
justifications or causal accounts provided to employees for the actions of management (Bies 
1987; Libby 1999). Explanations are especially important when providing justification for 
unfavourable outcomes, since as discussed above, employees facing these outcomes may already 
have a tendency towards feeling unfairly treated. In order for an explanation to be effective at 
improving perceptions of fairness, it must be perceived as credible (Colquitt and Chertkoff 
2002), sincere, and informationally valid (Greenberg 1993; Libby 1999).  
Prior studies have shown that providing employees with an explanation for negative 
outcomes can mitigate their negative reactions to those outcomes (Bies and Shapiro 1988; 
Shapiro 1991; Libby 1999; Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). For example, Shapiro (1991) created a 
setting where members of dyads were led to believe that the actions of their partner resulted in 
financial losses for both members of the group. Shapiro (1991) found that individuals’ desire to 
punish their partner was less severe when they were provided with an explanation from their 
partner explaining that their actions were intentional and altruistic compared to when their 
partner’s explanation indicated intentional but selfish motives. Libby (1999) allowed employees 
the opportunity to provide input into the budgeting process, but ultimately ignored that input. She 
found that providing an explanation for management’s decision to ignore input from employees 
mitigated the negative performance effects of ignoring their input. 
Providing an explanation may be effective at combatting egocentric bias because if it 
follows Greenberg’s (1993) criteria for effective explanations, it should in part communicate 
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management’s internal thoughts and intentions to employees, making them more available to 
employees when making fairness judgments.    
2.4.3 Perspective Taking 
Perspective taking refers to the phenomenon whereby an individual, either consciously or 
subconsciously, imagines the thoughts, feelings, or intentions of another individual, i.e., the 
perspective taking target (Davis et al. 1996). Perspective taking increases the degree to which the 
mental representations of the perspective taker and the target overlap with each other, a process 
described as self-other overlap (Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky, Ku, and Wang 2005). Psychology 
research has shown that this self-other overlap results in two distinct effects: 1) the internal state 
(i.e., the thoughts, feelings, and intentions) of the other becomes more accessible to the self when 
making judgments and decisions, and 2) the other is judged as more similar to the self than 
before perspective taking, allowing self-evaluations (either positive or negative) to transfer from 
the self to the other.17 
Using a laboratory experiment to examine perspective taking and negotiations, Galinsky, 
Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008) find that perspective taking allows buyers to better understand 
sellers’ internal motivations, resulting in better outcomes for both parties. Similarly, Epley et al. 
(2006) find that taking the perspective of other players in a public goods game increases the 
availability of others’ internal states in fairness judgments and decision making.18 Important to 
note is that this effect of perspective taking depends on features of the perspective taker’s 
                                                          
17 To the best of my knowledge, there are no accounting studies examining the use of perspective taking. 
18 In both co-operative and competitive settings, perspective taking increases the degree to which the other’s internal 
state is accessible to the perspective taker, and reduced egocentrism in their fairness judgments (the percentage of a 
pool of shared resources they were entitled to). However, in the case of competitive games, perspective taking led to 
heightened selfish behaviour (actual amount drawn from the pool of shared resources). Epley et al. (2006) explain 
that a competitive setting activates cynical thoughts about others’ motives, which result in egoistic behaviour. 
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information environment. For example, Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) find that individuals taking 
the perspective of a target with stereotypic features assigned more stereotype consistent attributes 
to the target. Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) explain that when highly salient, the stereotypic 
behaviour of the target is used as a basis for forming the other’s perspective in perspective 
taking.19 Therefore, it appears that when individuals have an accurate basis for understanding the 
target’s perspective, perspective taking can result in greater availability of the target’s internal 
state, and incorporation of this information into judgment and decision making. 
Another consequence of perspective taking is that the perspective taking individual feels 
more similar to the target (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, and Galinsky 2011). Due to self-
serving biases, individuals have a tendency to maintain a positive self-concept (Taylor and 
Brown 1988; Pronin 2008). Since individuals on average maintain a positive self-concept, self-
other overlap triggered by perspective taking allows for the subconscious transfer of positive 
self-evaluations about themselves to the perspective taking target (Todd and Burgmer 2013). For 
example, in an experiment on stereotyping, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) find that when 
individuals take the perspective of others, they evaluate others more favourably and use less 
stereotypic language when describing the other. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) explain that the 
process of self-other overlap makes the other seem more like the self, allowing for generally 
positive self-evaluations to transfer to the other. An important point here is that the effect of 
automatic transfer of self-evaluations to the other depends critically on the valence of the 
perspective taker’s self-evaluation. For example, Todd and Burgmer (2013) find that perspective 
taking reduces in-group bias, but not when participants were measured or manipulated to have 
                                                          
19 Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) use pictures of a hospitalized old man, and a forlorn looking old man with a cane as 
their stereotype consistent perspective taking targets, and pictures of an old man sitting next to a newspaper stand 
and a heashot of an old man as their ambiguously stereotypic perspective taking targets. 
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negative self-evaluations. Todd and Burgmer (2013) reason that when the perspective taker has a 
negative self-evaluation, there are no positive self-evaluations to transfer to the target. Similarly, 
Galinsky and Ku (2004) find that when self-esteem was manipulated downwards through 
negative feedback, perspective taking did not reduce prejudice as it did when self-esteem was 
manipulated upwards through positive feedback.20    
 The above two effects are both informative to predicting how perspective taking impacts 
fairness judgments. First, to the extent that employees can accurately simulate management’s 
perspective, they should better understand the considerations management must make when 
deciding whether or not to make ex-post adjustments. Secondly, self-other overlap triggered by 
perspective taking should increase the degree to which employees feel like they are similar to 
management, allowing for the automatic transfer of generally positive self-evaluations from the 
employee to management.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I described the economic setting of ex-post adjustments, and provided an 
overview of organizational justice literature, especially as it relates to my outcome of interest, 
individual performance. I described egocentric bias, a decision making heuristic pertinent to the 
understanding of how employees form fairness judgments and react to fairness interventions. 
Finally, I introduced two possible interventions that could potentially mitigate egocentric bias.  
Overall, existing literature suggests that while ex-post adjustments may be efficient from 
a contracting perspective, uncertainty in how managers choose to exercise their discretion 
                                                          
20 Interestingly, neither Todd and Burgmer (2013) nor Galinsky and Ku (2004) find that negative self-evaluations 
were transferred to the other. The conclusion in both studies is that negative self-evaluations/self-esteem simply 
suppress the transfer of positive evaluations from the self to the other. 
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imposes a cost to adopting ex-post adjustments as a contracting feature. Prior research shows that 
there is considerable variation in the frequency and extent to which firms use ex-post 
adjustments (Merchant 1989; Höppe and Moers 2011). One cost of ex-post adjustments is that 
employees, in forming fairness judgments about unfavourable ex-post adjustment outcomes, will 
have a tendency to fixate on the unfavourable outcome, discounting any fair intentions 
management may have (Pronin 2008). Employees’ biased fairness judgments may then have a 
negative impact on performance, which may be mitigated through provision of an explanation or 






CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I use organizational justice as a theoretical lens to examine the 
consequences of the ex-post adjustment setting on employee motivation and performance. As 
described in section 2.2, the contracting literature has identified ex-post adjustments as an 
efficient contracting feature for addressing the impact of uncontrollable events on employee 
compensation (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol 2008). However, there are costs to ex-post 
adjustments in the form of employees experiencing uncertainty over how managers will exercise 
discretion to perform ex-post adjustments. To date, only a few studies (Arnold and Artz 2015; 
Kelly et al. 2015; Burt et al. 2019) have examined the implications of ex-post adjustments on 
employee performance. Further, as described in section 2.2, prior research has not distinguished 
between the availability of ex-post adjustments and the exercise of ex-post adjustments. To 
address this gap in the literature, the current investigation examines the consequences of both the 
availability of, and selective use, of ex-post adjustments on employee perceptions of fairness and 
performance.  
 In addition to studying the implications of ex-post adjustments on justice perceptions and 
performance, I also explore the effectiveness of two fairness interventions: explanation, and 
perspective taking. Explanation and perspective taking both have potential to reduce egocentric 
bias, which may impact employees’ fairness judgments with respect to management’s decision 
of whether or not to exercise ex-post adjustments. Through its impact on fairness judgments, I 
expect explanation and perspective taking to improve employee performance. Although the 
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effects of explanation on performance have been studied in prior literature (Libby 1999), to my 
knowledge, the relationship between perspective taking and performance has received less 
attention from accounting and management scholars.21 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I describe important 
features of my setting relevant to the hypotheses development. In section 3.3 I examine the 
motivational implications of the mere availability of ex-post adjustments. In section 3.4 I 
develop hypotheses relating to management discretion in the exercise of ex-post adjustments. In 
section 3.5, I explore the possibility of using explanation and perspective taking as interventions 
to improve performance. In section 3.6 I provide a conclusion. 
3.2 Important Features of my Setting  
 As described in section 2.2, I employ an ex-post adjustment setting, which entails an 
explicit compensation contract to employees with the provision that management can 
subjectively adjust employee compensation in response to new information that arises during the 
contract period (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Höppe and Moers 2011). In addition to these features 
typical in an ex-post adjustment setting, I employ the following important features in my setting: 
1) the explicit contract offered to employees includes performance based pay in the form of a 
bonus for goal attainment, 2) employees work in a multi-task environment, where they choose to 
devote effort towards the focal task to which the compensation contract relates, or a secondary 
task, 3) employees work for multiple periods, and 4) I make no assumptions about the prior 
                                                          
21 A notable exception here is Parker and Axtell (2001), who examine in a field study the antecedents and 
consequences of perspective taking, with superior contextual performance (manager ratings of co-operativeness) as 




relationship between employees and their supervisors. Below I explain the importance and 
rationale for these features.  
 A bonus for goal attainment compensation contract involves management offering 
employees a monetary reward for achieving some benchmark of performance (i.e., a goal) on a 
given task. The use of performance goals in compensation contracting is ubiquitous and has been 
shown to be effective in motivating performance gains by employees (Locke and Latham 1990; 
2002).22 However, as discussed in section 2.2, events outside of the control of employees may 
impact their measured performance, making performance a noisy measure of employee effort, 
distorting the incentives provided by the compensation contract. Because of this, firms that make 
use of bonus for goal attainment compensation schemes often incorporate ex-post adjustments 
into their compensation contracts (Libby and Lindsay 2010; Höppe and Moers 2011). Due to the 
frequency that ex-post adjustments appear in bonus for goal attainment settings, it is an 
important setting to study.23 
 In practice, employees must balance a variety of work responsibilities and choose how to 
allocate their time and effort. Even where an explicit compensation contract rewards effort on a 
focal task, employees typically have some secondary task they can perform while at work which 
can provide utility (Holmström and Milgrom 1991). Some examples of these secondary tasks 
include administrative duties, or cultivating personal relationships to gain favour with co-
workers and supervisors (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Aside from the fact that this feature of 
                                                          
22 Research shows that for goals to be effective, they must be specific, and difficult but attainable (Locke and 
Latham 2007). 
23 Baiman and Rajan (1995, p. 559) assert that “incomplete contracts are a widely observed phenomenon and the use 
of discretion to partially complete these contracts is also widespread”. Höppe and Moers (2011) find that 19% of 
their sample disclosed the use of ex-post adjustments. Arnold and Artz (2015) find that each of the 97 firms 
surveyed indicated some degree of target flexibility, with no firm indicating that targets were never adjusted intra-
year, and average target flexibility (3.57) being above the midpoint on a 5-point Likert scale. 
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my setting is ubiquitous in practice, making it an important setting to study, it also offers some 
experimental advantages, which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter.    
One of the research objectives of this study is to examine the differing consequences of 
the announcement and exercise of ex-post adjustments on justice perceptions and performance. 
This necessitates multiple contract periods to create temporal separation between the 
announcement and exercise of ex-post adjustments. Finally, in my study, I make no assumptions 
about the prior relationship between employees and the managers that will be evaluating them. 
Although prior psychology research has shown that prior relationships affect concerns for 
fairness (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989) and perspective taking (Drolet, Larrick, 
and Morris 1998), due to the already complex nature of my ex-post adjustment setting and 
fairness interventions, I decided to leave an examination of prior relationships to future research. 
3.3 Availability of Ex-Post Adjustments  
As discussed above, both the mere availability and the eventual exercise of ex-post 
adjustments are related but distinct constructs that have potential implications on employee 
performance. I expect that the mere availability of ex-post adjustments to be salient for employee 
judgments in the period between policy announcement and the first-time employees observe how 
management enacts the policy.24 However, I believe that it is still valuable to study this 
phenomenon. In a real-world setting, if targets are set on an annual basis, the time between the 
enactment of such a policy and the first-time employees observe the enactment of the policy can 
                                                          
24 Höppe and Moers (2011) provide evidence from SEC filings that ex-post discretion is a formal feature of 
employee compensation contracts. Given the formal nature of ex-post discretion, it is likely that it is committed to 
ex-ante by management.   
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be considerable. In this subsection, I develop hypotheses with respect to how the mere 
availability of ex-post adjustments impact employee justice perceptions and performance. 
When management announces the availability of ex-post adjustments to neutralize the 
negative impact of uncontrollable events, I expect this to improve employees’ justice 
perceptions. This is because prior to observing the exercise of ex-post adjustments, employees’ 
justice perceptions will be based solely on management’s announced policy as this will be one of 
the only informational cues with which to form fairness judgments.25 I expect management’s 
announced policy to signal fair intentions to employees and will likely result in improved 
perceptions of procedural justice through improvements to the Leventhal criteria, accuracy 
(Leventhal 1980). Accuracy is improved through ex-post adjustments because employees 
anticipate that the negative performance effects of uncontrollable events will be neutralized 
through ex-post adjustments. At the beginning of the contract period, since the employee has not 
yet observed any outcomes, I do not expect employees’ perceptions of distributive justice to be 
affected by the announcement of ex-post adjustments.26  
However, this prediction is not without tension. As described in section 2.2, although 
management’s introduction of an ex-post policy is a signal of their fair intentions, employees 
face uncertainty as to how and when management intends to exercise the policy. In contracting 
terms, employees may view management’s policy as cheap talk, that is, that management has not 
                                                          
25 To the best of my knowledge, there have only been a handful of studies examining the effect of announcements on 
justice perceptions. Mansour-Cole and Scott (1998) provide evidence that the content and manner in which layoff 
announcements were announced affect survivors’ perceptions of procedural and distributive justice. Roberts (1994) 
find that public service announcements answering common concerns about the income tax system improved 
individuals’ perceptions of fairness of the taxation system, and improved tax compliance intentions. These two 
studies provide evidence that individuals attend to the information content of announcements in their formation of 
fairness judgments. 
26 It is possible that when employees perceive fair procedures, they will anticipate fair outcomes as well, which 
could cause an announcement effect on distributive justice (Burney et al. 2009). Therefore, any impact of the 
announcement on distributive justice would be mediated through procedural justice perceptions. 
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committed ex-ante to perform goal adjustments ex-post, only to consider performing them. This 
uncertainty may undermine the effectiveness of the announcement at improving procedural 
justice perceptions.  
In summary, I expect that the mere announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy will 
result in improved perceptions of procedural justice in the periods between the announcement of 
the policy and the first instance of a negative uncontrollable event impacting employee 
performance. This leads to my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H1a: Perceptions of procedural justice following the announcement of an ex-post 
adjustment policy but prior to management’s discretionary use of that policy will be more 
positive relative to a setting where no such policy has been announced.    
As discussed in section 2.3, justice perceptions particularly procedural justice 
perceptions, are positively associated with performance (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; 
Colquitt et al. 2001). Employees value fairness in the procedures enacted by management, and 
when procedures are judged to be fair, employees reciprocate with increased effort (Cohen-
Charash and Spector 2001; Wayne et al. 2002). Further, prior accounting research has shown that 
even in the presence of a bonus for goal-attainment incentive scheme, justice perceptions are 
important to individuals and positively impact performance (Libby 1999; Kelly et al. 2015).27 
Therefore, to the extent that fairness concerns are important to employees and positively impact 
performance, I expect that an announcement that impacts justice perceptions to also be positively 
associated with future performance. Based on the above discussion, I expect performance effects 
to mirror procedural justice effects in the contract periods immediately following the 
                                                          
27 Both Libby (1999) and Kelly et al. (2015) employ a budget linear incentive scheme where bonuses consist of a 
fixed amount for attaining the goal, and a piece-rate for production in excess of the goal. This contract elicits effort 
from employees even after they reach their goals, in theory reducing the scope for fairness concerns to have an 




announcement of an ex post adjustment policy. This, leads to my next hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form: 
H1b: Performance following the announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy but prior 
to management’s discretionary use of that policy will be greater relative to a setting 
where no such policy has been announced. 
As with my first hypothesis, this hypothesis is not without tension. Findings of Arnold 
and Artz (2015) call into question the positive impact of ex-post adjustments on performance. 
They find that target flexibility in the form of intra-year performance target adjustments is 
negatively associated with firm performance. Their explanation for this finding is that when 
targets are flexible, employees will opportunistically withhold effort in anticipation of having 
their targets adjusted downwards.28 My predictions in H1a and H1b are shown graphically in 
Figure 1, Panel A. 
3.4 Manager Discretion to Exercise Ex-Post Adjustments 
As discussed above, the second important event that has potential fairness and 
motivational consequences in the ex-post adjustment setting is the extent to which managers 
actually exercise their discretion to make ex post adjustments. When management has announced 
an ex-post adjustment policy, and an employee fails to meet their performance goal due to an 
uncontrollable event, the employee will likely anticipate an ex-post adjustment.29 If management  
                                                          
28 There is a key difference between Arnold and Artz (2015) and the other studies examining the motivational 
consequences of ex-post adjustments (Kelly et al. 2015; Burt et al. 2019; Cai et al. 2019). First, Arnold and Artz 
(2015) examine intra-year adjustments, which occur during the contract period. To the extent that managers are able 
to change their effort choices after learning of the realization of intra-year adjustments but before the end of the 
contract period, employees in their setting have greater incentives to opportunistically withhold effort. Because 
adjustments occur ex-post in my study, it would be risky for employees to withhold effort in the expectation of 
receiving an adjustment, as they risk missing out on their bonus if no adjustment is made. 
29 I assume that employees recognize that the uncontrollable event caused them to miss their goal. I believe this is a 
reasonable assumption for the following reasons. First, as described by Merchant (1989) and Bol et al. (2015), the 
nature of these uncontrollable events is such that employees have superior information about the impact of these 
events than management. Therefore, if management is in the position to perceive the impact of these events and is 
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework  
 














1 Adjustment refers to the availability of ex-post adjustments as part of the compensation contract.  
2 Explanation refers to justifications provided by management for observed non-helping behaviour. 
3 Perspective taking refers to employees simulating the internal state (thoughts, intentions, feelings) of management. 
Summary of hypotheses: 
H1a: Before observing non-helping behaviour, the announcement of ex-post adjustments will improve perceptions 
of overall justice. 
H1b: Before observing non-helping behaviour, the announcement of ex-post adjustments will improve performance. 
H2a: Perceptions of overall justice will worsen after observing non-helping behaviour. 
H2b: Performance will worsen after observing non-helping behaviour. 
H3a: After observing non-helping behaviour, an explanation from management will attenuate the worsening of 
overall justice perceptions. 
H3b: After observing non-helping behaviour, an explanation from management will attenuate the decline in 
performance. 
H4a: After observing non-helping behaviour, perspective taking will attenuate the worsening of overall justice 
perceptions. 
H4b: After observing non-helping behaviour, perspective taking will attenuate the decline in performance.     
                                                          
considering an ex-post adjustment, I assume employees understand that the event was responsible for them not 
attaining their goals. Secondly, if the nature of these events were not so significant as to impact goal attainment, 



















then decides not to perform an adjustment (non-helping behaviour), this will likely have negative 
implications for perceptions of fairness and motivation. In contrast to H1a, where I do not make 
predictions with respect to distributive justice perceptions, I expect that post-observation of non-
helping behaviour, perceptions of both procedural and distributive justice perceptions will be 
affected. Employees have now observed how management has distributed rewards, which 
informs perceptions of distributive justice. 
I choose to focus on situations where management decides not to perform adjustments for 
several reasons. First, there is empirical evidence that management may choose not to make such 
adjustments even when they are bestowed discretion to do so (e.g. Merchant 1989, Höppe and 
Moers 2011), making this an important and relevant setting to study. Second, all prior studies on 
the impact of ex-post adjustments on performance examine settings where ex-post adjustments 
are made in at least some of the periods (Arnold and Artz 2015; Kelly et al. 2015; Burt et al. 
2019; Cai et al. 2019), and so examining a setting where adjustments are not made fills a gap in 
the literature. Finally, as expanded upon below, I believe that management’s non-helping 
behaviour will have negative consequences for employee justice perceptions and performance, 
making the examination of this setting and its consequences important.    
If management decides not to exercise ex-post adjustments to help employees in response 
to a negative uncontrollable event, management’s perceived inaction will likely counteract 
positive procedural fairness effects engendered by announcing the policy. This will likely have a 
negative impact on procedural justice perceptions as employees re-evaluate management’s 
motives for announcing such a policy. Similarly, to the extent that employees were actively 
engaged in goal pursuit, they had a reasonable expectancy of goal attainment, and may attribute 
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their failure to attain their expected rewards to management inaction, further negatively affecting 
perceptions of distributive justice  (Folger 1977; Carmichael 1989; Bol 2008). 
As described by Bol et al. (2015), management may have legitimate reasons to not make 
ex-post adjustments to neutralize the effects of uncontrollable events. For example, if employees 
work in a volatile industry where such uncontrollable events occur often, management may 
choose to reserve ex-post adjustments for extraordinary circumstances in order to encourage 
employees to adapt to the common occurrence of uncontrollable events (Merchant 1989; Bol et 
al. 2015). As another example, where employees’ compensation is highly interdependent, as in 
the case of a fixed bonus pool, management may not be able to make favourable ex-post 
adjustments for all employees due to the zero-sum nature of adjustments in the fixed bonus pool 
setting (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol et al. 2015). However, due to employees’ egocentric bias, it 
is management’s observed behaviour that will be most salient and available to employees when 
making fairness judgments.30 Thus, I expect the effects described above to dominate any positive 
impact that the existence of the policy would have on procedural and distributive justice 
perceptions. Important to note is that these predictions are expected to hold so long as 
management decides not to perform ex-post adjustments.31 As in the case of my first set of 
hypotheses, based on the established link between both procedural and distributive justice 
                                                          
30 Prior studies (e.g. Burney et al. 2009) find evidence that the receipt of unfavourable outcomes triggers 
reconsideration about the fairness of procedures used to arrive at those outcomes, resulting in a positive indirect 
effect of outcome valence on procedural justice perceptions. This further supports my predictions.  
31 If employees were to subsequently receive an ex-post adjustment in the future, this may attenuate some of the 
negative effects described. However, in practice, ex-post adjustments are observed to occur with relatively low 
frequency, even for firms disclosing ex-post adjustments as a part of the compensation contract (24.3%, Höppe and 
Moers 2011). Further, as described above, I believe that employees not receiving an ex-post adjustment has greater 
implications for justice perceptions and performance, and so my predictions centre around employees not receiving 
ex-post adjustments.   
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perceptions and performance, I make a prediction about performance in parallel with my fairness 
prediction.32 This leads to my next set of hypotheses, stated in the alternative form: 
H2a: Procedural and distributive justice perceptions following management’s decision to 
not exercise ex-post adjustments will worsen relative to before management’s 
decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments.     
H2b: Performance following management’s decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments 
will be lower relative to before management’s decision to not exercise ex-post 
adjustments. 
 
3.5 Explanation and Perspective Taking Interventions  
As described in the preceding sections, the announcement of ex-post adjustments is 
predicted to have positive fairness and motivational consequences, whereas management’s 
subsequent inaction threatens to attenuate these positive effects. In this section, I explore two 
possible interventions aimed at improving perceptions of fairness and performance. Examining 
more than one fairness intervention in my setting allows me to compare and contrast the 
effectiveness of these interventions at improving fairness perceptions and performance. 
One of the most intuitive and often-studied fairness interventions in the workplace is 
providing an explanation for management decision making (Bies and Moag 1983; Greenberg 
1993; Libby 1999). In an organizational context, explanations are causal accounts or 
justifications provided to employees for management decision making, usually accompanying 
unfavourable management decisions (Bies and Shapiro 1988; Libby 1999). Bies and Shapiro 
(1988) suggest that in response to unfavourable management decisions, employees search for a 
                                                          
32 My predictions in H2a and H2b are specific to a setting where ex-post adjustments are possible. However, it is 
also possible that in a setting where ex-post adjustments are not possible, employee justice perceptions and 
performance will nonetheless decrease in response to simply not attaining their goals, even when management has 
no ability to help them through ex-post adjustments. 
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causal account or justification for management’s decision. In the absence of an explanation, 
employees may attribute sinister motives to management (Kelley 1973). Therefore, providing an 
explanation is a way for management to head off employee speculation or misunderstandings 
and manage employee justice perceptions (Greenberg 1990).  
Explanations studied in the accounting and psychology literatures have generally focused 
on: 1) why the unfavourable outcome could not be any different (e.g., Bies and Shapiro 1988; 
Shapiro 1991), or 2) why the unfavourable outcome should not be any different (e.g. Libby 1999; 
Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). An example of a ‘could not’ explanation is used in Bies and 
Shapiro (1988), who explained to participants that the unfavourable outcome was due to policy 
‘imposed by top management’, and thus out of their control. An example of a ‘should not’ 
explanation is used in Libby (1999), who explained to participants that their unfavourable 
outcome was carefully reviewed by management with no errors found. The accounting and 
psychology literatures have also explored the determinants of effective explanations, finding 
explanations that are sincere, logical, and thorough to improve perceptions of fairness and 
performance (Libby 1999; Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). 
In my setting, due to the discretion bestowed upon management to make ex-post 
adjustments, management cannot argue that they could not have made an ex-post adjustment to 
help employees. Instead, management must appeal to why they should not have made an ex-post 
adjustment. Consistent with Libby (1999), I expect that an explanation from management 
providing logical, sincere reasons for why they should not exercise ex-post adjustments to 
attenuate the negative effects of observed non-helping behaviour. As described in my 
development of H2a and H2b, observed non-helping behaviour is expected to worsen both 
procedural and distributive justice perceptions, and therefore performance. Thus, an effective 
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explanation based on the above criteria should improve both procedural and distributive justice 
perceptions, as well as subsequent performance.   
Although I expect providing an explanation to employees in my setting to improve both 
procedural and distributive fairness perceptions, the effectiveness of an explanation may be 
limited. The employee in my setting has failed to attain their goal and earn their desired reward, 
negatively impacting perceptions of distributive justice. In addition, as described in the preceding 
section, management’s decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments contrasts with their 
expectations, deteriorating employee trust in management, which could undermine the 
effectiveness of an explanation provided ex-post. Despite this, based on the discussion above, I 
expect that providing an explanation to employees for management inaction will mitigate some 
of the negative fairness and therefore performance consequences caused by management’s 
decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments. This leads to my next set of hypotheses, stated in 
the alternative form:  
H3a: The worsening of procedural and distributive justice perceptions following 
management’s decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments will be attenuated when 
management provides an explanation for their decision relative to when 
management provides no such explanation. 
H3b: The decline in performance following management’s decision to not exercise ex-
post adjustments will be smaller when management provides an explanation for 
their decision relative to when management provides no such explanation.  
   
In subsection 2.4.3, I described two possible consequences of perspective taking due to 
self-other overlap: 1) an increase in the availability of the internal thoughts, feelings, and 
intentions (i.e., the internal state) of the perspective taking target to the perspective taker, and 2) 
an increase in the degree to which the perspective taker believes they are similar to the target, 
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allowing for positive self-evaluations to automatically transfer from perspective taker to target.33 
I expect that both of these effects of self-other overlap will lead to improved justice perceptions 
and performance in my setting, for different reasons, described below. 
As described above, management may have legitimate reasons for not performing ex-post 
adjustments.34 If employees are asked to take the perspective of management who made this 
decision, these legitimate reasons will become more available to employees when making 
fairness judgments, as long as they are able to accurately simulate management’s perspective. As 
discussed in subsection 2.4.3, if employees are not provided with the basis with which to form 
accurate mental representations of management, they will use other salient cues in their 
information environment, such as stereotypic behaviour, in simulating management’s perspective 
(Skorinko and Sinclair 2013), perhaps ascribing a self-serving motive for management’s non-
helping behaviour (Kelley 1973). However, if employees are provided with a basis to help them 
accurately simulate management’s internal state, then perspective taking should result in the 
increased availability of management’s internal state in fairness judgments (Pronin 2008). I 
expect that this increased availability of management’s legitimate reasons for not performing ex-
post adjustments will improve employees’ procedural and distributive justice perceptions. 
Another consequence of the greater availability of management’s internal state is a deeper 
understanding of the motivations and considerations management must make in performing ex-
post adjustments. This should lead to an increased understanding of when and how management 
                                                          
33 As discussed in subsection 2.4.3, perspective taking results in the automatic transfer of self-evaluations from the 
perspective taker to the target. Since individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Taylor and 
Brown 1988; Pronin 2008), on average, perspective taking should result in the transfer of positive self-evaluations 
from the self to the other.  
34 These could include trying to induce adaptive behaviour if the employees operate in a volatile environment 
(Merchant 1989; Bol et al. 2015), or that their options are constrained by the zero-sum nature of ex-post adjustments 
in a fixed bonus pool setting (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol et al. 2015).  
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is likely to exercise these adjustments, resulting in reduced uncertainty over how such 
adjustments will impact the effort-performance-reward relationship. All else equal, this reduction 
in uncertainty should strengthen the effort-performance-reward relationship inherent to the 
compensation contract (Holmström 1979; Bol, 2008), improving performance.  
Individuals are generally motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Taylor and 
Brown 1988; Todd and Burgmer 2003). Therefore, self-overlap induced through perspective 
taking should also cause employees’ positive self-evaluations to automatically transfer to 
management as the perspective taking target, leading to more favourable evaluations and 
opinions about the target (Todd and Burgmer 2003). As a result of perspective taking, 
perspective takers have been shown to reduce stereotyping of the target (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000; Todd and Burgmer 2003), have greater empathic concern for the target 
(Cialdini et al. 1997), and have improved attitudes and more positive evaluations of the attributes 
of the target (Galinsky and Ku 2004). To the extent that self-other overlap improves attitudes and 
evaluations of the target, employees taking the perspective of management should have more 
positive procedural and distributive justice perceptions, and therefore performance, relative to 
employees who do not take management’s perspective.  
 The above discussion of perspective taking leads me to predict that in my setting, a 
perspective taking intervention will attenuate egocentric bias and improve perceptions of 
procedural and distributive justice and performance. This leads to my next set of hypotheses, 
stated in the alternative form: 
H4a: The worsening of procedural and distributive justice perceptions following 
management’s decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments will be attenuated when 




H4b: The decline in performance following management’s decision to not exercise ex-
post adjustments will be smaller when employees take management’s perspective 
relative to when no such perspective taking occurs.    
 
My predictions in H3a, H3b, H4a, and H4b are shown graphically in Figure 1, Panel B. 
In addition to the above two sets of hypotheses on the effects of explanation and perspective 
taking, I also examine whether explanation and perspective taking are substitutes or 
complements as fairness interventions. As described above, explanation does not directly combat 
egocentric bias, whereas perspective taking does. Based on this, it is possible that perspective 
taking can enhance the effectiveness of explanations, acting like a complement and resulting in a 
multiplicative effect on justice perceptions and performance. However, it is also possible that 
possible that because both explanation and perspective taking increase the availability of 
management’s internal state to employees, that these two fairness interventions will act as 
substitutes, resulting in either an additive or ceiling effect on justice perceptions and 
performance. Finally, it is possible that the presence of one intervention will interfere with or 
suppress the effect of the other. For example, taking management’s perspective may result in 
employees arriving at an adequate justification for management’s observed non-helping 
behaviour. To the extent that the explanation provided ex-post by management conflicts with the 
justifications arrived at through perspective taking, this may cause employees to question 
management’s true motivations, decreasing the effectiveness of both interventions. Due to the 
considerable uncertainty over how my two fairness interventions will interact, I pose the 
following research questions: 
RQ1a: Will explanation and perspective taking have interactive effects in attenuating the 
worsening of procedural and distributive justice perceptions that occur in response 
to observing non-helping behaviour? 
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RQ1b: Will explanation and perspective taking have interactive effects in reducing 
performance decreases that occur in response to observing non-helping behaviour? 
 
3.6 Summary 
 This chapter develops four sets of hypotheses and one set of research questions regarding 
employee reactions to events triggering fairness considerations in an ex-post adjustment setting. 
In summary, I hypothesize that although employees will react favourably to the initial 
announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy (H1), these initial favourable reactions will be 
attenuated when management decides not to exercise adjustments for employees (H2). I further 
hypothesize that both explanation (H3) and perspective taking (H4) will at least partly mitigate 
the negative impact of management’s decision to not exercise ex-post adjustments. Finally, I 
pose a research question about how explanation and perspective taking will interact when used 
together. In the next section, I discuss the research design of this investigation that I employ to 





CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD 
4.1 Design Overview 
To test my hypotheses, I conduct laboratory experiments employing a 2x2 between 
subjects, full factorial design with a control condition.  My manipulated factors are: 1) the 
presence or absence of a perspective taking exercise, and 2) the presence or absence of an 
explanation for decision making, for a total of four non-control conditions and one control 
condition. In each of these four non-control conditions, the availability of discretionary ex-post 
goal adjustments are disclosed to participants in the experiment instructions. In the control 
condition, instructions do not disclose the availability of ex-post goal adjustments and will not be 
performed. 35 My experimental conditions are summarized in Figure 2.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
experimental tasks as well as the operationalization of important features in my experimental 
setting. Section 4.3 provides an overview of experimental procedures, as well as my 
experimental manipulations. Section 4.4 discusses the operationalization and measurement of my 
dependent variables, and section 4.5 discusses the operationalization and measurement of my 
control and process variables. This chapter concludes with section 4.6. 
 
 
                                                          








Ex-post adjustments available 
Control 
No explanation / No 
perspective taking 
Explanation / No 
perspective taking 
No explanation / 




Summary of conditions: 
Control: In this condition, participants receive individualized goals, learn about the bonus for goal attainment 
incentive scheme, and learn about negative uncontrollable events. They do not learn about ex-post adjustments and 
are not eligible to receive them. 
 
No explanation/no perspective taking: In this condition, participants learn about everything that the control 
participants learn. In addition, they learn about the possibility of ex-post adjustments being employed and are 
eligible to receive them. 
 
Explanation/no perspective taking: In this condition, participants learn about everything that the no explanation/no 
perspective taking participants learn. In addition, they receive an explanation for management’s decision to perform 
or not perform ex-post adjustments at the end of each difficult production round. 
 
No explanation/perspective taking: In this condition, participants learn about everything that the no explanation/no 
perspective taking participants learn. In addition, they receive perspective taking training just prior to the beginning 
of the production rounds. 
 
Explanation/perspective taking: In this condition, participants learn about everything that the no explanation/no 
perspective taking participants learn. In addition, they receive perspective taking training just prior to the beginning 
of the production rounds and receive an explanation for management’s decision to perform or not perform ex-post 
adjustments at the end of each difficult production round.  
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4.2 Experiment Details 
4.2.1 Task Description 
In my experiment, participants work on two computer based effort sensitive tasks: 1) a task 
where participants are required to count the number of ‘1’s that appear in a 7x7 matrix of ‘0’s and 
‘1’s (hereafter the counting task), and 2) a task where participants decode strings of symbols with 
the aid of a decoding key that translates symbols to letters (hereafter the decoding task). Both tasks 
were adapted from Anand, Webb, and Wong (2019).36 The counting task in my experiment maps 
to an employee’s focal task in an organization and is reinforced by a bonus for goal attainment 
incentive scheme. The decoding task is not reinforced through performance-based pay and proxies 
for an ancillary task that is not directly compensated by the principal, but for which the agent 
derives some token utility.  
At any time during any of the production rounds, participants are able to switch between 
the counting and decoding tasks at will. I chose to allow participants to switch between tasks at 
will for ecological validity. In real organizations, employees with multiple task options must 
choose how to allocate their time between these tasks. If participants were not allowed to switch 
at will (i.e., switching from counting to decoding was permanent), then participants who simply 
wanted a break or distraction from the counting task may feel compelled to remain in the counting 
task to avoid forfeiture of their bonus, introducing noise to my measure of effort duration 
(subsection 4.4.3). 
 
                                                          




4.2.2 Incentive Structure 
 There are four ways in which participants in my experiment can earn remuneration, each 
described in further detail in this subsection: 1) all participants are paid $5 for showing up to the 
experiment, 2) participants earn $0.10 for each unit of the counting task completed in the 
practice round, 3) participants earn $3 for each of the four production rounds in which they meet 
or beat an assigned output goal, and 4) participants earn $0.25 for each minute they spend on the 
decoding task instead of the counting task in the production round.  
 I decided to pay participants a $5 show-up fee to show appreciation for their participation 
in my experiment. Since the other sources of remuneration in the experiment depend on the 
actions taken by the participant, the $5 show up fee ensures that all participants leave the study 
with some remuneration. As described in more detail in in section 4.3, I am interested in 
measuring performance on my focal task (counting task) in order to test my hypotheses. To 
support this aim, I measure performance in a practice round as a measure of baseline 
performance. To elicit effort from participants in this practice round, I pay a piece-rate of $0.10 
per unit of the counting task completed. 
 The most substantial opportunity for remuneration provided to participants is in the form 
of a bonus for output goal attainment incentive scheme in the production round (discussed in 
more detail in the next section). In each of four production rounds, participants have an 
opportunity to earn a $3 bonus if they meet or beat an assigned output goal on the counting task. 
If they do not meet their output goal, they receive no bonus. Unlike in the practice round, 




 The other opportunity for participants to earn remuneration during the production round 
is through time spent on the decoding task. As described above, the decoding task in my 
experiment represents any outside options (i.e. anything unrelated to the focal task) available to 
employees in an organization that provides them with some utility (e.g. leisure time). To 
represent this outside option in my experiment, participants can choose not to work on the 
counting task, instead spending time on the decoding task in order to earn $0.25 per minute.  
4.2.3 Negative Uncontrollable Events 
To simulate negative uncontrollable events and their impact on employee performance, I 
introduce negative shocks to participant performance on the counting task by varying its 
difficulty across the four production rounds within the production round. I vary the difficulty of 
the counting task by varying the proportion of ‘1’s in the 7x7 matrices from 40% in normal 
rounds to 60% in difficult rounds.37 For experimental consistency, as well as to strengthen the 
salience of management decision making, all participants experience the same sequence of 
normal and difficult rounds: normal, difficult, difficult, normal. Ex-ante, participants only know 
that the difficulty will vary across rounds, not the order or frequency of difficult rounds. Recall 
that some of my predictions require employees to have observed non-helping behaviour from 
management, i.e., not performing an ex-post adjustment in response to negative events. 
Employees can only observe management’s non-helping behaviour when they have encountered 
a difficult round (negative event) and management chooses not to perform an ex-post adjustment. 
Therefore, by isolating my difficult rounds in the middle of the production rounds, I create a 
                                                          
37 The time required to count the ‘1’s in a 7x7 matrix increases with the proportion of ‘1’s in the table, increasing the 
difficulty of the counting tasks in periods with a relatively larger proportion of ‘1’s per table. I corroborated this 
through pilot testing, where I observed that increasing the proportion of ‘1’s in the table from 40% to 60% resulted 
in a 33% decrease in performance. 
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clear pre-observation of non-helping behaviour period (rounds 1 and 2), and a clear post-
observation of non-helping behaviour period (rounds 3 and 4), allowing me to test my 
hypotheses requiring such a pre-/post- period (H2, H3, H4, and RQ1). 
4.2.4 Ex-Post Adjustments 
Participants in the four non-control conditions are told that in response to the varying 
difficulty across production rounds (described above), at the discretion of the experimental 
administrator, their goals may be adjusted downwards in light of a particularly difficult round. 
However, participants are also informed that any downward goal adjustments will have to be 
balanced with an upward goal adjustment to one or more other participants in a zero-sum game. 
This design choice was made for two reasons. First, the high degree of compensation 
interdependency inherent to the zero-sum game of ex-post adjustments in my setting is the 
reason management is selective about making adjustments. This is consistent with Bol et al. 
(2015), who find that managers are less likely to make ex-post adjustments when compensation 
interdependency is high. Second, Baiman and Rajan (1995) find analytically that such a fixed 
bonus setting can be optimal if the principal commits ex-ante to the size of the bonus pool but 
retains discretion to make ex-post adjustments based on non-contractible information, such as the 
occurrence of negative uncontrollable events during the contract period.38 Baiman and Rajan 
(1995) provide some anecdotal evidence that such fixed bonus pool arrangements exist in 
practice, which is corroborated by Cai et al. (2019), who find evidence in a field study of ex-post 
                                                          
38 Baiman and Rajan’s (1995) study was in part motivated by the ubiquity of such fixed bonus pool arrangements in 
practice, but also notes that such arrangements can have motivational consequences because it sets up a zero-sum 
game between managers with respect to compensation.  
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adjustments being made in a zero-sum game. Therefore, this design choice has ecological 
validity. 
Notably, my experiment differs from the fixed bonus pool arrangements described by 
Baiman and Rajan (1995) in that my setting employs a fixed goal setting, where the zero-sum 
game is not in the allocation of bonuses as in a fixed bonus pool setting, but in the setting of 
employee goals, i.e., the sum of employee goals must equal some overall divisional or 
organizational goal. The reason for this difference is based on feedback received during my first 
pilot study. As part of my first pilot study (n = 45, subsection 4.2.5), I recruited undergraduate 
students to get feedback on my perspective taking manipulation as well as the various elements 
of the compensation contract. In this study, the compensation contract included the possibility of 
ex-post adjustments in a fixed bonus pool setting, consistent with Baiman and Rajan (1995). In 
interviews conducted with participants after the pilot study, the majority of participants indicated 
that the process behind making ex-post adjustments to objectively determined bonuses was 
confusing and seemed arbitrary. When asked whether adjustments to goals in a fixed goal setting 
would be easier to understand, participants indicated that it would, since it maintained the link 
between goal attainment and receiving a bonus. I believe it is appropriate to use a fixed goal 
setting, as the contract feature relevant to examining the motivational consequences of ex-post 
adjustments (zero-sum game played by managers) is retained in a fixed goal setting. Further, 
there is evidence that such fixed goal settings also occur in practice. For example, in a field 
study, Bol et al. (2010) observe a setting where managers make discretionary adjustments in a 
zero-sum game to objectively determined goals based on non-contractible information. 
Finally, as discussed in my hypotheses development, I am interested in studying the 
consequences of management not performing ex-post adjustments on justice perceptions and 
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performance. As such, I am primarily interested in data collected from participants not receiving 
an ex-post adjustment. However, to avoid deception, since I disclose the availability of ex-post 
adjustments, I must actually perform ex-post adjustments for some participants. To maximize the 
number of participants not receiving an ex-post adjustment, the incidence of ex-post adjustments, 
which are randomly determined in my experiment, is set quite low at 15%. The low incidence of 
ex-post adjustments in my experiment is consistent with Höppe and Moers (2011), who find 
evidence from SEC filings that of firms disclosing the use of ex-post bonus adjustments, only 
24.3% report exercising upwards bonus adjustments. 
4.2.5 Participants 
I am interested in studying employees’ fairness reactions to the implementation of 
management controls and the resulting impact on employee performance. As discussed in section 
2.4, employee fairness perceptions are heavily influenced by egocentric bias, which is inherent to 
all individuals (Pronin 2008). Although age has been shown to moderate egocentric tendencies, 
individuals’ initial reactions are still coloured by egocentric bias, regardless of age (Epley, 
Morewedge, and Keysar 2004). Further, my experimental tasks are simple computer-based tasks 
which require no special skills or knowledge to perform. For these reasons, testing my 
hypotheses using university student participants is appropriate. For my main study, I recruited a 
total of 169 participants, of which 22 received random ex-post goal adjustments. As described 
above, my hypotheses centre around individuals not receiving ex-post adjustments, so the 22 
participants receiving adjustments are excluded from my analyses, leaving 147 participants in 
my final sample.39 
                                                          
39 Of the 169 participants recruited for my main study, 140 of them were assigned to non-control conditions and 
were eligible for ex-post adjustments. Therefore, the 22 participants receiving ex-post adjustments represents an 
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4.2.6 Pilot Studies 
To pilot my instrument and test my hypotheses, I conducted three pilot studies, all using 
undergraduate business students from large Canadian universities. In my first pilot study (n = 
45), I used two conditions equivalent to the No Intervention and Perspective Only conditions in 
the final study, in order to test my perspective taking manipulation, as well as elements of the 
compensation contract (e.g. incentive structure, ex-post adjustments) and information 
environment (e.g. negative uncontrollable events). In this pilot study, my perspective taking 
manipulation required participants to write a narrative from the perspective of management, and 
ex-post adjustments were endogenously rather than exogenously determined. I did not observe 
any significant effects of perspective taking on justice perceptions or performance. Based on the 
results of this pilot test, I decided to greatly simplify my experimental instrument, exogenously 
determine ex-post adjustments, and use a more practical perspective taking manipulation (i.e., a 
training exercise). 
In my second pilot study (n = 110), I tested three conditions equivalent to the Control, 
Explanation Only, and Both Interventions conditions in my final study. In this pilot study, I 
tested refinements to my perspective taking manipulation, as well as changes to the 
compensation contract made as a result of pilot test 1. In the second pilot study, I observed a 
positive but insignificant effect of both explanation and perspective taking on cumulative 
performance, but no effects of either on justice perceptions. In this pilot study, there was only 
one production round (with six periods), and participants received feedback at the end of each 
period on their progress towards goal attainment. As a result of this pilot study I decided to 
                                                          
adjustment rate of 15.7%, evidence of the successful operationalization of my random ex-post adjustments, which 
was parameterized at 15% (subsection 4.2.4). 
59 
 
change the structure of the production period such that instead of one long production round with 
one bonus, participants experience multiple production rounds. I did so based on my belief that 
the failure to observe results consistent with my predictions was due in part to participants not 
observing the realization of bonus attainment (or failure to attain the bonus) until the end of the 
experiment.  When participants experienced one long production round with one bonus, it may 
have been difficult for participants to fully understand how receipt or non-receipt of a goal 
adjustment affected their remuneration. By splitting my production round into multiple periods, 
the impact of goal adjustments on remuneration is clearer to participants, making it more salient 
to them as they make effort choices in subsequent rounds.  
In my third pilot study (n = 54), I further refined my perspective taking and explanation 
manipulations by testing two conditions equivalent to my Explanation Only and Both 
Interventions conditions in the final study. I observed that after observing non-helping behaviour, 
receiving both explanation and perspective taking improved performance and justice perceptions, 
but that receiving only explanation did not improve either. In this pilot study, my explanation 
was quite terse. I believed that this terse explanation hindered its ability to improve justice 
perceptions and performance. Accordingly I revised my explanation to include expressions of 
sincerity (e.g. use of words like “carefully”, “sincerely”) to signal sensitivity towards 
participants’ perceived unfairness (see subsection 4.3.2), consistent with explanations used in 
literature, such as Libby (1999). 
4.3 Experimental Design 
The basic flow of the experimental task is depicted in Figure 3 and is described as 
follows. First, participants are be provided with brief instructions on how to perform the counting  
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Figure 3. Experimental flowchart 
 
Notes: 
1 Task 1 is based on Abeler et al. (2011) and involves participants counting the number of ‘1’s in a matrix of ‘1’s and 
‘0’s.Task 2 is based on Chow (1983) and involves participants decoding a string of symbols into a string of letters 
using a decoding key. 
Practice Round Instructions
• Description of counting and decoding tasks
• Remuneration for Practice Rounds explained
• Comprehension checks
Practice Rounds
• Two four-minute rounds to work on counting task, 
earning $0.10/unit of production
• Baseline performance measured
Production Round Instructions
• Bonus for goal attainment scheme explained
• Individualized goal for Production Rounds set
• First measure of organizational justice taken
• Description of negative events
• Description of ex-post goal adjustments (non-
control conditions only)
• Description of switching tasks
• Comprehension checks
• Second measure of organizational justice taken
• Perspective taking exercise (Perspective taking 
conditions only)
Production Rounds
• Four four-minute rounds, earning $3 for goal 
attainment on counting task in each round
• Participants can switch between counting and 
decoding tasks at will, earning $0.25/minute 
spent on the decoding task 
• Realization of ex-post goal adjustment (non-
control conditions only) after each round
• Negative events occur in rounds 2 and 3 
(observed non-helping behaviour for non-control 
conditions)
• Third measure of organizational justice taken 
Post Experimental Questionnaire
• Manipulation and attention check questions
• Covariates and demographic variables measured
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and decoding tasks (described in subsection 4.2.1). Next, participants are given two four-minute 
rounds to practice the counting task. This allows participants to acquaint themselves with the 
focal task (counting task), to get used to the four-minute length of the production rounds, and 
more accurately estimate their expectancy of goal attainment in four-minute production rounds. 
Further, participant performance on the counting task in the practice rounds serves as a measure 
of their baseline performance and is used to set individualized goals. To elicit high effort, I pay 
participants $0.10 for each unit of the counting task completed in the practice rounds.  
After the practice round, participants receive further instructions that they have an 
opportunity to earn a bonus by meeting an individualized output goal on the counting task.40 In 
each of four upcoming four-minute production rounds, participants can earn a bonus of $3 if they 
achieve their output goal on the counting task. Participants also learn that at any point during the 
four-minute production rounds, they may switch freely between the counting and decoding tasks 
and earn $0.25 per minute spent on the decoding task.41 However, participants are also informed 
that only units of the counting task completed contribute progress towards their output goal and 
achievement of their bonus. At this point, the first measure of justice perceptions is recorded, 
which is described in subsection 4.4.2. Participants are then informed about the existence of 
negative shocks to their performance, and participants in the non-control conditions also learn 
about the availability of discretionary ex-post goal adjustments. Throughout the instructions, I 
                                                          
40 Consistent with Anand et al. (2019), goals are based on rounds of ‘normal’ difficulty and incorporate expected 
learning. Participant goals are set as the lesser of 20 tables and 2.9 + 0.65*(Practice), where Practice represents 
cumulative participant performance in the two four-minute practice rounds. Goals assigned in a similar manner 
resulted in an overall goal attainment rate of 62% in Anand et al. (2019), which is broadly consistent with a 
moderately difficult goal attainment rate of 50% (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989). 
41 The parameterization of pay in the decoding task was kept consistent throughout my pilot studies, and resulted in 
participants spending a reasonable amount of time on the decoding task. I intended to keep the guaranteed pay of the 
decoding task to the lowest level possible that would still be considered non-trivial by participants, leading me to use  
$0.25 per minute. 
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administer comprehension checks to ensure that participants attend to the salient features of the 
compensation contract and setting. Participants are not permitted to proceed with the instructions 
until they correctly answer the comprehension check questions. All participant responses to 
comprehension checks are recorded. 
Just prior to the start of the production rounds, the second measure of justice perceptions 
are taken, then participants in the perspective taking conditions perform a perspective taking 
exercise (subsection 4.3.1). During the production rounds, participants are provided with the 
following information in real-time: 1) units of production completed in the round, 2) amount of 
time spent on the decoding task, and 3) amount of time left in the round. 
At the end of each round, all participants receive feedback showing their performance for 
the round, a reminder of their goal, and the average number of ‘1’s per matrix in the round just 
completed.42 In addition to this, participants in the non-control conditions learn whether they will 
receive a goal adjustment or not. After difficult rounds only, participants in the explanation 
conditions receive an explanation for management’s decision to perform or not perform ex-post 
adjustments (subsection 4.3.2). After the end of the fourth four-minute production round, the 
third and final measure of justice perceptions are taken, and then participants complete a post-
experimental questionnaire (section 4.5), after which they are paid and debriefed. 
 
 
                                                          
42 Disclosing the average number of ‘1’s per table in the round just completed removes any ambiguity about the 
difficulty of the past round. This reduces uncertainty to participants about whether or not to anticipate ex-post 
adjustments, since in the instructions they are told that ex-post adjustments may be performed in response to a 
difficult round.  
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4.3.1 Perspective Taking Manipulation 
As described above, just prior to the beginning of the production rounds, participants in 
the perspective taking conditions perform a perspective taking exercise. Specifically, participants 
are provided with a table summarizing the performance of two hypothetical employees who have 
both just faced a difficult round and have similar goals (Figure 4). Based on the performance and 
individual goals of the two hypothetical employees, one employee has just beat their goal by one 
unit of production, and the other has missed their goal by two units of production. Participants 
are required to propose a goal adjustment (if any) for these two employees such that the net goal 
adjustment equals zero, i.e., an upwards adjustment for one employee must be balanced with a 
downwards adjustment for the other.  
Importantly, participants are unable to propose a goal adjustment to help the lower 
performing employee without causing the higher performing employee to lose their bonus. This 
feature causes participants to experience the tension faced by management inherent to the zero-
sum nature of ex-post adjustments in my setting, that helping one employee necessarily hurts 
another. This choice was made in response to the results of my second pilot test, where I tried an 
implicit induction similar to the method described above, except that there were three employees: 
two who had met their goal, and one who had not. Importantly, it was possible for participants to 
suggest goal adjustments that would help the lower employee attain their goal without causing 
either of the higher performing employees to lose theirs. The majority of pilot participants 
suggested adjustments to help the lowest performing employee, and so did not experience the 
tension of being unable to help one employee without materially hurting another. Notably, this 
perspective taking manipulation does not provide perspective taking participants with 
incremental information over participants in the no perspective taking conditions. Relevant  
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Figure 4. Perspective taking manipulation 
Based on the information below, please propose goal adjustments to participants, if any, in the 
‘Proposed goal adjustment’ column. Remember that any proposed decreases to goals must be 
accompanied by an increase to another participant’s goal. The total of the ‘Proposed goal 
















1 Difficult 32 31  31 $3 
2 Difficult 27 29  29 $0 
   
Net 
Adjustment4 
   
 
When you are satisfied with your proposed goal adjustments, please fill in the following text 
fields and press the ‘Submit Adjustments’ button. 
Please explain your rationale for your proposed goal adjustments:6 
 
 
Imagine that you now have to provide explanations to these participants for your proposed goal 
adjustments. Please write out an explanation that you would provide to the participants who are 




1 Performance shown for employee 1 is always one greater than their goal, and always two less than their goal for 
employee 2. Therefore, there are no adjustments that participants can propose that would result in both employees 
attaining their goal and earning their bonus. 
2 Employees’ original goals are parameterized to be equal to the perspective taking participant’s own goal +/- 1. 
3 The proposed goal adjustment column is initially blank and contains a field in each row for participants to record 
their proposed goal adjustment. The instrument does not allow participants to continue if either field is left blank or 
if the net adjustment does not sum to zero. 
4 These fields update dynamically based on participant proposed adjustments. 
5 The amount of bonus earned is colour coded: green for employees earning a bonus, and red otherwise.  
6 The instrument does not allow participants to proceed if they leave either of these fields blank. 
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incremental information in this context could include the actual likelihood of goal adjustment or 
the number and sequence of normal and difficult rounds, which might influence participant effort 
choices for reasons other than those described in my hypotheses development.  
Most perspective taking manipulations in laboratory experiments involve asking 
participants to think about the internal state (thoughts, feelings, intentions) of some perspective 
taking target, then either writing a narrative from the target’s perspective (e.g. Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000), or having a group discussion about their thoughts (e.g. Epley et al. 2006). In 
my experiment, I never ask participants to explicitly take the perspective of management. 
Instead, it is through sharing the experience of management’s decision making that participants 
come to implicitly take the perspective of management by performing an exercise from 
management’s perspective.  
I chose to operationalize my perspective taking manipulation implicitly for several 
reasons. First, in my first pilot test, I used an explicit perspective taking induction similar to 
Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), asking participants to write a short essay about the thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions that management might have when faced with making ex-post 
adjustments. I found that participant narratives were still overwhelmingly egocentric in that the 
majority of participants fixated on helping employees who had missed their goals, ignoring the 
negative impact that goal adjustments would have on employees receiving upwards adjustments 
to goals. I view these narratives as egocentric, since they fail to recognize the tension faced by 
management, instead fixating on the types of helpful actions they would benefit from in the 
upcoming production rounds.  
66 
 
Second, studies have shown that explicit perspective taking relies on the perspective 
taker’s initial beliefs about the target. For example, Drolet et al. (1998) find that the positive 
effect of perspective taking is attenuated when the perspective taker has a negative working 
relationship with the target. Further, Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) find that if the perspective 
taking target exhibits clearly stereotypical traits, perspective taking increases stereotyping rather 
than suppressing it. Thus, explicit perspective taking can be coloured by contextual factors, such 
as salient stereotypes or prior interactions between employees and management. Theoretically, 
an implicit induction should avoid some of the cognitive biases described above, since 
management’s perspective is gained by employees through sharing management’s experience of 
the difficulty in deciding whether to make ex-post adjustments, rather than imagining what it 
must feel like. Finally, in my perspective taking manipulation, participants share the experience 
of management’s dilemma in deciding whether to make ex-post adjustments. Cortland et al. 
(2017) find in a series of experiments that increasing the salience of shared experiences between 
groups of racial and sexual minorities improve evaluations of and empathic concern for the other 
group. This provides evidence that a perspective taking intervention aimed at providing a shared 
experience between employees and management can be effective at improving employee 
evaluations of and concern for management.       
4.3.2 Explanation Provided 
As described above, after each of the two difficult rounds (rounds 2 and 3), participants 
in the explanation conditions are provided an explanation for management decision making.43 
For the 85% of participants who will not receive goal adjustments, the explanation provides a 
                                                          
43 Participants in the no explanation conditions simply receive a message showing the realization of whether ex-post 




justification for why management did not make an ex-post adjustment in their case. As described 
in my hypotheses development, both Libby (1999) and Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) find that 
explanations can be effective at improving performance when management accepts ownership of 
the decision resulting in unfavourable outcomes to employees, and when the explanation is 
perceived to be sincere and informationally valid. The explanation provided to participants after 
a difficult round (not receiving a goal adjustment) is as follows: 
“I have carefully considered making a goal adjustment. However, even though 
the last round was fairly difficult, I have decided not to reduce your goal. As 
experiment administrator, I must make difficult decisions that may not result in 
favourable outcomes for everyone. I sincerely hope that this outcome does not 
discourage you from pursuing your goal in future rounds.” 
 Following Libby (1999) and Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), I designed the explanation to 
focus on why the unfavourable outcomes experienced by participants should not be any different. 
This represents the decision-maker owning the decision that resulted in unfavourable outcomes, 
as opposed to claiming that the outcomes could not be any different by shifting blame to external 
factors. Further, the above explanation satisfies Greenberg’s (1993) sincerity criterion through its 
choice in language. Following Libby (1999), I use language such as ‘carefully considered’, and 
‘sincerely hope’ to signal my sensitivity towards my subordinates’ perceived unfairness. 
Greenberg (1993) found that such signals of interpersonal sensitivity improved perceptions of 
fairness and attenuated counter-productive work behaviours. The above explanation also satisfies 
Greenberg’s (1993) informational validity criterion by including information that is verifiable 
(previously included in instructions). In my third pilot test, I tested an explanation similar to the 
one shown above, except that it did not include the expressions of sincerity (first and last 
sentences); it was ineffective at improving justice perceptions or performance. I therefore added 
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the first and last sentences shown above to illustrate to participants my sensitivity towards the 
fact that they have just received an unfavourable outcome.44, 45  
4.4 Dependent Variables 
To test my hypotheses, I measure three primary dependent variables: 1) justice 
perceptions (both procedural and distributive), 2) performance, and 3) effort. I describe these 
variables and their measurement in this section.   
4.4.1 Justice Perceptions 
Each of my hypotheses make predictions with respect to justice perceptions. To measure 
justice perceptions in my experiment, I collect survey based self-reported measures of 
distributive and procedural justice perceptions based on Kelly et al. (2015), who use modified 
justice scales developed originally by Leventhal (1980), Thibaut and Walker (1975), and 
validated by Colquitt (2001) (Appendix I). In my first pilot test, I also included items in my 
justice questionnaire designed to measure perceptions of interactional justice, based on Colquitt 
and Rodell (2015). However, based on feedback from participants that the instrument was too 
lengthy, and the high degree of correlation between perceptions of interactional and procedural 
justice (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2011), I decided to remove these 
interactional justice items from my scale. As described above, I measure justice perceptions at 
three points in the experiment: 1) immediately after participants learn about the basic 
                                                          
44 It is possible that the final sentence in my explanation intervention could be perceived as explicitly encouraging 
participants to work hard. However, given the results of my third pilot test, I decided to employ a stronger 
manipulation to improve the likelihood of observing an explanation effect. 
45 I did not explicitly mention the zero-sum nature of goal adjustments in my explanation, since Colquitt and 
Chertkoff (2002) note that explanations are more effective when the source of the explanation takes responsibility 
for negative outcomes (as in my explanation) as opposed to shifting blame for the negative outcome to some other 
target.   
69 
 
remuneration scheme in the production round (bonus for goal attainment), 2) immediately before 
the beginning of the production round, and 3) immediately after the end of the production round. 
The first measurement of justice perceptions is intended to act as a baseline for justice 
perceptions in response to the basic bonus for goal attainment incentive contract. The second 
measurement captures participants’ reaction to important features of their environment, such as 
the existence of negative shocks (varying difficulty between rounds) and the availability of ex-
post adjustments, and serves as my measure of justice perceptions pre-observation of non-
helping behaviour used in all of my tests of hypotheses and the examination of my research 
question. The third and final measurement of justice perceptions captures participants’ reaction 
to experiencing negative exogenous shocks to their performance, not receiving an ex-post 
adjustment, as well as to my experimental manipulations (perspective taking and explanation), 
and serves as my measure of justice perceptions post-observation of non-helping behaviour 
required to evaluate H2, H3, H4, and RQ1. 
4.4.2 Performance 
Each of my hypotheses also makes a prediction about performance. As described above, 
the focal task in my experiment is the counting task so I am interested in measuring participant 
performance on that task. I measure performance as the number of units of the counting task 
completed by participants in a given production round. I define performance pre-observation of 
non-helping behaviour (used in all tests) as performance in rounds 1 and 2, with performance 






Effort is an important organizational outcome for management and accounting scholars, 
consisting of four dimensions, direction, duration, intensity, and strategy development (Bonner 
and Sprinkle 2002). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002, p 306) characterize the first three dimensions as 
effort “directed towards current performance”, whereas strategy development is effort “directed 
towards learning” and future performance. Since I use a simple, effort sensitive task, there are 
minimal opportunities for learning and strategy development. Therefore, in the current 
investigation, I focus on the dimensions of effort directed towards current performance: 
direction, duration, and intensity.  
Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) note that the performance management literature has 
typically focused on performance as the construct of interest, resulting in a lack of understanding 
of how incentives impact the various dimensions of effort (e.g., duration, intensity, and 
direction). In recent years, accounting academics have examined the impact of management 
controls on effort direction (e.g. Hannan, McPhee, Newman, and Tafkov 2013; 2019), but to the 
best of my knowledge, no studies have directly measured effort duration and intensity in the 
same experiment as constructs of interest.46  
As described in my hypotheses development, I employ a multi-task setting in my 
experiment. As a result, I am able to decompose performance on the counting task into effort 
duration and effort intensity. In my experiment, effort direction is constrained to the two tasks 
available to participants, counting and decoding. As such, effort direction cannot be 
                                                          
46 Psychology and accounting studies have measured effort duration as a proxy for effort (e.g. Bettman, Johnson, 
and Payne 1990; Libby and Lipe 1992), but these studies do not measure effort intensity. Choi, Clark, and Presslee 




distinguished from effort duration in my experiment, and so I focus on effort duration in this 
investigation. Consistent with Libby and Lipe (1992), I define effort duration as the amount of 
time a participant spends on the counting task in each production round, measured in seconds. 
Consistent with Anand et al. (2019), effort intensity is measured by taking performance for a 
given production round and scaling by effort duration. I believe this is a suitable measure of 
effort intensity as it is captures changes in effort as measured through performance, controlling 
for duration.     
4.5 Controls and Other Measured Variables 
In addition to the dependent variables of interest discussed in section 4.4, I measure one 
co-variate: baseline performance, and three process variables: 1) self-other overlap, 2) 
expectancy of goal attainment, and 3) expectancy of goal adjustment (for those in the non-
control conditions only). I describe these variables and their measurement in this section.   
4.5.1 Baseline Performance 
 Prior studies using tasks similar to my counting task (e.g. Abeler et al. 2011, Anand et al. 
2019) have reported between subjects variation in performance, attributed to individual 
differences in ability. To control for these between subjects differences, I collect a measure of 
baseline performance equal to the cumulative units of the counting task completed in the two 
practice rounds. Based on my pilot study and other studies who have adopted similar methods to 
control for individual ability (e.g. Libby 1999; Anand et al. 2019), practice round performance is 
a strong predictor of production round performance that is uncorrelated with my experimental 
manipulations. I believe practice round performance is an appropriate co-variate to control for 
individual ability in my analyses.   
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4.5.2 Self-other Overlap 
 As discussed in subsection 2.4.3, self-other overlap describes a process whereby an 
individual’s mental representation becomes similar to an other’s, increasing the degree to which 
the individual feels that they are similar to the other. This phenomenon is expected to mediate 
many of my predicted effects of perspective taking (section 3.5). For example, employees taking 
the perspective of management is expected to result in the transfer of positive self-evaluations 
(e.g. positive attributes, perceptions of fairness) from the employee to management, resulting in 
improved justice perceptions and performance. Therefore, I collect a survey based self-report 
measure of self-other overlap using the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) Scale (Appendix II) 
(Aron et al. 2012). The IOS scale has been well validated, consists of a one-item pictoral scale, 
and has been used in accounting studies to measure degree of connectedness (Bauer 2015). I 
collect my measure of self-other overlap in the post-experimental questionnaire, and use it as a 
manipulation check for perspective taking. 
4.5.3 Expectancy of Goal Attainment 
 Expectancy theories of motivation suggest that individuals are motivated to exert high 
levels of effort when they believe that doing so will result in high performance, leading to a 
desired reward (Vroom 1964; Klein 1991; Klein et al. 1999; Presslee, Vance, and Webb 2013). 
Although I am interested in examining the motivational implications of managers not making ex-
post adjustments, my hypothesized effects on effort and performance are mediated through 
justice perceptions rather than expectancy. However, as described in my literature review, in a 
volatile production environment, due to noise in performance measurement the effort-
performance relationship (expectancy) can become impaired (Bol 2008). Interventions aimed at 
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restoring the effort-performance relationship in such volatile environments, therefore, may be 
mediated through expectancy.     
 Following Anand et al. (2019), I measure expectancy of goal attainment by asking 
participants to indicate the percentage likelihood that they will attain their performance goal in a 
production round. I measure expectancy of goal attainment at the same time as I administer the 
justice questionnaire, i.e., at three points in my experiment: 1) after learning about the basic 
incentive contract (bonus for goal attainment), 2) just prior to the beginning of the production 
round, and 3) just after the end of the production round. As with the first measurement of justice 
perceptions, the first measurement of expectancy of goal attainment is intended to act as a 
baseline for use as a possible control variable. The second measurement will allow me to assess 
whether or not contextual factors in the production environment (negative shocks, absence of ex-
post adjustments) change expectancy of goal attainment, and the third will allow me to assess 
whether or not my interventions affect expectancy of goal attainment.    
4.5.4 Expectancy of Goal Adjustment 
Arnold and Artz (2015) find that the availability intra-period adjustments leads to 
decreased firm performance, hypothesized to occur due to employees opportunistically 
withholding effort in anticipation of an intra-year adjustment. As outlined in section 3.3, my 
predictions are somewhat at odds with those of Arnold and Artz (2015).47 However, Arnold and 
Artz (2015) are one of the few accounting studies to examine the motivational consequences of 
                                                          
47 In contrast to Arnold and Artz (2015), I predict a positive effect of the availability of ex-post adjustments on 
performance, through improved justice perceptions.   
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ex-post adjustments. I believe this warrants collecting the expectancy of goal adjustment as a 
process measure to test their model as an alternative to mine. 
To measure expectancy of goal adjustment, I ask participants to indicate the percentage 
likelihood that they will receive a goal adjustment in response to a negative event. I measure 
expectancy of goal adjustment at the same time as I administer the justice questionnaire, and 
intend to examine it as a possible alternative mediator for performance effects observed in my 
experiment. The expectancy of goal adjustment item is only administered to those in the non-
control conditions, since participants in the control condition do not learn of and are not eligible 
for ex-post adjustments.  
4.6 Summary 
 In this chapter, I explained that to test my hypotheses, I run a laboratory experiment 
employing a 2x2 + 1 control condition between subjects design. I described the economic setting 
of my experiment, including the basic incentive contract (bonus for goal attainment), and how I 
operationalized important contextual factors inherent to the ex-post adjustment setting (existence 
of negative events, availability of ex-post adjustments). I described my choice of participant 
pool, as well as an overview of my experimental procedures and manipulations. Finally, I 
described the measurement and collection of my key dependent variables (justice perceptions, 
performance, effort), as well as for my intended covariates (baseline performance) and process 
variables (self-other overlap, expectancy of goal attainment, expectancy of goal adjustment). In 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I describe the results of my four sets of formal hypotheses tests, and 
examine my one set of research questions. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. 
In section 5.2, I discuss the results of my attention and manipulation checks. In section 5.3, I 
report results of confirmatory factor analysis for my measurement model of organizational 
justice. In sections 5.4 – 5.8, I formally test my four sets of hypotheses and my one set of 
research questions described in Chapter 3. In section 5.9, I test the fit of my theoretical model 
and compare it to alternative models. In section 5.10, I examine the effect of my experimental 
manipulations on effort duration and effort intensity. In section 5.11, I analyze participant goal 
attainment in normal rounds. I provide summary remarks in section 5.12. 
 5.2 Attention and Manipulation Checks 
 In this section, I discuss the results of my attention and manipulation checks. In total, I 
recruited 169 undergraduate business students from a Canadian university to take part in my 
experiment. Of these participants, 22 received random ex-post adjustments and are excluded 
from my main analyses, leaving me with a final sample of 147 participants (Table 1). On 
average, participants were 20.2 years old, and had 22.2 months of work experience, with 49.7% 
of participants identifying as female. One-way ANOVA of my demographic variables on 
Condition (untabulated), a categorical variable with five levels, one for each experimental 
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condition, show that these demographic variables do not differ significantly by condition (all p > 
0.20, two-tailed).48 
Table 1.  Mean (standard deviation) of gender, age, and work experience by condition 
Condition1 Condition Label2 n Gender3 Age4 
Work 
Experience5 






















































1 Condition describes which of the five experimental conditions participants belong to. Participants in the 
explanation (no explanation) conditions receive (do not receive) an explanation for management decision making 
accompanying their end of round feedback. Participants in the perspective taking (no perspective taking) conditions 
are provided (are not provided) with perspective taking training just prior to the start of the first production round. 
2 Condition label provides a descriptive label for each condition, and is used throughout Chapter 5 (not italicized, 
title cased), and in the remainder of the tables to describe conditions. 
3 Gender describes the proportion of participants who indicated female in the demographic questionnaire. 
4 Age describes participants’ mean stated age in years. 
5 Work Experience describes participants’ mean stated work experience in months. 
5.2.1 Attention Checks 
 In addition to the comprehension check questions administered during the experimental 
instructions described in section 4.3, I ask participants two attention check questions in the post-
experimental questionnaire (Q2-Q3 in Appendix III). In my first attention check (Q2), I ask 
participants to rate their agreement with the statement “My performance in some periods was 
                                                          
48 Further, none of the demographic variables are significantly correlated with any of my dependent variables. 
Therefore, I do not include any demographic variables as covariates in my tests of hypotheses. 
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negatively impacted by the increased difficulty of these periods”.49 This question assesses 
participant attention to negative uncontrollable events as a feature of their production 
environment, as well as their belief that the existence of these events negatively impacts 
performance. In my second attention check question (Q3), I ask participants to rate their 
agreement with the statement “The experimental administrator had the ability to reduce the 
impact of this increased difficulty on my performance”. The purpose of this question is to assess 
whether participants in the Non-Control conditions attended to the ex-post adjustment policy and 
whether they believed that the experimental administrator could help them.50 I focus on Non-
Control participants for Q3 because Control participants do not learn of and do not have ex-post 
adjustments in their compensation contract.51 
The average participant response to Q2 across all conditions is 3.2, which based on 
results of a one-sample t-test, is significantly greater than the midpoint of 2 (p < 0.01, one-
tailed), indicating that on average, participants agreed that negative uncontrollable events 
negatively impacted their performance. A one-sample t-test on Q3 responses reveals that average 
participant response in Non-Control conditions is 2.9, which is significantly greater than the 
midpoint of 2 (p < 0.01, one-tailed). This indicates that on average, Non-Control participants 
                                                          
49 All attention check questions were asked on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (0) to 
“Strongly Agree” (4). 
50 Attention to all key elements of my compensation contracts are assessed through comprehension checks 
administered during the instructions (see section 4). However, I decided to ask participants these two attention check 
questions in the post-experimental questionnaire because they are key features of the participants’ information 
environment. Further, as worded, these questions do not merely capture attention, they in part measure participants’ 
perceptions about how these features impact their performance on the experimental task.  
51 For consistency and clarity, throughout Chapter 5, I refer to conditions by their condition label defined in Table 1, 




attended to the ex-post adjustment policy and believed that the experimental administrator was 
able to reduce the impact of negative events using ex-post adjustments.52 
5.2.2 Manipulation Checks 
As discussed in my literature review (subsection 2.4.2), in an organizational context, 
explanations are causal accounts or justifications provided to employees for management 
decision making. To assess the effectiveness of my explanation manipulation, I ask participants 
to rate their agreement with the statement “I was provided adequate justification for decisions 
made during this experiment that impacted my performance and pay.” (Appendix III, Q1).53 The 
purpose of this question is to assess whether participants receiving an explanation perceive the 
explanation provided to be adequate. Results of a one-sample t-test indicate that participant 
responses in the Explanation Only condition differ significantly from the scale midpoint of 2 (M 
= 2.7, p < 0.01, one-tailed).54 This suggests that on average, participants receiving only an 
explanation perceived these explanations to be adequate.55 To further assess the effectiveness of 
my explanation manipulation, I ask Non-Control participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement “Deciding whether or not to make a goal adjustment to help out an employee is a 
difficult decision.” (Appendix III, Q4). This question assesses the degree to which participants 
receiving either intervention are aware of the dilemma faced by management making goal 
adjustments in my setting. Because participants stand to benefit from ex-post adjustments during 
                                                          
52 A one-way ANOVA on Condition (untabulated, excluding Control participants for Q3) show that responses to 
attention check questions do not differ by treatment condition (all p > 0.20). 
53 All manipulation check questions with the exception of the IOS Scale were asked on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (0) to “Strongly Agree” (4). 
54 Since I do not make predictions about the interactive effects of perspective taking and explanation, analysis of 
manipulation checks and tests of hypotheses regarding the effects of perspective taking and explanation exclude 
Both Intervention participants.  
55 Including participants in the Both Interventions condition yields the same result that participants receiving an 
explanation perceive it to be adequate (M = 2.4, p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
79 
 
the experiment, but do not receive any during the production periods, I expect egocentrically 
biased participants to rate the decision to make ex-post adjustments as easy. I expect participants 
receiving either intervention to rate the decision as more difficult as they should have a more 
nuanced understanding of the tension management faces in making these adjustments. A two-
sample t-test on participant responses indicates that participants in the Explanation Only 
condition (M = 2.9) rated the decision to make ex-post adjustments as more difficult than 
participants in the No Intervention condition (M = 2.8). However, this difference is not 
significant (p = 0.28, one-tailed).56 Overall, results from the manipulation check questions 
provide some evidence that my explanation manipulation was successful. 
 To assess the effectiveness of my perspective taking manipulation, I ask two 
manipulation check questions in my post-experimental questionnaire, and also code participant 
responses to the perspective taking exercise described in subsection 4.3.1. The hypothesized 
effects of perspective taking in my experiment (section 3.5) are predicted to occur due to 
increased self-other overlap between the participant and the experimental administrator. To 
measure self-other overlap, I administer the Inclusion of the Other in the Self (hereafter IOS, 
Appendix 2) scale to participants in the post-experimental questionnaire. The IOS scale was 
developed by Aron et al. (2012) and is a one-item 7-point pictoral scale depicting two circles 
representing the self and the other in varying degrees of overlap, ranging from no overlap (0) to 
almost fully overlapped (6). A two-sample t-test of participant responses to the IOS scale 
indicates that participants in the Perspective Only condition (M = 0.8) did not perceive a greater 
degree of self-other overlap than participants in the No Intervention condition (M = 1.1) (p = 
                                                          
56 Including participants in the Both Interventions condition, I observe that participants receiving an explanation (M 
= 3.0) rate the ex-post adjustment decision as more difficult than participants in the No Intervention condition (M  = 
2.8) but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.12, one-tailed).  
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0.77, one-tailed). These results suggest that my perspective taking training exercise did not 
induce self-other overlap as measured using the IOS scale.57 As in the case of explanation, I ask 
Non-Control participants to indicate whether performing an ex-post adjustment is a difficult 
decision (Appendix III, Q4). Results of a two-sample t-test indicate that Perspective Only 
participants (M = 2.7) did not rate the decision to make ex-post adjustments as more difficult 
than participants in the No Intervention condition (M = 2.8, p = 0.54, one-tailed). These results 
suggest that my perspective taking manipulation did not increase participants’ perceptions of the  
difficulty of the ex-post goal adjustment decision.   
 To further assess the effectiveness of my perspective taking manipulation, I code and 
analyze participant responses to the perspective taking exercise. In the perspective taking 
exercise, participants perform goal adjustments for a pair of hypothetical employees, provide a 
justification for their decision as well as an explanation to the hypothetical employees for their 
decision. On average, participants receiving perspective taking training suggested a positive 
adjustment to the top performing hypothetical employee (Table 2, Panel A, M = 0.8).58 Results of 
a one-sample t-test indicate that the average adjustment is significantly greater than zero (p < 
0.01, two-tailed), but not significantly different from one (p = 0.33, two-tailed). An increase to 
the top performer’s goal of one maintains the status quo in that there is no change in goal 
attainment for each employee as a result of the adjustment. This exercise reinforces the idea to 
perspective taking participants that management’s decisions can be constrained such that they are  
                                                          
57 Batson et al. (1997) notes that although the IOS scale is often used to measure self-other overlap, it can be low 
powered when examining relationships between strangers. Appropriately, I have collected additional manipulation 
checks to assess the effectiveness of my perspective taking manipulation. 
58 Recall that the top performing employee has beaten their goal by one unit of production, whereas the bottom 
performing employee has missed their goal by two units of production. Due to the zero-sum nature of goal 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics for metrics of perspective taking success 
Panel A. Mean (standard deviation) of adjustment, cognitive perspective taking success, 
and group orientation by condition 
Condition Label1 n Adjust2 CogPT3 Group4 























Panel B. Coding distribution by condition 
Condition Label Code5 Adjust CogPT Group 
 0 9 9 14 
Perspective Only 1 14 17 14 
 2 7 4 2 
 0 11 9 15 
Both Interventions 1 11 12 12 
 2 7 8 2 
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. 
2 Adjust describes the mean proposed adjustment to the top performing employee in the perspective taking exercise 
performed by participants in the perspective taking conditions. 
3 CogPT describes participants’ degree of success in taking the cognitive perspective of management in the 
perspective taking exercise on a scale from 0 to 2. Participants were coded as high in cognitive perspective taking if 
their response indicated a sensitivity towards the constraints faced by management in making ex-post adjustments, 
and were coded as low in cognitive perspective taking otherwise. 
4 Group describes participants’ degree of group or other-focused orientation on a scale from 0 to 2. Participants were 
coded as high in group orientation if their response focused on group outcomes over individual outcomes, and were 
coded as low in group orientation otherwise.  
5 Code describes the value coded for each participant. For Adjust, values less than 0 are included in the ‘0’ code 
category, and values greater than 2 are included in the ‘2’ code category. 
not always able to help underperforming employees. The fact that the average suggested goal 
adjustment to the top performer is less than, but not significantly different from one, indicates 
that on average, participants in the Perspective Only and Both Interventions conditions did not 
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suggest egocentric goal adjustments.59 This provides some evidence that my perspective taking 
manipulation accomplished its intended purpose. That is, to reinforce and make available the 
cognition that management must sometimes make decisions that do not result in favourable 
outcomes for all. 
In addition to the magnitude of participant adjustments discussed above, I also examine 
participants’ justification for their proposed adjustments. With the help of an independent coder, 
I coded participant perspective taking responses on two variables: the degree to which 
participants took management’s cognitive perspective (CogPT), and the degree to which 
participants adopted a group orientation in their response (Group).60 Participant responses were 
coded on a scale from 0 to 2 increasing in their degree of successful cognitive perspective taking 
and group orientation.61 Participants whose responses indicate an awareness or sensitivity of 
management’s constraints in performing ex-post adjustments, such as by referencing the zero-
sum nature of adjustments, are coded as being high (2) in CogPT. Responses that fixate only on 
helping the underperforming employee are coded as being low (0) in CogPT, with responses 
falling in between coded as being moderate (1) in CogPT. Similarly, participants whose 
responses indicate a group or other-focused orientation, such as by referencing how goal 
adjustments impact employees at a group level, are rated as being high in Group (2). Similarly, 
responses that mainly reference individual outcomes are coded as low in Group (0), with 
                                                          
59 Participants are not provided with any contextual cues that would justify helping the lower performing employee 
at the expense of materially hurting the top performing employee. Therefore, I consider an adjustment of two or 
greater to the top performer’s goal to be egocentrically biased, since it is consistent with their preference to be 
helped in the upcoming production rounds. 
60 The independent coder is a doctoral student who is blind to condition and hypotheses. 
61 I expect perspective taking to improve participants’ ability to take management’s cognitive perspective, which is 
why I code perspective taking responses on CogPT. In addition to this, it is possible that my perspective taking 
exercise improves other-regarding behaviour more broadly, which is why I code responses on Group.  
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responses falling in between coded as being moderate (1) in Group.62 Cronbach’s alpha for both 
CogPT and Group show a high degree of initial inter-rater reliability (α = 0.96 and 0.95 
respectively). Initial inter-rater agreement for both CogPT and Group was 91.5%, with all coding 
discrepancies discussed and reconciled to generate the final codes used in analysis.  
Analysis of participant responses show that on average, participants in the Perspective 
Only and Both Interventions conditions were moderately successful in taking management’s 
cognitive perspective, with a mean CogPT of 0.90 (Table 2, Panel A).63 Further, only 18 
participants (9 per condition, 30%) were coded as having failed at taking management’s 
cognitive perspective (0), indicating that the remaining 70% of participants were at least 
moderately successful in taking management’s cognitive perspective (Table 2, Panel B). 
Analysis of Group shows that participants were split on whether they adopted an other-focused 
group orientation, with mean Group being 0.58 across the two perspective taking conditions 
(Table 2, Panel A). Further, 29 participants in total (49%), 14 in the Perspective Only condition 
and 15 in the Both Interventions condition, were coded as 0 on Group, suggesting that the 
perspective taking exercise is only weakly successful in inducing a group or other-focused 
orientation. I further explore the consequences of CogPT and Group on manipulation and 
attention check responses by regressing responses to my manipulation check questions on CogPT 
and Group, finding that neither are significantly associated with self-other overlap as measured 
by the IOS scale (untabulated, all p > 0.20, two-tailed), or the perception of whether negative 
events influenced performance (untabulated, all p > 0.20, two-tailed). I find that CogPT has a 
negative but insignificant effect on perceptions of the adequacy of management explanations 
                                                          
62 A more detailed coding protocol provided to the independent coder is provided in Appendix IV. 
63 Mean CogPT of 1 suggests that on average, participants achieved moderate success in taking management’s 
cognitive perspective.  
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(untabulated, p = 0.28, two-tailed). However, I find that CogPT has a significantly negative 
impact on participant perception of whether management is able to use goal adjustments to offset 
the impact of negative events (untabulated, p = 0.05, two-tailed), whereas Group has a 
directionally positive impact on these perceptions (untabulated, p = 0.15, two-tailed). Taken 
together, these results suggest that my perspective taking manipulation was somewhat successful 
in helping participants to adopt management’s cognitive perspective, but was not successful in 
inducing a group or other-focused orientation.  
5.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Justice Questionnaire 
 As discussed in subsection 4.4.1, I measure procedural and distributive justice 
perceptions at three points in my experiment: 1) immediately after the bonus for goal attainment 
compensation contract is described to participants, 2) immediately before the start of the 
production rounds, and 3) immediately after the end of the production rounds. These are labelled 
timepoints A, B, and C respectively. Further, organizational justice scholars consider procedural 
and distributive justice to be two distinct theoretical constructs (subsection 2.3.1). To assess how 
my data fits the theoretical two-factor model, I perform confirmatory factor analysis on my seven 
justice questionnaire items (Appendix I). Results of my confirmatory factor analysis indicates 
that at all timepoints, justice questionnaire items load significantly on their respective theoretical 
latent constructs (Table 3, Panel A; β ranges from 0.70 to 0.90, all p < 0.01). Analysis of fit 
statistics also show reasonable fit to the theoretical two-factor model at each of the three 




Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis of organizational justice measurement model 
Panel A. Standardized coefficients for confirmatory factor analysis on two-factor and one-
factor models of organizational justice at timepoints A, B, and C  
Timepoint1 Two-factor model One-factor model 
 Item 
Latent 
Factor β SE Item 
Latent 
Factor β SE 
 PJ1 PJ 0.75  PJ1 J 0.72  
 PJ2 PJ 0.86 0.12 PJ2 J 0.84 0.12 
 PJ3 PJ 0.75 0.12 PJ3 J 0.74 0.13 
A DJ1 DJ 0.72  DJ1 J 0.71 0.13 
 DJ2 DJ 0.71 0.11 DJ2 J 0.69 0.12 
 DJ3 DJ 0.70 0.12 DJ3 J 0.69 0.13 
 DJ4 DJ 0.90 0.12 DJ4 J 0.90 0.12 
 PJ1 PJ 0.84  PJ1 J 0.80  
 PJ2 PJ 0.82 0.09 PJ2 J 0.78 0.09 
 PJ3 PJ 0.78 0.09 PJ3 J 0.74 0.10 
B DJ1 DJ 0.77  DJ1 J 0.75 0.10 
 DJ2 DJ 0.82 0.09 DJ2 J 0.79 0.09 
 DJ3 DJ 0.74 0.09 DJ3 J 0.72 0.09 
 DJ4 DJ 0.89 0.10 DJ4 J 0.90 0.09 
 PJ1 PJ 0.71  PJ1 J 0.64  
 PJ2 PJ 0.86 0.14 PJ2 J 0.82 0.16 
 PJ3 PJ 0.76 0.12 PJ3 J 0.71 0.14 
C DJ1 DJ 0.87  DJ1 J 0.86 0.18 
 DJ2 DJ 0.88 0.06 DJ2 J 0.86 0.17 
 DJ3 DJ 0.81 0.07 DJ3 J 0.81 0.16 
 DJ4 DJ 0.83 0.07 DJ4 J 0.83 0.16 
 
Panel B. Goodness of fit statistics for two-factor and one-factor models of organizational 
justice at timepoints A, B, and C  
Timepoint 
Two-factor model One-factor model 
χ2 SRMR2 RMSEA3 CFI4 χ2 SRMR RMSEA CFI 
A 70.13 0.055 0.173 0.908 76.19 0.062 0.174 0.900 
B 46.07 0.044 0.132 0.951 63.27 0.055 0.155 0.927 








Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis of organizational justice measurement model 
(continued) 
Panel C. Goodness of fit statistics for two-factor and one-factor models of organizational 
justice at timepoints A, B, and C  
 Two-Factor model One-Factor model 
 AIC5 BIC5 AIC BIC 
A 2492.24 2558.03 2496.29 2559.10 
B 2427.19 2492.99 2442.39 2505.19 
C 2588.74 2654.53 2605.43 2668.23 
 
Notes: 
1 Timepoint refers to one of three points in the experiment when the justice questionnaire was administered to 
participants. Timepoint A occurs right after the basic bonus for goal attainment compensation contract is explained 
to participants; timepoint B occurs right before the commencement of the production rounds; timepoint C occurs 
right after the end of the production rounds. 
2 SRMR represents the standardized root mean square residual, is an absolute measure of fit, and is calculated as the 
standardized difference between observed and predicted correlations. Values less than 0.08 are indicative of good 
model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
3 RMSEA represents the root mean square error of approximation, is an absolute measure of fit based on the non-
centrality parameter. Values less than 0.05 are indicative of good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
4 CFI represents the comparative fit index, is an incremental measure of fit based on the non-centrality parameter. 
Values greater than 0.90 are indicative of acceptable model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
5 AIC and BIC represent the Akaike information criterion, and the Bayesian information criterion respectively, and 
describe the amount of information lost when fitting a candidate model to a data generating process. When selecting 
between candidate models, models with lower AIC and BIC lose less information when fitting to the data, and are 
preferred over models with higher AIC and BIC (Vrieze, 2012). 
0.06) indicate poor model fit, whereas the SRMR (all SMRM < 0.08) indicates good model fit, 
and CFI indicates mediocre to good fit (ranging from 0.908 to 0.951).64  
Because examination of the fit indices does not unanimously support the conclusion of a 
good model fit, I examine the fit of an alternative one-factor model where my justice 
questionnaire simply captures general justice perceptions, not distinguishing between procedural 
and distributive justice. Analysis of this alternative model shows that the justice questionnaire 
items load significantly onto a single justice construct (Table 3, Panel A; β ranges from 0.64 to 
                                                          
64 Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that RMSEA < 0.06, SRMR < 0.08, and CFI > 0.95 are reasonable cut-offs for 
good model fit. 
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0.90, all p < 0.01). Further, fit indices suggest this model fits the data similarly to the two-factor 
model, but has directionally poorer fit according to SRMR, RMSEA, and CFI fit indices (Table 
3, Panel B).65 In addition, examination of comparative fit indices AIC and BIC (Table 3, Panel 
C) indicate that at each timepoint, there is somewhat greater information lost (greater AIC and 
BIC) by the one-factor model relative to the two-factor model, suggesting that the two-factor 
model better fits the data (Vrieze 2012).66 Finally, Cronbach’s alpha indicates a high degree of 
inter-item reliability for my justice scale at all timepoints under assumptions of a two-factor 
model (α ranges from 0.83 to 0.91) or a one-factor model (α ranges from 0.90 to 0.92). The 
above analyses indicate that the two-factor model fits the data no better than the one-factor 
model. Since the one-factor model is more parsimonious, and there is no other justification to 
favour the two-factor model, I have decided to opt for the one-factor model in my measurement 
of organizational justice. As such, in subsequent tests of hypotheses and supplemental analyses 
involving justice perceptions, I use a single composite measure of overall justice calculated as 




                                                          
65 Since my models are not nested, I cannot use a difference in χ2 test to assess whether my theoretical two-factor 
model fits significantly better than my alternative one-factor model. However, I can examine comparative fit indices 
such as AIC or BIC, which measure the amount of information lost by model to compare non-nested models 
(Vrieze, 2012). 
66 AIC and BIC represent the Akaike information criterion, and the Bayesian information criterion respectively, and 
describe the amount of information lost when fitting a candidate model to a data generating process. A perfectly 
fitting model would have zero information loss when fitting the model to the data generating process (Burnham and 
Anderson 2004). 
67 Since my justice items are measured on the same scale, and the range of standardized loadings is small (β ranges 
from 0.70 – 0.90), I calculate composite variables through summation of item scores instead of calculating factor 
scores to make the change in justice perception across timepoints more comparable. 
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5.4 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 My first hypotheses predict a positive effect of the announcement of an ex-post 
adjustment policy on perceptions of overall justice (H1a) and performance (H1b). Recall that this 
announcement effect is expected to manifest in the period between the announcement and the 
first realization of management’s decision to not perform an ex-post adjustment. Specifically, 
overall justice perceptions immediately after announcement (PJB) and performance in the first 
two rounds (Prod12) are expected to be greater for Non-Control participants relative to Control 
participants.68 Descriptive statistics for overall justice perceptions can be found in Table 4. 
Across all conditions mean baseline overall justice perceptions (JA) is 19.8 out of a maximum of 
28 (Panel A). A one-way ANOVA of JA on Condition (untabulated) show that baseline justice 
perceptions do not differ significantly by condition (p > 0.20, two-tailed). Examination of JB 
show that post-announcement, mean perceptions of overall justice decreases from 19.8 to 18.0.  
Descriptive statistics for practice round and production rounds one and two performance 
can be found in Table 5, Panel A. Mean performance for the eight-minute practice round 
(Practice) is 33.3 units of production across all conditions. A one-way ANOVA of Practice on 
Condition (untabulated) shows that Practice does not differ significantly by condition (p > 0.20, 
two-tailed). Performance in the first normal four-minute production round (Prod1) on average is 
23.8 units of production across all conditions, and performance in the first difficult four-minute 
production round (Prod2) on average is 11.8 units.   
                                                          
68 Only production in the first two rounds is considered for H1b, as it is after the end of the 2nd production round that 
participants have faced their first difficult period, for which they may expect an ex-post adjustment. After the 2nd 
production round, I expect the observation that management has not performed an ex-post adjustment to result in 
different justice and performance effects, discussed in the next subsections. 
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Table 4. Mean (standard deviation) of overall justice perceptions at timepoints A, B, and C, 
by condition  













































1 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. 
2 JA, JB, and JC refer to participants’ mean perceptions of overall justice, as measured using an organizational 
justice scale based on Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980), and validated by Colquitt (2001), 
containing seven items measuring procedural and distributive justice, responses to which are summed to form a 
composite overall justice measure at timepoints A, B, and C. 
 In order to test H1a, I regress JB on the dummy variable Adjustment, which describes 
whether participants were in the Control condition (0) or not (1), and baseline overall justice 
perceptions (JA) as a co-variate.69,70 Results of this regression (Table 6, Panel A) show no effect 
of Adjustment on JB, (p = 0.32, two-tailed). Therefore, I do not find support for H1a.  
  
                                                          
69 Though I present my multi-variate analyses as regressions, as modelled, they are mathematically equivalent to 
ANCOVA (van Breukelen, 2013). Further, I employ a levels approach to analyzing my data in H1, using the level of 
post-treatment as my dependent variable and controlling for the level of pre-treatment. van Breukelen (2013) argue 
that so long as groups are randomly assigned, as in my experiment, this approach is preferred over using change 
scores (post-treatment less pre-treatment) as the dependent variable.    
70 Although I considered the possibility that baseline ability on the task (Practice) may affect justice perceptions, I 
observe that Practice does not correlate significantly with any of my composite justice variables at any timepoint. 
So, I do not include Practice as a covariate in any analyses regarding justice perceptions. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for performance variables 
Panel A. Mean (standard deviation) of performance in practice round and production 
rounds 1-2 by condition  

























































Panel B. Mean (standard deviation) of performance in production rounds 3-4 by condition  













































1 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. 
2 Practice refers to the mean number of tables counted by participants in the eight-minute practice round. 
3 Prod* refers to the mean number of tables counted by participants in round *. For example, Prod1 represents the 
number of tables counted by participants in round 1, and Prod12 represents the cumulative number of tables counted 
by participants in rounds 1 and 2.  
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Table 6. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Panel A. Effect of announcement on perceptions of procedural justice (n=147) 
 
Model: JBi





 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 6.2 4.17 <0.001 
   Adjustment -1.0 -1.00 0.321 
   JA 0.6 8.31 <0.001 
Adjusted R2 31.59%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of announcement on cumulative performance in rounds 1 and 2 (n=147) 
 
Model: Prod12i
4 = β0 + β1Adjustmenti + β2Practicei
4
 + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 13.9 4.29 <0.001 
   Adjustment 2.1 1.06 0.291 
   Practice 0.7 7.22 <0.001 
Adjusted R2 26.64%   
 
 
Panel C. Effect of announcement on performance in round 1 (n=147) 
 
Model: Prod1i
4 = β0 + β1Adjustmenti + β2Practicei + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 4.9 2.80 0.006 
   Adjustment 0.4 0.34 0.736 
   Practice 0.6 11.48 <0.001 








Table 6. Tests of Hypothesis 1 (continued) 
Panel D. Effect of announcement on performance in round 2 (n=147) 
 
Model: Prod2i
4 = β0 + β1Adjustmenti + β2Practicei + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 9.0 4.01 <0.001 
   Adjustmenti 2.5 1.79 0.076 
   Practicei 0.1 1.54 0.126 
Adjusted R2 26.64%   
 
 
Panel E. Effect of announcement on performance in round 2 controlling for procedural 
justice perceptions (n=147) 
 
Model: Prod2i = β0 + β1Adjustmenti + β2Practicei + β3JBi + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 6.2 2.15 0.033 
   Adjustmenti 2.6 1.85 0.067 
   Practicei 0.1 1.68 0.095 
   JBi 0.1 1.52 0.130 
Adjusted R2 3.61%   
 
 
Panel F. Effect of expectancy of goal adjustment on performance in round 2, including 
Control participants (n=147) 
 
Model: Prod2i = β0 + β1Adjustmenti + β2Practicei + β3JBi + β4ExpectancyGAdjBi
5 + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 6.1 1.93 0.055 
   Adjustmenti 2.5 1.31 0.192 
   Practicei 0.1 1.68 0.096 
   JBi 0.1 1.50 0.135 
   ExpectancyGAdjBi <0.1 0.08 0.937 





Table 6. Tests of Hypothesis 1 (continued) 
Panel G. Effect of expectancy of goal adjustment on performance in round 2, excluding 
Control participants (n=118) 
 
Model: Prod2i = β0 + β1Practicei + β2JBi + β3ExpectancyGAdjBi
 + ui 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 7.1 1.99 0.049 
   Practicei 0.1 1.06 0.291 
   JBi 0.1 1.40 0.166 
   ExpectancyGAdjBi <0.1 0.03 0.979 
Adjusted R2 -0.25%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 4. 
2 Adjustment is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the participant is in a Non-Control condition, and a 
value of zero otherwise. Participants in the Control condition do not learn of the existence of ex-post adjustments 
and are not eligible for such adjustments.  
3 ui represents the error term. 
4 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 5. 
5 ExpectancyGAdj* represents participants views on the likelihood that they will receive a goal adjustment from 
management, measured as a percentage at one of three timepoints, A, B, or C. For example, ExpectancyGAdjB 
represents the mean perceived likelihood of goal adjustment for participants as measured at timepoint B. 
In order to test H1b, I regress Prod12 on Adjustment, including baseline ability (Practice) 
as a co-variate.71 Results of this regression (Table 6, Panel B) show a positive but insignificant 
effect of Adjustment on performance (p = 0.15, one-tailed). To gain a better understanding of this 
relationship, I perform my test of H1b with alternate dependent variables: 1) performance in 
round 1, the first normal round (Prod1), and 2) performance in round 2, the first difficult round 
(Prod2). Results of these regressions (Table 6, Panel C and Panel D) show that there is no effect 
of Adjustment on Prod1 (p = 0.37, one-tailed), but that there is a significant positive effect of 
                                                          
71 Other than Practice, representing baseline ability on the production task, no demographic variable correlates 
significantly with performance in any round, and so only Practice is included as a covariate in my tests of 
hypotheses concerning performance. 
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Adjustment on Prod2 (p = 0.04, one-tailed). Overall, these results provide some support for H1b 
in showing a positive announcement effect on performance in the first difficult round.  
Further analysis (Table 6, Panel E) shows that this positive announcement effect persists 
when controlling for JB (p = 0.03, one-tailed). These results suggest that although overall justice 
perceptions positively impact performance as predicted (p = 0.07, one-tailed), there is an 
announcement effect that operates independently of justice perceptions. Theory suggests that 
participants anticipating a goal adjustment may persist longer in the face of a difficult period 
because they may anticipate a goal adjustment to compensate for the difficulty of the round. To 
explore this possibility, I include the expectancy of goal adjustment at timepoint B 
(ExpectancyGAdjB) as a regressor in my model of round 2 performance. I perform this analyses 
two ways, including or excluding Control participants.72 Results of the analysis including 
Control participants (Table 6, Panel F) show no effect of ExpectancyGAdjB on Prod2 (p = 0.47, 
one-tailed), with the effect of Adjustment on Prod2 still being marginally significant (p = 0.10, 
one-tailed). Results of the analysis excluding Control participants (Table 6, Panel G) show no 
effect of ExpectancyGAdjB on Prod2 (p = 0.49, one-tailed). Taken together, these analyses do 
not support the assertion that the positive announcement effect on round 2 performance is due to 
Non-Control participants expecting a goal adjustment. 
 In summary, my formal tests do not provide support for H1a, but provide some support 
for H1b. In contrast to my predictions, I do not observe a positive announcement effect on 
overall justice perceptions. However, I observe a significantly positive announcement effect on 
                                                          
72 I collect a measure of participants’ expectancy of goal adjustment, but only present it to Non-Control participants, 
since Control participants do not have goal adjustments in their contract. Therefore, I cannot directly test the 
relationship between Adjustment and ExpectancyGAdjB. As an alternative test, I code ExpectancyGAdjB as zero in 
my analysis including Control participants. 
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performance in the first difficult round, round 2. Further analyses show that this positive 
announcement effect on round 2 performance persists when controlling for overall justice 
perceptions, suggesting that part of the announcement effect on performance occurs 
independently of overall justice perceptions. Finally, I find no support for the conjecture that the 
positive announcement effect observed in the first difficult round is due to Non-Control 
participants anticipating goal adjustments.    
5.5 Test of Hypothesis 2 
My second set of hypotheses predict that after participants first face a difficult round and 
do not receive an ex-post adjustment, i.e. they observe non-helping behaviour, their perceptions 
of overall justice will worsen (H2a) and their performance will suffer (H2b). Recall that this 
effect is expected to occur in the absence of a fairness intervention. Specifically, overall justice 
perceptions post-observation of non-helping behaviour (JC) are expected to worsen relative to 
overall justice perceptions prior to observing non-helping behaviour (JB) for participants in the 
No Intervention condition. Similarly, performance post-observation of non-helping behaviour 
(Prod34) is expected to suffer relative to performance prior to observing non-helping behaviour 
(Prod12) for No Intervention participants.  
Descriptive statistics for overall justice perceptions pre and post-observation of non-
helping behaviour can be found in Table 4. Mean overall justice perceptions for participants in 
the No Intervention condition in the pre-period is 17.6 (JB), dropping to 15.0 (PJC) in the post-
period. Descriptive statistics for performance post-observation of non-helping behaviour can be 
found in Table 5, Panel A and Panel B. Mean cumulative performance in the pre-period for No 
Intervention participants is 37.9 units of production (Panel A), dropping to 26.4 units of 
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production (Panel B) in the post-period. Examination of performance in normal rounds (Prod1 
and Prod4) and difficult rounds (Prod2 and Prod3) shows that the performance decrease occurs 
for both types of rounds. Mean performance in normal rounds is 25.6 units for No Intervention 
participants in the pre-period (Panel A), dropping to 17.2 in the post-period (Panel B). Mean 
performance in difficult rounds is 12.3 units for the same participants in the pre-period (Panel 
A), dropping to 9.2 units in the post-period (Panel B). 
In order to test H2a, for participants in the Control and No Intervention condition, I 
regress overall justice perceptions (J) on the dummy variable Post, which takes on a value of one 
if the observation occurred post-observation of non-helping behaviour (i.e., at timepoint C), and 
zero otherwise, as well as the Post*Adjustment interaction, using a panel regression with 
participant fixed effects.73 Adjustment is as defined above for the tests of H1a and H1b. The 
coefficient on Post describes the effect of the time trend on my dependent variable when all other 
factors in the model (i.e., Adjustment) take on a value of zero, whereas the coefficient on the 
Post*Adjustment interaction describes the marginal effect of Adjustment in the post-period. 
Results of this regression (Table 7, Panel A) show a negative and significant coefficient on Post 
(p = 0.02, one-tailed), and an insignificant coefficient on the Post*Adjustment interaction (p = 
0.79, two-tailed). Therefore, I do not find support for my prediction that non-helping behaviour 
has a negative effect on justice perceptions. The significantly negative coefficient on Post, 
combined with the insignificant coefficient on Post*Adjustment suggests that as predicted, 
overall justice perceptions are significantly worse in the post-period for No Intervention  
                                                          
73 Since I include participant fixed effects in the panel regression analyses used in my tests of H2, I do not include 
any time-invariant factors in my model, such as condition, baseline justice perceptions, or practice round 
performance. All time-invariant participant level factors that might affect justice perceptions or performance are 
controlled for with participant fixed effects. 
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Table 7. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Panel A. Effect of observed non-helping behaviour on perceptions of procedural justice for 
No Intervention participants, with participant fixed effects (n=116) 
 
Model: Jit
1 = β0 + β1Post
2 + β2Post*Adjustmenti + ai
3 + uit
3 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 18.05 30.37 <0.001 
   Post -2.55 -2.15 0.036 
   Post*Adjustmenti 0.45 0.27 0.791 
Adjusted R2 4.18%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of observed non-helping behaviour and round difficulty on performance for 
No Intervention participants, with participant fixed effects (n=232) 
 
Model: Prodit = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
5 + β3Post*Adjustmenti + β4Post*Difficult + 
β5Adjustmenti*Difficult + β6Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 24.40 15.93 <0.001 
   Post -8.34 -4.18 <0.001 
   Difficult -13.21 -6.61 <0.001 
   Post*Adjustmenti -3.45 -1.22 0.224 
   Post*Difficult 5.21 1.84 0.067 
   Adjustmenti*Difficult 0.38 0.13 0.893 
   Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult 0.38 0.09 0.925 
Adjusted R2 32.42%   
 
Notes: 
1 Jit represents overall justice perceptions for participant i at timepoint t. In the above panel regressions, justice 
perceptions measured at different timepoints represent separate observations. For measurement and scale 
information, refer to Table 4. 
2 Post is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the observation occurs after participants observe non-
helping behaviour from management in the form of not receiving an ex-post adjustment, and zero otherwise. 
3 ai and uit represent participant fixed effects and the error term respectively.   
4 Prodit represents the mean number of tables counted by participant i in round t. In the above panel regressions, 
performance in different rounds represent separate observations. 
5 Difficult is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if performance in the round in question is subject to a 
negative exogenous shock, and zero otherwise. The negative shock takes the form of an increase in the ratio of 1’s to 
0’s in the tables to be counted by participants, increasing the time required to count the 1’s in each table. 
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participants. However, this negative effect is no more pronounced for No Intervention 
participants relative to Control participants, and so I cannot attribute this effect for No 
Intervention participants to Adjustment.  
Overall, I do not find support for my prediction (H2a), that non-helping behaviour will 
lead to less favourable overall justice perceptions. I do find that overall justice perceptions are 
lower in the post-period for No Intervention participants, but this effect is attributable to the time 
trend common to Control and No Intervention participants. This suggests that the decrease in 
overall justice perceptions pre-/post-observation of non-helping behaviour appears to be driven 
by factors common to the Control and No Intervention conditions, such as the existence of 
negative uncontrollable events causing my participants to not meet their goals in difficult rounds. 
To test H2b, for Control and No Intervention participants, I regress performance (Prod) 
on the dummy variable Post, the dummy variable Difficult, which takes on a value of one if the 
observation occurs in a difficult round (i.e., rounds 2 or 3) and zero otherwise, as well as every 
two and three-way interaction between Post, Adjustment, and Difficult, using a panel regression 
with participant fixed effects. The coefficients of interest in this regression are the coefficients on 
Post, Post*Adjustment, and Post*Adjustment*Difficult. The interpretation of coefficients on Post 
and Post*Adjustment are as interpreted for the test of H2a, except that the Post*Adjustment 
effect is conditional on Difficult taking a value of zero (i.e., the marginal effect of Adjustment in 
the post-period in normal rounds). The coefficient on the Post*Adjustment*Difficult interaction 
is interpreted as the interactive effect of Adjustment and Difficult in the post-period. Results of 
this test (Table 7, Panel B) show a significantly negative coefficient on Post (p <0.01, one-
tailed), a negative but insignificant coefficient on the Post*Adjustment interaction (p = 0.11, one-
tailed), and an insignificant coefficient on the Post*Adjustment*Difficult interaction (p = 0.93, 
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two-tailed). Taken together, these results suggest that performance is significantly worse in the 
post-period for Control participants, that this effect is directionally worse for No Intervention 
participants relative to Control participants and does not depend on round difficulty. Therefore, I 
do not find support for H2b, that participants perform worse after observing non-helping 
behaviour.  
In summary, I find mixed support for my second set of hypotheses. On the one hand, I 
find strong evidence that overall justice perceptions and performance are significantly worse in 
the post-period relative to the pre-period. On the other hand, I find no evidence that the 
deterioration of overall justice perceptions is due to observation of non-helping behaviour, and 
only find directional evidence that the decrease in performance is due to non-helping behaviour. 
Taken together, these results suggest that as a result of experiencing negative shocks to 
performance in round 2, causing participants to miss their goals, participant overall justice 
perceptions and performance suffer, and the existence of ex-post adjustments does not seem to 
have an effect on this, other than the directionally negative effect it has on performance. 
5.6 Test of Hypothesis 3 
My third set of hypotheses predict that after participants first face a difficult round and do 
not receive an ex-post adjustment (observed non-helping behaviour), receiving an explanation 
for this decision will attenuate the negative effects observed on justice perceptions (H3a) and 
performance (H3b). Specifically, overall justice perceptions (JC) post-observation of non-
helping behaviour for participants in the Explanation Only condition are expected to improve 
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relative to those of participants in the No Intervention condition.74 Similarly, performance post-
observation of non-helping behaviour (Prod34) for Explanation Only participants is expected to 
improve relative to No Intervention participants. 
Descriptive statistics for JC can be found in Table 4. Mean JC in the Explanation Only 
condition (M = 17.9) is greater than for participants in the No Intervention condition (M = 15.0) 
Descriptive statistics for Prod34 can be found in Table 5, Panel B. Mean Prod34 in the 
Explanation Only condition (M = 25.9) is less than for participants in the No Intervention 
condition (M = 26.4).  
In order to test H3a, for participants in the No Intervention and Explanation Only 
conditions, I regress J on the dummy variable Post and the Post*ExplanationOnly interaction, 
using a panel regression with participant fixed effects. ExplanationOnly is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 if participants are in the Explanation Only condition, and 0 otherwise.75 The 
interpretation of the coefficient on Post is as above in the test of H2a, and the coefficient on the 
Post*Explanation interaction describes the marginal effect of receiving an explanation in the 
Post period. Results of this regression (Table 8, Panel A) show a significant negative coefficient 
on Post (p = 0.02, one-tailed) and a positive and significant coefficient on the 
Post*ExplanationOnly interaction (p = 0.04, one-tailed). These results suggest that as with my 
tests of H2a, there is a significant decrease in overall justice perceptions in the No Intervention 
condition after observing non-helping behaviour, and that this decrease is attenuated by  
                                                          
74 I do not make any predictions about the interactive effects of explanation and perspective taking (RQ1). 
Accordingly, my tests of H3 exclude Perspective Only and Both Interventions participants, and my tests of H4 
exclude Explanation Only and Both Interventions participants.  
75 For clarity, I use ExplanationOnly and PerspectiveOnly in my tests of H3 and H4 respectively, and Explanation 
and Perspective in my tests of RQ1, to identify that I am excluding Both Intervention participants from my tests of 
H3 and H4. 
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Table 8. Tests of Hypothesis 3 
Panel A. Effect of explanation on perceptions of procedural justice post-observation of non-
helping behaviour for participants in the No Intervention and Explanation Only 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=118) 
 
Model: Jit








 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 17.47 28.62 <0.001 
   Post -2.55 -2.07 0.043 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi 3.09 1.79 0.079 
Adjusted R2 2.82%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of explanation on performance post-observation of non-helping behaviour 
for participants in the No Intervention and Explanation Only conditions, with participant 
fixed effects (n=236) 
 
Model: Prodit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
1 + β3Post*ExplanationOnlyi + β4Post*Difficult +  
β5ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 24.02 23.97 <0.001 
   Post -8.34 -4.13 <0.001 
   Difficult -13.21 -6.53 <0.001 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi 1.58 0.56 0.578 
   Post*Difficult 5.21 1.82 0.070 
   ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult 2.41 0.85 0.397 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult -0.07 -0.02 0.985 
Adjusted R2 26.25%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
2 ExplanationOnly is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the participant is in the Explanation Only 
condition, and a value of zero otherwise. Participants in Explanation Only condition receive an explanation for 
management’s decision to exercise ex-post adjustments or not after each of the four production rounds, and do not 




ExplanationOnly. Therefore, I find support for my third hypothesis that an explanation for 
management decision making improves justice perceptions after employees observe non-helping 
behaviour relative to employees receiving no intervention. 
In order to test H3b, for participants in the No Intervention and Explanation Only 
conditions, I regress Prod on the dummy variables Post and Difficult, as well as every two and 
three-way interaction between Post, ExplanationOnly, and Difficult, using a panel regression 
with participant fixed effects. Coefficients of interest in this regression are coefficients on Post, 
Post*ExplanationOnly, and Post*ExplanationOnly*Difficult, with the interpretation of these 
coefficients as above in the tests of H2b, except that I examine the marginal effect of 
ExplanationOnly as opposed to Adjustment. Results of this regression (Table 8, Panel B) show a 
significant negative coefficient on Post (p < 0.01, one-tailed), and insignificant coefficients on 
the Post*ExplanationOnly interaction (p = 0.29, one-tailed), as well as on the 
Post*ExplanationOnly*Difficult interaction (p = 0.99, two-tailed). These results suggest that 
performance decreases significantly in the post-period for No Intervention participants, that this 
effect is not attenuated by providing an explanation on its own. 
In summary, I find some support for my third set of hypotheses. Providing an explanation 
on its own for observed non-helping behaviour significantly improves overall justice perceptions 
relative to individuals not receiving an intervention. However, I fail to find support for my 
prediction that providing an explanation on its own improves performance relative to receiving 
no intervention. Taken together, these results suggest that although providing an explanation can 
improve employees’ justice perceptions, these improved justice perceptions may not lead to 
improved performance when they observe non-helping behaviour from management.   
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5.7 Test of Hypothesis 4 
My fourth set of hypotheses predict that after participants first observe non-helping 
behaviour, having undergone perspective taking training will attenuate the negative effects of 
non-helping behaviour on justice perceptions (H4a) and performance (H4b). Specifically, overall  
justice perceptions post-observation of non-helping behaviour (JC) are expected to improve for 
participants receiving only perspective taking training relative to participants receiving no 
fairness intervention at all. Further, performance post-observation of non-helping behaviour 
(Prod34) for participants receiving Perspective Only is expected to improve relative to 
participants receiving no fairness intervention.  
Descriptive statistics for JC can be found in Table 4. Mean JC in the Perspective Only 
condition (M = 18.7) is greater than for participants in the No Intervention condition (M = 15.0). 
Descriptive statistics for Prod34 can be found in Table 5, Panel B. Mean Prod34 in the 
Perspective Only condition (M = 31.6) is greater than for participants in the No Intervention 
condition (M = 26.4).  
To test H4a, for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only conditions, I 
regress J on the dummy variable Post and the Post*PerspectiveOnly interaction, using a panel 
regression with participant fixed effects. PerspectiveOnly is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if participants are in the Perspective Only condition, and 0 otherwise. Interpretation of 
coefficients are as above in the test of H3a, except I examine the marginal effects of 
PerspectiveOnly as opposed to ExplanationOnly. Results of this regression (Table 9, Panel A) 
show a significantly positive Post*PerspectiveOnly interaction (p = 0.01, one-tailed), indicating 
that after observing non-helping behaviour, providing perspective taking only significantly   
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Table 9. Tests of Hypothesis 4 
Panel A. Effect of perspective taking on perceptions of procedural justice post-observation 
of non-helping behaviour for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=118) 
 
Model: Jit








 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 17.53 31.72 <0.001 
   Post -2.55 -2.29 0.026 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 3.79 2.42 0.019 
Adjusted R2 4.57%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of perspective taking on performance post-observation of non-helping 
behaviour for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only conditions, with 
participant fixed effects (n=236) 
 
Model: Prodit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
1 + β3Post*PerspectiveOnlyi + β4Post*Difficult +  
β5PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 25.69 24.18 <0.001 
   Post -8.34 -3.89 <0.001 
   Difficult -13.21 -6.16 <0.001 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 5.54 1.84 0.067 
   Post*Difficult 5.21 1.72 0.088 
   PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult 0.77 0.26 0.797 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult -7.27 -1.71 0.089 











Table 9. Tests of Hypothesis 4 (continued) 
Panel C. Effect of perspective taking on performance in normal rounds post-observation of 
non-helping behaviour for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=236) 
 
Model: Prodit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*PerspectiveOnlyi + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 24.02 25.04 <0.001 
   Post -8.34 -4.03 <0.001 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 5.54 1.91 0.061 
Adjusted R2 10.45%   
 
 
Panel D. Effect of perspective taking on performance in difficult rounds post-observation 
of non-helping behaviour for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=236) 
 
Model: Prodit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*PerspectiveOnlyi + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 12.88 13.91 <0.001 
   Post -3.14 -1.68 0.098 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi -1.73 -0.66 0.512 
Adjusted R2 6.94%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
2 PerspectiveOnly is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the participant is in the Perspective Only 
condition, and a value of zero otherwise. Participants in the Perspective Only condition perform a perspective taking 
exercise just prior to the commencement of the production rounds, where they simulate the experimental 
administrator’s decision to make ex-post adjustments on a pair of hypothetical employees and provide justification 




improves overall justice perceptions relative to participants receiving no intervention. Therefore, 
I find support for my fourth hypothesis that perspective taking training can improve overall 
justice perceptions after employees observe non-helping behaviour relative to employees 
receiving no intervention.76 
To test H4b, for participants in the No Intervention and Perspective Only conditions, I 
regress Prod on the dummy variables Post, PerspectiveOnly, and Difficult, as well as every two 
and three-way interaction between Post, PerspectiveOnly, and Difficult, using a panel regression 
with participant fixed effects. Coefficients of interest and their interpretation are as above in the 
test of H3b, except that I examine the marginal effect of PerspectiveOnly as opposed to 
ExplanationOnly. Results of this regression (Table 9, Panel B) show a significantly positive 
coefficient on the Post*PerspectiveOnly interaction (p = 0.03, one-tailed), and a marginally 
significant negative coefficient on the Post*PerspectiveOnly*Difficult interaction (p = 0.09, two-
tailed). These results suggest that providing perspective taking training on its own significantly 
improves performance after observing non-helping behaviour relative to providing no 
intervention, and that this positive effect is marginally weaker in difficult rounds. Additional 
analyses (Table 9, Panel C and Panel D) show that the Post*PerspectiveOnly interaction is 
significant in normal rounds (p = 0.03, one-tailed), but not in difficult rounds (p = 0.51, two-
tailed).77 Overall, I find support for my hypothesis that providing perspective taking training on 
                                                          
76 It is possible that the effects of my manipulations on justice perceptions could be attributable in part to demand 
effects. Specifically, the experimental administrator is responsible for paying participants and so participants feel 
compelled to rate the administrator as fair. However, I do not believe demand characteristics are driving any of my 
observed effects, since: 1) I observe that my manipulations only have a significant effect on justice perceptions post 
observing non-helping behaviour but not prior, and 2) with respect to perspective taking, I also observe real 
performance effects, requiring the provision of real effort. 
77 This is consistent with Kelly et al. (2015), who only find positive effects of ex-post adjustments when goals were 
moderately but not highly difficult. In my difficult rounds, due to the occurrence of negative events, goal attainment 
becomes highly difficult, impairing motivation to provide effort towards goal attainment.   
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its own improves performance subsequent to observed non-helping behaviour relative to 
providing no intervention, and that this effect is only significant in normal rounds. 
In summary, I find support for my hypothesis that providing perspective taking training 
on its own improves perceptions of justice relative to providing no intervention, and that these 
improved justice perceptions result in improved performance. Specifically, I find that perspective 
taking on its own has a significant positive effect on overall justice perceptions. Further, I find 
that perspective taking on its own improves performance subsequent to observed non-helping 
behaviour, but only in normal rounds. Taken together, this suggests that providing perspective 
taking training can improve employees’ justice perceptions and performance when they observe 
non-helping behaviour from management. 
5.8 Examination of Research Questions 
 In section 3.5, I pose a set of research questions about the interactive effects of 
explanation and perspective taking on justice perceptions and performance. In order to examine 
RQ1a, I regress J on the dummy variable Post, as well as on the Post*Explanation, 
Post*Perspective, and Post*Explanation*Perspective interactions, using a panel regression with 
participant fixed effects. Explanation is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
participants receive an explanation, and zero otherwise. Similarly, Perspective is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if participants receive perspective taking training, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient of interest in this analysis is the coefficient on the 
Post*Explanation*Perspective interaction, which describes the interactive effects of explanation 
and perspective taking in the post-period. Results of this regression (Table 10 Panel A) show a 
significantly negative coefficient on the Post*Explanation*Perspective interaction (p = 0.02,  
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Table 10. Analysis of Research Question 
Panel A. Effect of explanation and perspective taking on perceptions of procedural justice 
post-observation of non-helping behaviour for Non-Control participants, with participant 
fixed effects (n=236) 
 
Model: Jit










 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 17.83 48.02 <0.001 
   Post -2.55 -2.41 0.018 
   Post*Explanationi 3.09 2.08 0.040 
   Post*Perspectivei 3.79 2.55 0.012 
   Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei -4.90 -2.33 0.021 
Adjusted R2 2.18%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of explanation on perceptions of procedural justice post-observation of non-
helping behaviour for participants in the Perspective Only and Both Interventions 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=118) 
 
Model: Jit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*Explanationi + ai + uit  
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 18.19 43.01 <0.001 
   Post 1.23 1.47 0.147 
   Post*Explanationi -1.82 -1.52 0.134 












Table 10. Analysis of Research Question (continued) 
Panel C. Effect of perspective taking on perceptions of procedural justice post-observation 
of non-helping behaviour for participants in the Explanation Only and Both Interventions 
conditions, with participant fixed effects (n=118) 
 
Model: Jit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*Perspectivei + ai + uit  
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 18.14 36.54 <0.001 
   Post 0.53 0.54 0.590 
   Post*Perspectivei -1.12 -0.80 0.428 
Adjusted R2 0.06%   
 
 
Panel D. Effect of explanation and perspective taking on performance post-observation of 
non-helping behaviour for Non-Control participants, with participant fixed effects (n=472) 
 
Model: Prodit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
1 + β3Post*Explanationi + β4Post*Perspectivei + 
β5Post*Difficult + β6Difficult*Explanationi + β7Difficult*Perspectivei + 
β8Post*Explanationi*Difficult + β9Post*Perspectivei*Difficult + 
β10Difficult*Explanationi*Perspectivei + β11Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei + ai 
+ uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 23.98 34.80 <0.001 
   Post -8.15 -4.44 <0.001 
   Difficult -13.01 -7.09 <0.001 
   Post*Explanationi 1.19 0.50 0.618 
   Post*Perspectivei 5.16 2.16 0.031 
   Post*Difficult 4.81 2.01 0.046 
   Difficult*Explanationi 2.02 0.85 0.398 
   Difficult*Perspectivei 0.39 0.16 0.872 
   Post*Explanationi*Difficult 0.70 0.26 0.799 
   Post*Perspectivei*Difficult -6.50 -2.36 0.019 
   Difficult*Explanationi*Perspectivei 0.67 0.24 0.809 
   Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei 0.45 0.16 0.871 






Table 10. Analysis of Research Question (continued) 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
2 Perspective is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the participant is in the Perspective Only or Both 
Interventions condition, and a value of zero otherwise. Participants in these conditions perform a perspective taking 
exercise just prior to the commencement of the production rounds, where they simulate the experimental 
administrator’s decision to make ex-post adjustments on a pair of hypothetical employees and provide justification 
for their decision.  
3 Explanation is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the participant is in the Explanation Only or Both 
Interventions condition, and a value of zero otherwise. Participants in these conditions receive an explanation for 
management’s decision to exercise ex-post adjustments or not after each of the four production rounds. 
two-tailed). These results suggest are suggestive of suppression, or that these interventions act as 
substitutes, i.e., each intervention appears to improve justice perceptions on their own (H3a, 
H4a), but their effectiveness is hindered when used together.   
In order to further explore the nature of this negative interaction, I examine the simple 
effects of Explanation and Perspective at each level of Perspective and Explanation respectively. 
Recall that my tests of H3a and H4a show that the simple effect of each intervention on justice 
perceptions in the absence of the other intervention are positive and significant. Therefore, here I 
only report results of the marginal effects of each intervention on justice perceptions in the 
presence of the other intervention, i.e., the marginal effects of Perspective and Explanation for 
participants already receiving the other intervention.78  Results of this further analysis show that 
the effect of Explanation on J conditional on receiving perspective taking training is negative but 
not significant (Table 10 Panel B, p = 0.13, two-tailed). Similarly, the effect of Perspective on J 
conditional on receiving an explanation is not significant (Table 10, Panel C, p = 0.43, two-
tailed). All considered, these results suggest that with respect to justice perceptions, Explanation 
                                                          
78 For these analyses, I compare the: (a) the Explanation Only to the Both Interventions condition to examine the 
marginal effect of perspective taking on participants already receiving an explanation; and (2) Perspective Only to 
the Both Interventions condition to examine the marginal effect of explanation on participants already receiving 
perspective taking training. 
111 
 
and Perspective act as substitutes, because conditional on receiving one intervention, there is no 
marginal effect of receiving the other.  
 In order to examine RQ1b, I regress Prod on the dummy variables Post and Difficult, as 
well as every two and three-way interaction between Post, Explanation, Perspective, and 
Difficult, using a panel regression with participant fixed effects.79 As in the case of RQ1a, the 
coefficient of interest is the one on the Post*Explanation*Perspective interaction. Results of this 
analysis (Table 10, Panel D) show that the coefficient on the Post*Explanation*Perspective 
interaction is insignificant (p = 0.87, two-tailed), suggesting no significant interactive effect of 
Explanation and Perspective on Prod.  
In summary, I find evidence of a significant negative Explanation by Perspective 
interaction on overall justice perceptions, but not on performance. Further analyses of show that 
the nature of the interaction for overall justice perceptions is consistent with Explanation and 
Explanation being substitutes. Further, I find no evidence that Explanation and Perspective have 
an interactive effect on Prod. 
5.9 Mediation Model 
 In my hypotheses development (Chapter 4), my hypothesized effects of explanation and 
perspective taking on performance are mediated by justice perceptions. To test this mediation 
model, I perform path analyses on the theoretical model (Figure 1, Panel B).80 For the theoretical 
                                                          
79 The Explanation*Perspective interaction is excluded from the panel regression. Since this interaction term is 
participant specific and time invariant, it cannot be estimated directly and instead is captured by the participant fixed 
effects term. I further exclude the Post*Explanation*Perspective*Difficult interaction due to complexity in 
interpreting a coefficient on such an interaction. Inferences remain unchanged if I including this interaction term, 
and the coefficient on this interaction is not significant.   
80 Because I do not find any effect of announcement on justice perceptions, it does not appear that the effect of 
announcement on performance is mediated through justice perceptions. Therefore, the focus of my tests of 
mediation are on the effect of my interventions on Prod in the post-period, where I observe effects of my 
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model, χ2 is significant (p < 0.01, one-tailed), RMSEA = 0.185, CFI = 0.623, and SRMR = 
0.086, all of which indicate poor model fit (Table 11, Panel B).81 Due to this poor fit, I explore 
an alternative model specification. Motivated by the efficient contracting literature suggesting 
that employees face uncertainty over whether management will exercise ex-post adjustments 
(Baiman and Rajan 1995), and that this uncertainty weakens the effort-performance relationship 
(expectancy) in the incentive contract (Holmström 1979; Bol 2008), I examine an expectancy 
based model of performance (Figure 5). My expectancy-based model of performance suggests 
that the effect of fairness on performance is mediated through expectancy. That is, when 
individuals observe unfair outcomes and procedures, the perceived strength of the effort-
performance relationship (i.e. expectancy) with respect to the incentive scheme weakens, 
resulting in low effort provision and thus poor performance. This model is identical to the 
theoretical model, except that it estimates an additional two paths, one from JC to expectancy of 
goal attainment at timepoint C (ExpectancyC), and one from ExpectancyC to Prod4.82  
 Examination of goodness of fit statistics for these two models show that the expectancy 
based model appears to fit the data better than the theoretical model (Table 11, Panel B). 
Examination of the comparative fit indices AIC and BIC show that information loss appears to 
be lower for the expectancy based models relative to the theoretical model.  
                                                          
interventions on justice perceptions (H3a and H4a) and performance in normal rounds (H4b). Since I am only 
concerned with Prod in the post period in normal rounds (i.e., Prod4), I test for mediation using a levels model, 
controlling for baseline levels of my measured variables, as opposed to the fixed effects model used in my tests of 
H2-H4. I believe that this is appropriate, and a conservative test of mediation, since I observe significant negative 
time trends on DJ and Prod in my tests of H2-H4, which work against finding the predicted positive indirect effects 
of my interventions on Prod4. 
81 Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest cut-offs for good model fit of: SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA <0.06, and CFI > 0.900. 
82 I considered another alternative model that reversed the relationship between ExpectancyC and JC to test reverse 
causality. Although this model fits somewhat better than the expectancy model I have presented (results 
untabulated) I believe the expectancy model presented is better grounded in theory, and so is preferred over the 
reverse-causality model.  
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Table 11. Mediation analyses 
Panel A. Standardized path coefficients for theoretical, theoretical with distributive 
dominance, expectancy, and expectancy with distributive dominance models (n = 118) 
 Model 
Paths Theoretical1 Expectancy1 
Path coefficients:   
Perspective5→ JC2 0.282*** 0.282*** 
Explanation6→ JC 0.226** 0.226** 
Perspective*Explanation→ JC -0.280** -0.280** 
JB2→ JC 0.586*** 0.586*** 
Perspective→ Prod43 0.184* 0.105 
Explanation→ Prod4 -0.027 -0.116 
Perspective*Explanation→ Prod4 -0.018 0.048 
JC→ Prod4 0.169** 0.072 
Practice→ Prod4 0.320*** 0.320*** 
ExpectancyB4→ ExpectancyC4 0.184** 0.089 
JC → ExpectancyC  0.281*** 
ExpectancyC → Prod4  0.363*** 
Indirect effects:   
Explanation→ Prod4  0.969* 
Perspective→ Prod4  1.205* 
Perspective*Explanation→ Prod4  -1.390* 
* represents coefficients significant at the 0.10 level, one-tailed, bolded for emphasis. 
** represents coefficients significant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed, bolded for emphasis. 
*** represents coefficients significant at the 0.01 level, one-tailed, bolded for emphasis. 
Panel B. Goodness of fit statistics for theoretical, theoretical with distributive dominance, 
expectancy, and expectancy with distributive dominance models (n = 118) 
 df χ2 SRMR7 RMSEA7 CFI7 AIC7 BIC7 
Theoretical 11 55.46 0.086 0.185 0.623 5756.23 5800.57 
Expectancy 9 29.19 0.055 0.138 0.829 5733.96 5783.84 
 
Panel C. Difference in chi square test comparing fit of nested models 
 Δdf Δχ2 p-value 








Table 11. Mediation analyses (continued) 
Notes: 
1 In this analysis, I compare the fit of two models: 1) the theoretical model, and 2) an alternative expectancy based 
model. These models are depicted in Figure 1 Panel B and Figure 5 respectively. The theoretical model describes the 
model implied in my hypotheses development. The expectancy based model includes an additional two paths, one 
from DJC to ExpectancyC, and one from ExpectancyC to Prod4. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 4. 
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 5. 
4 Expectancy* represents participants views on the likelihood that they will achieve their goals, measured as a 
percentage at one of three timepoints, A, B, or C. For example, ExpectancyC represents the mean perceived 
likelihood of goal attainment for participants as measured at timepoint C. 
5 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 9. 
6 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 8. 
7 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 3. 
 










1 Explanation refers to justifications provided by management for observed non-helping behaviour. 
2 Perspective taking refers to employees simulating the internal state (thoughts, intentions, feelings) of management. 
3 Overall justice refers to perceptions of overall justice measured post- observed non-helping behaviour. 
4 Expectancy refers to employees’ perceptions of the strength of the effort-performance relationship. 
5 Performance refers to the number of tables counted on the counting task in round 4 of the production rounds. 
6 The expectancy based model is identical to the theoretical model presented in Figure 1, Panel B, with the exception 
of two additional paths, one from overall justice to expectancy, and one from expectancy to performance, reflecting 
the assertion that the effect of distributive justice perceptions on performance is mediated by employees’ perceptions 

















Further, because my models are nested within each other, I am able to quantitatively 
compare fit between my competing models using the difference in chi-square test (Kline, 1998; 
Burney et al., 2009) Results of this test (Table 11, Panel C) show that the expectancy based 
model fits the data significantly better than my theoretical model (p < 0.01, two-tailed).83 
Examination of goodness of fit statistics for the expectancy based model show adequate model 
fit, with SMRM indicating good model fit (SRMR = 0.055), RMSEA indicating mediocre model 
fit (RMSEA = 0.138), and CFI indicating adequate model fit (CFI = 0.829) (Hu and Bentler, 
1999). I conclude that the expectancy based model fits my data best, and thus use this model for 
the remainder of my mediation analyses. 
 Standardized path coefficients for the expectancy based model are shown in Table 11, 
Panel A, with significant paths represented in Figure 6. Examination of the path coefficients 
show that in this model, the only significant direct effects of my manipulations are on JC, and 
the only significant direct effects on Prod4 are from ExpectancyC and Practice. Further analysis 
shows that there are marginally significant positive indirect effects of Perspective (p = 0.05, one-
tailed) and Explanation (p = 0.07, one-tailed) on Prod4 through JC and ExpectancyC, and a 
negative but insignificant indirect of the Perspective by Explanation interaction on Prod4 
through JC and ExpectancyC (p = 0.14, two-tailed) (Table 11, Panel A). These results suggest 
that the effects of Perspective and Explanation on Prod4 are mediated through JC and 
ExpectancyC.84 In other words, both perspective taking training and providing an explanation  
                                                          
83 The chi-square statistic represents the degree to which observations in a sample distribution deviate from some 
other referent distribution, and due to its derivation, is always a positive number (Pearson 1900). As a result, chi-
square goodness of fit tests are inherently one-sided tests, since we are concerned with the right tail of the 
distribution (i.e., deviation from referent distribution is too large), and not with the left tail (i.e. deviation from 
referent distribution is too small). Accordingly, I report one-tailed p values for all chi-square goodness of fit tests.    
84 Following Preacher and Hayes (2004), I interpret significant indirect effects as illustrative of mediation. 
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Only significant paths are shown above, standardized path coefficients shown. Paths significant at the 0.05 level, 
two-tailed. are noted with **, paths significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, are noted with ***. 
1 Explanation is a manipulated variable taking on a value of one if participants receive an explanation for observed 
non-helping behaviour and zero otherwise. 
2 Perspective taking is a manipulated variable taking on a value of one if participants have undergone perspective 
taking training, and zero otherwise. 
3 JB and JC refer to perceptions of overall justice measured pre-/post- observed non-helping behaviour respectively.  
4 ExpectancyC refers to employees’ perceived likelihood of attaining their goal, as measured post-observed non-
helping behaviour. 
5 Practice refers to the number of tables counted on the counting task in the eight-minute practice round. 
6 Prod4 refers to the number of tables counted on the counting task in round 4 of the production rounds. 
appear to improve overall justice perceptions, which in turn sustain the effort-performance 
relationship, improving performance. 
 In summary, path analyses indicate mediocre fit between my data and my theoretical 
mediation model (Figure 1, Panel B). My alternative expectancy based model fits the data 
significantly better, and I observe that both perspective taking and explanation have significantly 
positive indirect effects on performance through overall justice perceptions and expectancy. 
Taken together with the results of my formal hypotheses tests, these results suggest that the 
JC 


















positive impact of perspective taking on performance observed in my test of H4b is mediated by 
overall justice perceptions and expectancy.  
5.10 Analysis of Effort Duration and Intensity 
 As discussed in subsection 4.4.3, my multi-task environment allows me to collect data on 
two dimensions of participant effort, effort duration (Duration) and effort intensity (Intensity). 
This allows me to assess which dimensions of effort are affected by my experimental 
manipulations and their impact on the performance effects observed in my formal tests of 
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics for Duration and Intensity by round and condition can be found 
in Table 12, Panel B and Panel C respectively. Examination of Duration shows that the mean 
Duration in round 1 is 221.8 seconds out of a maximum of 240 seconds per round. In the first 
difficult round, round 2, Duration drops to 176.3 seconds, dropping further to 145.6 seconds in 
round 3, before increasing to 171.1 seconds in round 4. Intensity appears to follow a similar 
pattern, with round 1 intensity being the highest at 0.105 tables per second, dropping to 0.060 
and 0.056 in round 2 and round 3 respectively, before increasing to 0.089 in round 4.85   
 In my tests of H1, I observe a significantly positive announcement effect on round 2 
performance (Table 6, Panel D). With respect to the announcement effect on effort, I conjecture 
that it would likely operate through effort duration, i.e., participants aware of the possibility of an 
adjustment may continue to provide effort in the face of a difficult round in anticipation of a goal 
adjustment.  
  
                                                          
85 Recall that in difficult rounds, the ratio of ‘1’s to ‘0’s in the counting task is 60% compared to 40% in normal 
rounds, making the counting task more difficult. Therefore, effort intensity is expected to be lower in these rounds. 




Table 12. Descriptive statistics for alternate dependent variables 
Panel A. Mean (standard deviation) of goal attainment in production rounds 1-4 by 
condition  

























































Panel B. Mean (standard deviation) of effort duration in production rounds 1-4 by 
condition  































































Table 12. Descriptive statistics for alternate dependent variables (continued) 
Panel C. Mean (standard deviation) of effort intensity in production rounds 1-4 by 
condition  

























































1 For variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. 
2 Attainment* represents the mean proportion of participants whose performance on the counting task in round * 
exceeded their individually set goals. For example, Attainment1 represents the goal attainment rate in round 1. 
3 Duration* represents the mean amount of time in seconds spent by participants on the counting task in round *. 
For example, Duration1 represents the amount of time in seconds spent by participants on the counting task in round 
1. 
4 Intensity* represents the mean tables counted per second for participants on the counting task in round *, 
calculated as Prod* scaled by Duration*. For example, Intensity1 represents the mean tables counted per second for 
participants in round 1, calculated as Prod1 divided by Duration1. 
Analysis of Duration in round 2 (Table 13, Panel A) shows a positive and marginally 
significant announcement effect on round 2 Duration (p = 0.08, two-tailed). Analysis of Intensity 
in round 2 (Table 13, Panel B) show no announcement effect on round 2 Intensity (p = 0.74, two-
tailed). Taken together, these results suggest that the announcement of an ex-post adjustment 
policy improves participant persistence on task in the face of difficult periods. 
 In my tests of H2, I observe that for Control and No Intervention participants, 
performance significantly decreases after observing non-helping behaviour, but that this effect is 
only directionally stronger for No Intervention participants (Table 7, Panel C). Analyses of  
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Table 13. Tests of Hypothesis 1 using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as dependent 
variable  
 
Panel A. Effect of announcement on effort duration (n=147) 
 
Model: Duration2i
1 = β0 + β1Adjustment
2 + β2Practice
3 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 242.56 9.17 <0.001 
   Adjustment 29.02 1.77 0.079 
   Practice -1.82 -2.41 0.017 
Adjusted R2 8.51%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of announcement on effort intensity (n=147) 
 
Model: Intensity2i
1 = β0 + β1Adjustment + β2Practice 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.03 2.80 0.006 
   Adjustment 0 0.34 0.736 
   Practice 0 11.48 <0.001 
Adjusted R2 8.51%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 6. 
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 4. 
Duration (Table 14, Panel A) show that after observing non-helping behaviour, Adjustment has a 
directionally negative effect on Duration (p = 0.16, two-tailed), and that this effect does not 
depend on round difficulty (p = 0.98, two-tailed).86 Similarly, analyses of Intensity (Table 14, 
Panel B) show a directionally negative effect of Adjustment on Intensity in the post-period (p = 
0.16, two-tailed), and that this effect does not differ by round difficulty (p = 0.74, two-tailed).  
                                                          
86 I report two-tailed tests of significance since I do not make any formal predictions with respect to the effects of 
my experimental manipulations on effort duration, effort intensity, or goal attainment. 
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Table 14. Tests of Hypothesis 2 using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as dependent 
variable 
Panel A. Effect of observed non-helping behaviour and round difficulty on effort duration 
for No Intervention participants, with participant fixed effects (n=232) 
 
Model: Durationit




 + β4Post*Difficult + 
β5Adjustmenti*Difficult + β6Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult + ai
2 + uit
2 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 228.32 23.74 <0.001 
   Post -80.06 -4.16 <0.001 
   Difficult -56.53 -2.94 0.004 
   Post*Adjustmenti -38.34 -1.41 0.161 
   Post*Difficult 40.69 1.50 0.137 
   Adjustmenti*Difficult 10.91 0.40 0.689 
   Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult 0.83 0.09 0.983 
Adjusted R2 14.08%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of observed non-helping behaviour and round difficulty on effort intensity 
for No Intervention participants, with participant fixed effects (n=232) 
 
Model: Intensityit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult + β3Post*Adjustmenti + β4Post*Difficult + 
β5Adjustmenti*Difficult + β6Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.11 28.10 <0.001 
   Post -0.03 -4.32 <0.001 
   Difficult -0.05 -6.28 <0.001 
   Post*Adjustmenti -0.02 -1.42 0.157 
   Post*Difficult 0.03 2.39 0.018 
   Adjustmenti*Difficult >-0.01 -0.10 0.923 
   Post*Adjustmenti*Difficult <0.01 0.33 0.742 




1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 6. 
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These results suggest that the directionally negative performance effects of observed non-helping 
behaviour are attributable to changes in both Duration and Intensity. 
 In my tests of H3, I fail to find an effect of ExplanationOnly on Prod in the post-period 
(Table 8, Panel C). Since I do not find performance effects of ExplanationOnly on Prod, I do not 
expect ExplanationOnly to significantly impact Intensity or Duration. Analyses of Duration 
(Table 15, Panel A) show no effect of ExplanationOnly on Duration (p = 0.66, two-tailed). 
Similarly, analyses of Intensity (Table 15, Panel B) show no effect of ExplanationOnly on 
Intensity (p = 0.43, two-tailed). 
In my tests of H4, I find that PerspectiveOnly significantly improves Prod in the post-
period, but only in normal rounds (Table 9, Panel C). Analysis of Duration and Intensity for No 
Intervention and Perspective Only participants (Table 16, Panel A and Panel B) indicate that 
PerspectiveOnly directionally improves Duration in the post-period (p = 0.13, two-tailed) and 
has a marginally significant positive impact on Intensity in the post-period (p = 0.06, two-tailed). 
Taken together, these results suggest that the positive performance effects of PerspectiveOnly on 
Prod are driven by increases in Intensity. 
 In the analysis of RQ1, I examine the interactive effects of Perspective and Explanation 
on performance, finding, no interactive effect of Perspective and Explanation on Prod (Table 10 
Panel G). Therefore, I do not expect to observe an interactive effect of Perspective and 
Explanation on Prod. Analysis of Duration and Intensity (Table 17, Panel A and Panel B) 
confirm this expectation, showing no interactive effect of Perspective and Explanation on either 




Table 15. Tests of Hypothesis 3 using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as dependent 
variable 
Panel A. Effect of explanation on duration for participants in the No Intervention and 
Explanation Only conditions (n=236) 
 
Model: Durationit




 + β4Post*Difficult 
+  β5ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + ai
2 + uit
2 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 222.45 23.19 <0.001 
   Post -80.06 -4.14 <0.001 
   Difficult -56.53 -2.92 0.004 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi 12.02 0.44 0.658 
   Post*Difficult 40.69 1.49 0.139 
   ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult 20.89 0.77 0.443 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult 8.64 0.23 0.822 
Adjusted R2 11.78%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of explanation on intensity for participants in the No Intervention and 
Explanation Only conditions (n=236) 
 
Model: Durationit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
1 + β3Post*ExplanationOnlyi + β4Post*Difficult +  
β5ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.11 27.57 <0.001 
   Post -0.03 -4.16 <0.001 
   Difficult -0.05 -6.04 <0.001 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi 0.01 0.79 0.428 
   Post*Difficult 0.03 2.30 0.022 
   ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult <0.01 0.35 0.724 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi*Difficult -0.01 -0.41 0.680 
Adjusted R2 21.09%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 




Table 16. Tests of Hypothesis 4 using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as dependent 
variable 
Panel A. Effect of perspective taking on duration for participants in the No Intervention 
and Perspective Only conditions (n=236) 
 
Model: Durationit




 + β4Post*Difficult +  
β5PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + ai
2 + uit
2 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 227.92 22.78 <0.001 
   Post -80.06 -3.97 <0.001 
   Difficult -56.53 -2.80 0.006 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 43.09 1.52 0.130 
   Post*Difficult 40.69 1.43 0.156 
   PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult 15.97 0.56 0.573 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult -59.81 -1.49 0.137 
Adjusted R2 16.45%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of perspective taking on intensity for participants in the No Intervention 
and Perspective Only conditions (n=236) 
 
Model: Intensityit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult
1 + β3Post*PerspectiveOnlyi + β4Post*Difficult +  
β5PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + β6Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.11 29.56 <0.001 
   Post -0.03 -4.20 <0.001 
   Difficult -0.05 -6.11 <0.001 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 0.02 1.89 0.060 
   Post*Difficult 0.03 2.33 0.021 
   PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult >-0.01 -0.35 0.730 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi*Difficult -0.02 -1.47 0.143 
Adjusted R2 28.43%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 




Table 17. Analysis of Research Question using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as 
dependent variable 
Panel A. Effect of explanation and perspective taking on duration post-observation of non-
helping behaviour for Non-Control participants, with participant fixed effects (n=472) 
 
Model: Durationit







β5Post*Difficult + β6Difficult*Explanationi + β7Difficult*Perspectivei + 
β8Post*Explanationi*Difficult + β9Post*Perspectivei*Difficult + 




 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 221.44 33.43 <0.001 
   Post -80.09 -4.54 <0.001 
   Difficult -56.57 -3.20 0.001 
   Post*Explanationi 12.09 0.53 0.599 
   Post*Perspectivei 43.16 1.88 0.061 
   Post*Difficult 40.76 1.77 0.078 
   Difficult*Explanationi 20.96 0.91 0.362 
   Difficult*Perspectivei 16.04 0.70 0.485 
   Post*Explanationi*Difficult 8.50 0.32 0.749 
   Post*Perspectivei*Difficult -59.95 -2.26 0.024 
   Difficult*Explanationi*Perspectivei -8.30 -0.31 0.754 
   Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei -1.60 -0.06 0.952 















Table 17. Analysis of Research Question using Effort Duration and Effort Intensity as 
dependent variable (continued) 
Panel B. Effect of explanation and perspective taking on intensity post-observation of non-
helping behaviour for Non-Control participants, with participant fixed effects (n=472) 
 
Model: Intensityit
1 = β0 + β1Post + β2Difficult + β3Post*Explanationi + β4Post*Perspectivei + 
β5Post*Difficult + β6Difficult*Explanationi + β7Difficult*Perspectivei + 
β8Post*Explanationi*Difficult + β9Post*Perspectivei*Difficult + 
β10Difficult*Explanationi*Perspectivei + β11Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei + ai 
+ uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.11 41.10 <0.001 
   Post -0.03 -4.65 <0.001 
   Difficult -0.05 -6.78 <0.001 
   Post*Explanationi 0.01 0.89 0.374 
   Post*Perspectivei 0.02 2.21 0.028 
   Post*Difficult 0.02 2.74 0.007 
   Difficult*Explanationi <0.01 0.35 0.724 
   Difficult*Perspectivei >-0.01 -0.49 0.621 
   Post*Explanationi*Difficult >-0.01 -0.48 0.631 
   Post*Perspectivei*Difficult -0.02 -2.04 0.042 
   Difficult*Explanationi*Perspectivei 0.01 1.02 0.311 
   Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei <0.01 0.11 0.913 
Adjusted R2 23.74%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 10. 
 
 In summary, analyses of Duration and Intensity largely mirror the performance effects 
observed in my formal tests of hypotheses. However, a pattern emerges where performance 
effects in difficult rounds, as in the case of H1, appear to be attributable to Duration, whereby 
participants abandon their goals in favour of guaranteed pay in the decoding task. In contrast, 
performance effects in normal rounds, where goals are reasonably attainable, as in the case of 
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H4, are driven primarily by increases in Intensity, representing participants engaging in active 
goal pursuit.     
5.11 Analysis of Goal Attainment 
 In my formal tests of hypotheses, I examine the performance effects of Adjustment, non-
helping behaviour, PerspectiveOnly, and ExplanationOnly. In this subsection, I examine how 
these manipulations affect participant goal attainment (Attainment). Descriptive statistics for goal 
attainment can be found in Table 12, Panel A. Examination of goal attainment reveals that the 
mean goal attainment rate in round 1 (Attainment1) is 59.2%. Goal attainment drops sharply in 
the two difficult rounds, rounds 2 and 3 (Attainment2 and Attainment3), to 1.4% and 0.7% 
respectively. In round 4, Attainment4 increases to 55.1%. Examination of Attainment1 shows that 
goal attainment is highest in the Control condition (69.0%), and lowest in the Both Interventions 
condition (48.3%). In round 4, Attainment4 is highest in the Perspective Only condition (73.3%), 
and lowest in the Control condition (44.8%).     
 Since goal attainment in difficult rounds is low and does not vary significantly by 
condition, I restrict my analyses of goal attainment to normal rounds. Recall that in my tests of 
H1, controlling for Practice, I find no effect of Adjustment on Prod1. Therefore, I do not expect 
any effects of Adjustment on Attainment1. Examination of Attainment1 (Table 18, Panel A) show 
no effect of Adjustment on Attainment1 (p = 0.23, two-tailed). Therefore, as expected based on 
the results of my formal tests, I find no effect of Adjustment on Attainment1. 
 In my tests of H2, I find that performance for No Intervention participants decreases post-
observation of non-helping behaviour, but that this effect is only directionally stronger relative to 
Control participants. Based on this, I do not expect Attainment to be significantly impacted by  
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Table 18. Analysis of Goal Attainment  
 
Panel A. Effect of announcement on goal attainment in round 1 (n=147) 
 
Model: Attainment1i
1 = β0 + β1Adjustment
2 + β2Practice
3 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.53 3.17 0.002 
   Adjustment -0.12 -1.21 0.229 
   Practice <0.01 0.26 0.792 
Adjusted R2 -0.35%   
 
 
Panel B. Effect of observed non-helping behaviour on goal attainment in normal rounds for 
No Intervention participants, with participant fixed effects (n=116) 
 
Model: Attainmentit = β0 + β1Post
4+ β3Post*Adjustmenti + ai
4 + uit
4 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.62 11.43 <0.001 
   Post -0.07 -0.63 0.528 
   Post*Adjustmenti 0.17 1.12 0.267 
Adjusted R2 1.89%   
 
 
Panel C. Effect of explanation on goal attainment in normal rounds for participants in the 
No Intervention and Explanation Only conditions (n=118) 
 
Model: Attainmentit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*ExplanationOnlyi
5
  + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.59 11.29 <0.001 
   Post -0.07 -0.65 0.518 
   Post*ExplanationOnlyi -0.03 -0.21 0.835 







Table 18. Analysis of Goal Attainment (continued) 
Panel D. Effect of perspective taking on goal attainment in normal rounds for participants 
in the No Intervention and Perspective Only conditions (n=118) 
 
Model: Attainmentit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*PerspectiveOnlyi
6
  + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.58 11.35 <0.001 
   Post -0.07 -0.67 0.503 
   Post*PerspectiveOnlyi 0.20 1.41 0.164 
Adjusted R2 3.36%   
 
 
Panel E. Effect of explanation and perspective taking on goal attainment in normal rounds 
for Non-Control participants (n=236) 
 
Model: Attainmentit = β0 + β1Post + β2Post*Explanationi
7 + β3Post*Perspectivei
7
  + 
β4Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei + ai + uit 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
Constant 0.57 15.13 <0.001 
   Post -0.07 -0.64 0.521 
   Post*Explanationi -0.03 -0.21 0.837 
   Post*Perspectivei 0.20 1.35 0.181 
   Post*Explanationi*Perspectivei -0.03 -0.16 0.876 
Adjusted R2 1.27%   
 
Notes: 
1 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
2 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 6. 
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 4. 
4 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
5 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 8. 
6 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 9. 
7 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 10. 
Adjustment. Analysis of the effect of Adjustment on Attainment in the post-period (Table 18, 
Panel B) shows no marginal effect of Adjustment on Attainment (p = 0.27, two-tailed), 
confirming my expectations. 
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 In my tests of H3, I find no effect of ExplanationOnly on Prod, and so do not expect an 
effect of ExplanationOnly on Attainment. Analysis of Attainment (Table 18, Panel C) corroborate 
this expectation (p = 0.84, two-tailed). In my tests of H4, I find a positive effect of 
PerspectiveOnly on Prod, and so expect a similar pattern of results for Attainment. Results of 
this analysis (Table 18, Panel D) show that PerspectiveOnly directionally improves Attainment in 
the post-period (p = 0.16, two-tailed). In my examination of RQ1, I find no interactive effect of 
Perspective and Explanation on Prod. Repeating these analyses on Attainment (Table 18, Panel 
E) similarly show no evidence of an interactive effect of Perspective and Explanation on 
Attainment in the post-period (p = 0.88, two-tailed). In summary, my analyses of goal attainment 
reveal results largely consistent with but weaker than the findings from my formal tests of 
hypotheses.   
5.12 Summary of Results 
 A summary of my main findings is presented in Table 19. In summary, my results do not 
provide support for my hypothesis that the announcement of ex-post adjustments would result in 
more positive justice perceptions (H1a). However, I find evidence of a positive announcement 
effect on performance in difficult rounds (H1b), suggesting that the announcement of an ex-post 
adjustment policy can sustain effort in the face of negative uncontrollable events. This is 
somewhat corroborated by analyses on effort duration and intensity suggesting that the positive 
announcement effect on round 2 performance is driven by effort duration rather than intensity. 
Further, I find that overall justice perceptions and performance significantly decrease in the post-
period. However, I fail to find support for my assertion that these effects are driven by observing 
non-helping behaviour (H2a and H2b), With respect to my fairness interventions, I find evidence 
that although providing an explanation improves overall justice perceptions (H3a), explanation  
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Table 19. Summary of results  
 









H1a Adjustment3 → JB4 + n/a No 
H1b 
Adjustment → Prod125 
Adjustment → Prod15 










H2a Non-helping behaviour6 → J7 - n/a No13 
H2b Non-helping behaviour → Prod8 - n/a No 
H3a ExplanationOnly9 → J + + Yes 
H3b ExplanationOnly → Prod + n/a No 
H4a PerspectiveOnly10 → J + + Yes 
H4b PerspectiveOnly → Prod + + Yes 
RQ1a Explanation11*Perspective11 → J n/a - n/a 
RQ1b Explanation*Perspective → Prod n/a n/a n/a 
Mediation 
Analyses 
Indirect: Explanation → Prod4  + + Yes 
Indirect: Perspective → Prod4 + + Yes 






Adjustment → Duration212 
Adjustment → Intensity212 






Non-helping behaviour → Duration12 
Non-helping behaviour → Intensity12 






ExplanationOnly → Duration 
ExplanationOnly → Intensity 






PerspectiveOnly → Duration 
PerspectiveOnly → Intensity 






Explanation*Perspective → Duration 
Explanation*Perspective → Intensity 
















Table 19. Summary of Results (continued) 
Notes: 
1 Actual Sign refers to the sign of the effect observed. Only signs that are marginally significant or better are labelled 
with a sign. 
2 Prediction Supported refers to whether the Actual Sign matches the Predicted Sign.  
3 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 6. 
4 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 4. 
5 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 5. 
6 Non-helping behaviour refers to participants not receiving ex-post goal adjustments to compensate for increased 
difficulty in some rounds, despite being made aware of the availability of such adjustments. 
7 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
8 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 7. 
9 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 8. 
10 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 9. 
11 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 10. 
12 For variable definition, please see notes to Table 12. 
13 With respect to the effect of non-helping behaviour on J, I observe that J is lower after observing non-helping 
behaviour, but because this effect is not significantly different from that in the Control condition, I cannot attribute it 
to non-helping behaviour. 
has no effect on subsequent performance (H3b). I also find evidence that perspective taking 
training improves overall justice perceptions and subsequent performance (H4a and H4b). 
Analyses on the interactive effects of my interventions show a significant negative interaction 
between explanation and perspective taking on justice perceptions (RQ1a), but not on 
performance (RQ1b). Analyses of the effects of explanation and perspective taking on justice 
perceptions conditional on receiving the other intervention suggest that these two interventions 
are substitutes with respect to overall justice perceptions.  
 To gain a better understanding of the mechanism underlying the above results, I tested a 
mediation model based on my theoretical framework, and compared it against an alternative 
theory consistent expectancy based model, finding support for this alternative model of 
performance. I further find that the indirect effect of my manipulations on performance are 
mediated by both overall justice perceptions and expectancy of goal attainment. This suggests 
that fairness perceptions influence the perceived strength of the effort-performance relationship, 
which in turn affects performance.  
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Taken together, my results suggest that both the announcement and enactment of ex-post 
adjustment policies influence subsequent performance, though only the latter significantly 
impacts justice perceptions. Further, although both explanation and perspective taking show 
promise in improving justice perceptions after observing non-helping behaviour, only 
perspective taking is effective as an intervention in improving subsequent performance. This 
suggests that perspective taking in the form of a training exercise can be an effective fairness 
intervention to improve justice perceptions and performance after employees have been 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
Employee performance can be negatively impacted by the occurrence of uncontrollable 
negative events, potentially reducing the motivating power of performance contingent rewards. 
In order to restore the motivational strength of performance contingent incentive contracts, 
management may implement an ex-post goal adjustment policy to filter out the effects of 
uncontrollable negative events on employees’ objectively measured performance. However, if 
management decides to seldomly exercise ex-post goal adjustments, employees who fail to meet 
their goals may perceive unfairness and respond by withholding effort. This perceived unfairness 
about observed non-helping behavior may result in part from employees’ inability to take 
management’s perspective, due to egocentric bias. Therefore, if management helps employees to 
understand their motivations, through either provision of an explanation or through perspective 
taking training, perhaps negative fairness and performance effects can be attenuated. To test my 
predictions, I conduct a laboratory study to examine the effects of: 1) the announcement of an 
ex-post adjustment policy, 2) not exercising this policy to help employees, 3) providing an 
explanation, and 4) providing perspective taking training, on employee justice perceptions and 
performance.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. I discuss the results of my four 
formal hypotheses tests and one research question in section 6.2. I discuss limitations and 
opportunities for future research in section 6.3. Finally, I discuss the contributions of my study 
and provide concluding remarks in section 6.4. 
135 
 
6.2 Discussion of Results 
In contrast to my predictions in H1a, I do not find that the announcement of an ex-post 
adjustment policy improves overall justice perceptions. I see three possible explanations for the 
failure to observe this effect. First, it could be that the fair intentions signaled by the 
announcement of such a policy were too weak to significantly alter participant justice 
perceptions. Second, it is possible that participants did not react positively to the zero-sum nature 
of goal adjustments. Third, it is also possible that due to the considerable uncertainty over how 
these ex-post adjustments would be exercised, participants were unsure of how to react to the 
announcement of such a policy.  
I find it most likely that participants either reacted negatively to the zero-sum nature of 
goal adjustments, or that uncertainty over the execution of the policy caused participants to 
reserve updating their fairness judgments until gaining some observations on how the policy 
would be enacted. Both of the above explanations are consistent with Bol (2008) and Baiman 
and Rajan (1995), who both note that from an agency theory perspective, the announcement of a 
discretionary ex-post adjustment policy can be perceived as cheap-talk, since it is non-binding. 
Baiman and Rajan (1995) further note that management’s concerns for reputation may assuage 
employee concerns that management will renege on their commitment to consider making ex-
post adjustments. However, in my experiment, by design, participants have no prior beliefs about 
the nature of their relationship with management, and given the limited number of periods in my 
experiment, participants have no reason to believe that concern for reputation would affect 
management decision making. Therefore, I find it likely that participants did not react to the 
announcement due to uncertainty over how it would be implemented. 
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Despite failing to observe an announcement effect on justice perceptions, I observe a 
positive announcement effect on performance in the first difficult round in my test of H1b. This 
provides evidence that the announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy accomplishes its 
intended purpose, to sustain employee effort and performance in the face of negative exogenous 
shocks to performance. This builds on prior research illustrating that exercising ex-post 
adjustments leads to performance improvements (e.g. Kelly et al. 2015; Cai et al. 2019) by 
showing that even the mere announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy can also improve 
performance.  
However, the pattern of results in H1a and H1b suggests that the positive announcement 
effect on performance is not mediated through justice perceptions as predicted, conflicting with 
Kelly et al. (2015), who find that the positive effect of exercising ex-post adjustments is partially 
mediated through procedural justice perceptions. Although Arnold and Artz (2015) find and 
predict a negative effect of target flexibility on performance, they suggest that the expectancy of 
goal adjustment plays a role in employee effort choices.87 It is possible that when ex-post 
adjustments are available, expectancy of goal adjustment sustains effort and performance in 
anticipation of a goal adjustment to filter out the effects of negative exogenous shocks on 
performance. To further explore this possibility, I examine the effect of participants’ expectancy 
of goal adjustment on performance in the first difficult round, finding no effect. However, in my 
analyses of effort duration and intensity, I find a marginally positive announcement effect on 
effort duration, and no effect of announcement on effort intensity. This suggests that the positive 
announcement effect on performance is driven by an increase in task persistence for participants 
                                                          
87 Arnold and Artz (2015) suggest that when targets are flexible, employees may withhold effort opportunistically in 
anticipation of a target adjustment. 
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aware of the possibility of ex-post adjustments. Taken together, the results of these supplemental 
analyses provide conflicting evidence on the nature of the observed positive announcement 
effect. 
 In my tests of H2, I observe a negative time trend in Control participants’ perceptions of 
overall justice and performance. Further, in contrast to my predictions, I find that the non-
helping behaviour observed by No Intervention participants does not have an incremental 
negative effect on overall justice perceptions, and a negative but insignificant incremental effect 
on performance. The significantly negative time trend on overall justice perceptions suggests that 
in between the pre- and post-periods, an event triggered participants to feel worse about the 
procedures and outcomes in the experiment. Further, the lack of an incremental negative effect of 
non-helping behaviour on overall justice perceptions suggests that this event was common to 
both Control and No Intervention participants. This pattern of results is strongly suggestive of 
participants in both conditions reacting negatively to the occurrence of negative exogenous 
shocks to performance in round 2 and round 3, resulting in participants failing to attain their 
goals and earn their bonus in these rounds. The finding of a directionally negative but 
insiginificant incremental effect of non-helping behaviour on performance in the post-period, 
combined with the observed positive effect of announcement on round 2 performance suggests 
that observing non-helping behaviour attenuates the positive effects of announcement. That is, 
although the announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy can sustain effort in the face of 
negative exogenous shocks to performance, once non-helping behaviour is observed, this effect 
is lost. 
The fact that explanation improved overall justice perceptions but not performance 
suggests that simply improving justice perceptions does not automatically translate into 
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improved performance. This is consistent with Colquitt et al. (2001), who point to the equivocal 
nature of findings in the justice literature with respect to this relationship. The equivocal nature 
of the findings with respect to the justice to performance relationship could owe in part to the 
manner in which distributive justice perceptions are formed. According to equity theory, 
individuals arrive at distributive justice perceptions by comparing the ratio of their outputs to 
inputs (Adams, 1965). This rational approach to examining outputs to inputs may lead 
participants to take a measured approach to updating effort choices in response to improved 
distributive justice perceptions, only increasing effort when the marginal benefits exceed the 
marginal cost. In contrast, using social exchange theory as a lens (Cropanzano and Prehar 1999), 
procedural justice indicates to employees that they are valued members of the firm, which is 
reciprocated through high task effort. Importantly, unlike equity theory’s conception of 
distributive justice, it is not based on consideration of output to input ratios, and improvements in 
procedural justice may result in effort improvements with little regard to the marginal costs and 
benefits of effort provision.  
The results of my model testing show that my theoretical model has inferior fit to an 
alternative expectancy-based model of performance. In this alternative model, the effects of my 
fairness interventions on performance are mediated not only by justice perceptions, but also by 
expectancies. The rationale behind this alternative model is that when individuals feel fairly 
treated, the effort-performance relationship is reinforced, resulting in greater effort provision. In 
testing this model, I observe significant and positive indirect effects of both explanation and 
perspective taking on performance. This, combined with the findings in H3 of no overall effect 
of explanation on performance, suggests that there is some lingering negative direct effect of 
explanation on performance masking the significant indirect effect.   
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In the examination of my research question, I find interactive effects of explanation and 
perspective taking on procedural and distributive justice perceptions. I find that the nature of 
these interactive effects is suggestive of the two interventions being substitutes. Based on the 
above discussion, equity theory may predict a more rational response to my fairness 
interventions, such that if individuals perceive equitable output to input ratios in response to one 
intervention, there is little scope for the other intervention to improve or deteriorate overall 
justice perceptions.   
6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
 A limitation of my study is that based on the sample sizes per cell, I may have not had 
adequate power to observe some of my hypothesized effects, resulting in my failure to find 
support for some of my hypotheses. This applies primarily to H1 and H2, as well as H3b. 
However, I do not believe lack of power played a significant role in my failure to observe my 
predicted effects, since in each of these cases, I observe an insignificant effect directionally 
opposite to my predictions (and thus cannot perform conventional power analyses). Nonetheless, 
I cannot rule out that lack of power contributed to my failure to observe my predicted effects for 
these hypotheses. 
In the preceding section, I discussed two possible reasons for my inability to observe a 
positive announcement effect on justice perceptions, the first being that participants may have 
reacted negatively to the zero-sum nature of goal adjustments, undermining the possible positive 
impact of the announcement. This is an important setting to study, since Baiman and Rajan 
(1995) acknowledge that employees may react negatively to the zero-sum nature of ex-post goal 
adjustments in a fixed bonus pool setting. Unfortunately, due to the fact that the zero-sum nature 
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of adjustments is perfectly confounded with the availability of adjustments in my experiment, I 
cannot assess whether the failure to find a positive announcement effect on justice perceptions is 
due to participants reacting negatively to the zero-sum nature of adjustments, representing a 
limitation of my study. Future research can examine whether the zero-sum nature of ex-post 
adjustment policies impacts employee reactions to the announcement of these policies.  
The second explanation discussed in the preceding section for my failure to find support 
for H1a was that uncertainty over how the policy would be enacted blunted participant responses 
to the announcement. I conjectured that this uncertainty would likely be related to prior beliefs 
about and interactions with management, but by design, I provide participants no information 
about their prior relationship with management as to not overcomplicate my experiment, and so 
could not test this possibility in my experiment. This represents a limitation of my study. Future 
research could examine the moderating role of prior relationships on the effect of both the 
announcement of and enactment of ex-post adjustment policies. On the one hand, it is possible 
that a strong, positive prior relationship between employee and management could strengthen the 
initial announcement effect. On the other hand, this strong, positive prior relationship may make 
subsequent management inaction feel more like a betrayal, exacerbating the negative reaction to 
management inaction. 
In my tests of H3 and H4, I observe a complex pattern of results, whereby explanation 
improved overall justice perceptions, but not performance, whereas perspective taking improves 
both. I conjectured that the difference in how distributive and procedural justice perceptions are 
formed may affect the overall justice to performance relationship such that improvements to 
procedural justice may lead to improvements in performance despite questionable returns on 
costly effort. Because I do not manipulate the cost of effort in my study, I cannot test this 
141 
 
conjecture. This is an important phenomenon to examine, since fairness interventions cost 
valuable time and money to implement, and firms should target the dimension of justice 
perceptions that are most likely result in returns in the form of improved employee performance. 
Future research could examine how the nature of fairness interventions target different 
dimensions of justice perceptions, and how this in turn affects employee performance. 
 One of the key contributions of my study is in developing a novel fairness intervention 
based on perspective taking through shared experience. I also believe this to be one of the most 
fruitful avenues for future research. Future research could examine whether such a perspective 
taking intervention can be applied to reduce other cognitive biases, such as surrogation, which 
describes the tendencies for employees to conflate performance measures with the strategic 
construct of interest (Choi et al. 2012). Future research could also examine possible moderators 
of the perspective taking performance relationship, such as prior relationships between the 
perspective taker and the target. Conceivably, if the prior relationship between the perspective 
taker and the target is negative, then increasing the availability of the target’s internal state may 
have the unintended consequence of actually worsening performance as it may trigger employees 
to recall past negative interactions. 
6.4 Contributions and Concluding remarks 
I believe my study makes several important contributions to management accounting and 
psychology research. First, I contribute to a small but growing literature on how ex-post 
adjustments influence employee performance. To the best of my knowledge, there are only a 
handful of studies examining this phenomenon (Kelly et al. 2015, Arnold and Artz 2015, Burt et 
al. 2019, and Cai et al. 2019). Further, I am unaware of any such studies that examine the period 
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between the announcement of an ex-post adjustment policy and its enactment as I do in my 
study. As discussed in my literature review, this is an important setting to study, since there can 
be considerable time between when such policies are announced, and when they are first enacted, 
especially if the organization sets employee goals with long time horizons, such as in the case of 
annual performance targets. My finding of a positive announcement effect on performance 
suggests that employees respond to the content of announcements by changing effort choices, 
contributing to our understanding of how employees react to unverifiable signals from 
management. Further, this finding suggests that the mere existence of these policies may be 
sufficient in motivating performance in the face of negative exogenous shocks to performance, 
which is the intended purpose of such a policy.   
In addition, the above studies focus on settings where ex-post adjustments are available 
and exercised, whereas I focus on situations where adjustments are available and not exercised. 
As discussed in my literature review, this is an important setting to study, since in practice, such 
policies are exercised selectively (Höppe and Moers 2011; Bol et al. 2015), and this selective 
exercise may undermine the positive announcement effects described above. However, I find that 
even when management decides not to exercise ex-post adjustments, this observed non-helping 
behaviour does not significantly worsen justice perceptions, and only directionally worsens 
performance. This suggests that the existing management practice of selectively exercising ex-
post adjustments may not be detrimental to employee justice perceptions and performance, 
possibly contributing to the low rate at which these adjustments are exercised in practice. 
My study also contributes to organizational justice research by examining the effects of 
explanation and perspective taking on justice perceptions. Although explanations have been 
studied extensively by psychologists (e.g. Bies and Moag 1986; Bies and Shapiro 1988; Colquitt 
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and Chertkoff 2002), I contribute to this literature by demonstrating that explanation can 
suppress the positive effects of perspective taking. Further, by demonstrating that explanation 
can be effective at improving justice perceptions but is not effective at improving performance in 
my setting, I contribute to the literature highlighting the equivocal nature of the justice 
perception to performance relationship described by Colquitt et al. (2001). Further, I shed some 
light onto the equivocal nature of this relationship by showing through my mediation analyses 
that the justice to performance relationship is mediated through expectancy.  
I also contribute to organizational justice and perspective taking literature by 
demonstrating that perspective taking can be used as an effective fairness intervention, building 
on work by Epley et al. (2006). To the best of my knowledge, I am one of the few studies 
examining the use of perspective taking as a fairness intervention in an organizational setting, 
and the first to demonstrate its use as a performance management tool. This represents a 
significant contribution, since as described in my hypotheses development, perspective taking 
has the capacity to directly combat egocentric bias, which can undermine the effectiveness of 
other fairness interventions, such as explanation. This makes perspective taking an excellent 
candidate as a fairness intervention in situations where employees’ limited perspective causes 
them to doubt the legitimate motives of management, since perspective taking should 
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IV. Coding Protocol 
Code Assigned CogPT 
0 
Participant rationale and explanation for adjustment does not demonstrate 
an understanding that using goal adjustments to help the underperforming 
employee materially hurts the top performing employee. Response only 
references impact on bottom performing employee. Participant suggests 
an adjustment to the top performing employee of 2 or greater. 
1 
Participant rationale and explanation for adjustment does not demonstrate 
an understanding that using goal adjustments to help the underperforming 
employee materially hurts the top performing employee, but does not 
suggest an adjustment to the top performing employee of 2 or greater. 
2 
Participant rationale clearly demonstrates an understanding that using 
goal adjustments to help the underperforming employee materially hurts 
the top performing employee. 
 
Code Assigned Group 
0 
Participant response only references impact of goal adjustments on 
individual level outcomes, does not mention impact of adjustment on 
group as a whole.  
1 
Participant response only directly references impact of goal adjustments 
on individual level outcomes, but response indicates that participant 
considered group outcomes. 
2 
Participant response directly references impact of goal adjustments on 
employees as a group. 
 
